<unnamed>

Public Key

npub1wwmwdup5f2zpztry6805ympat8gpmtgdr0yuv5pu48rnt08un9vsg84enl

Profile Code

nprofile1qqs88dhx7q6y4pq393jdrh6zds74n5qa45x3hjwx2q72n3e4hn7fjkgpz3mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuerpd46hxtnfduqs6amnwvaz7tmwdaejumr0dskgmz7r

Publishing to

relay.pocketstr.com

relay.damus.io

nos.lol

Last Notes

2023-06-07 13:45:01 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2013-04-09
📝 Original message:On 4/9/2013 4:09 AM, Peter Todd wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 09, 2013 at 12:42:12PM +0200, Mike Hearn wrote:
>> hack by changing the protocol. Nodes can serve up blocks encrypted under a
>> random key. You only get the key when you finish the download. A blacklist
> NAK
>
> Makes bringing up a new node dependent on other nodes having consistent
> uptimes, particularly if you are on a low-bandwidth connection.
>
>> can apply to Bloom filtering such that transactions which are known to be
>> "abusive" require you to fully download the block rather than select the
>> transactions with a filter. This means that people can still access the
> NAK
>
> No blacklists
>
It depends on how clever the spammers get encoding stuff. If law
enforcement forensic tools can pull a jpeg header + child porn out of
the blockchain, then there's a problem that needs mitigation.