<unnamed>

Public Key

npub1wh6j4sjw7nc97f64slljrznfexaekvzk4s0zq60erztskmtagvxsq4v3gj

Profile Code

nprofile1qqs8taf2cf80fuzlya2c0lep3f5unwumxpt2c83qd8u339ctd475xrgpz4mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn0wd68ytnwv46qz9rhwden5te0wfjkccte9ejxzmt4wvhxjmcpp4mhxue69uhkummn9ekx7mqg5yz68

Publishing to

relay.nostr.net

relay.damus.io

nos.lol

Last Notes

2023-06-07 20:16:30 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2019-02-17
📝 Original message:In Wasabi wallet we are in the finishing line of an encryption manager.
I'll ask the OP to review your BIP and probably I'll do it myself, too
before I'd merge. Feel free to review/test our PR, too:
https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/pull/1127
On Sun, Feb 17, 2019 at 6:01 PM Christopher Gilliard via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> I have written up a proposed BIP. It has to do with Signature formats when
> using Bitcoin Private keys. It is here:
> https://github.com/cgilliard/BIP/blob/master/README.md
>
> This BIP was written up as suggested in this github issue:
> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/10542
>
> Note that the proposal is inline with the implementation that Trezor
> implemented in the above issue.
>
> Any feedback would be appreciated. Please let me know what the steps are
> with regards to getting a BIP number assigned or any other process steps
> required.
>
> Regards,
> Chris
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
--
Best,
Ádám
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2023-06-07 20:16:17 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2019-02-04
📝 Original message:Unlike mouse movement it works in a CLI software, which is great. However,
isn't there something else you can use instead of cards? Something with
invariant culture and maybe more common.
On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 7:27 PM Ryan Havar via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> More of a shower-thought than a BIP, but it's something I've long wish
> (hardware) wallets supported:
>
> ---
>
> Abstract: Bitcoin Wallets generally ask us to trust their seed generation
> is both correct and honest. Especially for hardware and air gapped wallets,
> this is both a big ask and more or less impossible to practically verify.
> So we propose a bring-your-own-entropy approach in which the wallet can
> function completely deterministically. Our method is based on shuffling
> physical deck of cards. There are 52! (2^219.88) different shuffle order,
> which is a big enough space to be secure against collision and brute force
> attacks. Conveniently a shuffled deck of cards also can serve as a physical
> backup which is easy to hide in plain sight with great plausible
> deniability.
>
>
> Representation:
>
> Each card has a suit which can be represented by one of SCHD (spades,
> clubs, hearts, diamonds) and a value of one of 23456789TJQKA where the
> numbers are obvious and (T=ten, J=jack, Q=queen, K=king, A=ace) so "7 of
> clubs" would be represented by "7C" and a "Ten of Hearts" would be
> represented with "TH".
>
> An deck of cards looks like:
>
>
> 2S,3S,4S,5S,6S,7S,8S,9S,TS,JS,QS,KS,AS,2C,3C,4C,5C,6C,7C,8C,9C,TC,JC,QC,KC,AC,2H,3H,4H,5H,6H,7H,8H,9H,TH,JH,QH,KH,AH,2D,3D,4D,5D,6D,7D,8D,9D,TD,JD,QD,KD,AD
>
> And can be verified by making sure that every one of the 52 cards appears
> exactly once.
>
>
> Step 1. Shuffle your deck of cards
>
> This is a lot harder than you'd imagine, so do it quite a few times, with
> quite a few different techniques. It is advised to do at *least* 7 good
> quality shuffles to achieve a true cryptographically secure shuffle. Do not
> look at the cards while shuffling (to avoid biasing) and don't be afraid to
> also shuffle them face down on the table. Err on the side over
> over-shuffling.
> See also:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shuffling#Sufficient_number_of_shuffles
>
> Step 2. Write out the order (comma separated)
>
> And example shuffle is:
>
>
> 5C,7C,4C,AS,3C,KC,AD,QS,7S,2S,5H,4D,AC,9C,3H,6H,9D,4S,8D,TD,2H,7H,JD,QD,2D,JC,KH,9S,9H,4H,6C,7D,3D,6S,2C,AH,QC,TH,TC,JS,6D,8H,8C,JH,8S,KD,QH,5D,5S,KS,TS,3S
>
> Step 3. Sha512 it to create a seed
>
> In the example above you should get:
>
> dc04e4c331b1bd347581d4361841335fe0b090d39dfe5e1c258c547255cd5cf1545e2387d8a7c4dc53e03cacca049a414a9269a2ac6954429955476c56038498
>
> Step 4. Interpret it
>
> e.g. For bip32 you would treat the first 32 bytes as the private key, and
> the second 32 bytes as as the extension code.
>
>
>
>
> -Ryan
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
--
Best,
Ádám
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2023-06-07 20:15:10 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2018-11-12
📝 Original message:Thank you for all your comments. To sum up:
- There were no comments related to the implementation details.
- There are concerns about this may incentivize users to use copypaste
functionality extensively.
- A counter argument was made that crypto hijackers use the clipboard,
because that is the most convenient thing to hijack, not because they can
only hijack that and, if Bitcoin users would move to other ways of
specifying destinations, that may end up being just as an issue, too.
- The rest of the conversation was about crypto hijackers, which I think is
off topic in this thread.
Finally I'd like to note, there's already a work in progress implementation
in Wasabi: https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/pull/825
On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 1:14 AM Dmitry Petukhov via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> > > Do you know any reasonably convenient mechanism for end user to
> > > transfer an address from, say, a web page to the wallet address
> > > input field ?
> >
> > - QR code scanning of a Bitcoin URI
> > - On Android: A "bitcoin:" URI intent or a BIP70 payment message
> > intent
> > - On desktop OSes there are similar mechanisms to launch Apps from the
> > browser (e.g. for mailto: links)
>
> This works if the author of the web page thought about this, and
> created appropriate liks/qr codes. In many cases, addresses are
> just presented for users as text, to copy.
>
> People also send addresses in message apps and emails. Maybe if
> applications start to autodetect bitcoin addresses and convert them to
> bitcoin: links, there will be less need to copy-paste. But I suspect
> that this feature will not be quickly adopted by applications.
>
> > For cases where the payee is a well-known entity the BIP70 payment
> > protocol has authentication via certificates. That doesn't work for
> > the "the person in front of you is the only trust anchor you have"
> > usecase though.
>
> There are also BIP75 and BIP47 that may help, but the number of wallets
> that support these protocols is small (I think in part because of
> relative complexity of these protocols).
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
--
Best,
Ádám
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2023-06-07 20:10:02 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2018-01-23
📝 Original message:> It's quite easy to get no change with a not-dumb algorithm selecting
coins if you have a decent number of outputs well under the value
you're paying.
I have been playing around quite a lot these lines, too and created some
content that is worth to look at:
https://github.com/nopara73/ZeroLink/#coin-selection
Also, you can try a simpler privacy oriented coin control implementation
with HiddenWallet:
https://medium.com/@nopara73/coin-control-is-must-learn-if-you-care-about-your-privacy-in-bitcoin-33b9a5f224a2
--
Best,
Ádám
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