<unnamed>

Public Key

npub1sax5yz8xgp684kl9c5f4kzljunm7u569vgfvuv66xtnl2aqs664s0y4xsu

Profile Code

nprofile1qqsgwn2zprnyqar6m0ju2y6mp0ewfalw2dzkyykwxddr9el4wsgdd2cpz4mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn0wd68ytnwv46q2vyww3

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2023-06-08 01:21:54 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2023-05-24
🗒️ Summary of this message: The Ark service providers create pool transactions every 5 seconds, but it's unclear whether they replace, spend, or create separate transactions, and how they prevent ASPs from taking all the money.
📝 Original message:Hi - thanks for the Ark write up; I have a bunch of questions but here's 2:
---
Q1:
"Pool transactions are created by ark service providers perpetually
every 5 seconds"
What exactly happens every 5 seconds? From the 15.44.21-p-1080.png
diagram [1], a pool transaction is a bitcoin transaction, with all the
inputs coming from the ASP. My understanding is that every 5 seconds,
we progress from PoolTx(N) to PoolTx(N+1). Does the ASP sign a new
transaction which spends the same ASP funding inputs as the previous
pool transaction, which is a double spend or fee bump? Or does it
spend the outputs from the previous PoolTx?
In other words, does PoolTx(2) replace PoolTx(1) RBF-style, spending
the same inputs (call this method A), or does PoolTx(2) spend an
output Of Pooltx(1) such that PoolTx(1) must be confirmed in order for
PoolTx(2) to become valid (method B)? Or are they completely separate
transactions with unconflicting inputs (method C)?
When the ASP creates a pool transaction, what do they do with it? Do
they broadcast it to the gossip network? Or share it with other pool
participants?
With method A, if the ASP shares pool transactions with other people,
there Doesn't seem to be any way to ensure which PoolTx gets
confirmed, invalidating all the other ones. They're all valid so
whichever gets into a block first wins.
With method B, there seems to be a large on-chain load, with ~120
chained transactions trying to get in every block. This wouldn't play
nicely with mempool standardness and doesn't seem like you could ever
"catch up".
With method C, ASPs would need a pretty large number of inputs but
could recycle them as blocks confirm. It would cost a lot but maybe
could work.
---
Q2:
The other part I'm missing is: what prevents the ASP from taking all
the money? Before even getting to vTXOs and connector outputs, from
the diagram there are only ASP inputs funding the pool transaction.
If the pool transaction is confirmed, the vTXOs are locked in place,
since the vTXO output cannot be changed and commits to all
"constrained outs" via OP_CTV. If the pool transaction is
unconfirmed, the ASP can create & sign a transaction spending all ASP
funding inputs sending the money back to the ASP, or anywhere else.
In this case, users don't have any assurance that their vTXO can ever
turn into a real UTXO; the ASP can "rug-pull" at any time, taking all
the money in the pool. Adding other inputs not controlled by the ASP
to the transaction wouldn't seem to fix the problem, because then any
user removing their inputs would cancel the whole transaction.
More detail about how these transactions work would be appreciated, thanks!
-Tadge
[1] https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/645ae2e299ba34372614141d/6467d1f1bf91e0bf2c2eddef_Screen%20Shot%202023-05-19%20at%2015.44.21-p-1080.png

2023-06-07 20:00:52 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2017-05-10
📝 Original message:I messed up and only replied to Russel O'Connor; my response is copied below.
And then there's a bit more.
-----
Aha, Wagner's generalized birthday attack, the bane of all clever tricks!
I didn't realize it applied in this case but looks like it in fact does.
applies to this case. It would have to be a miner performing the
attack as the s-value would only be aggregated in the coinbase tx, but
that's hardly an impediment.
In fact, sketching it out, it doesn't look like the need to know m1,
m2... m_n is a big problem. Even if the m's are fixed after being
chosen based on the P1... Pn's, (in bitcoin, m always commits to P so
not sure why it's needed in the hash) there is still freedom to
collide the hashes. The R values can be anything, so getting h(m1,
R1, P1) + h(m2, R2, P2)... to equal -h(m0, R0, P0) is doable with
Wagner's attack by varying R1, R2... to get different hashes.
I *think* there is a viable defense against this attack, but it does
make the whole aggregation setup less attractive. The miner who
calculates s-aggregate could also aggregate all the public keys from
all the aggregated signatures in the block (P0, P1...), sort them and
hash the concatenated list of pubkeys. They could then multiply s by
this combo-pubkey hash (call it h(c)). Then when nodes verify the
aggregate signature, they need to go through all the pubkeys in the
block, create the same combo-pubkey hash, and multiply s by the
multiplicative inverse of the h(c) they calculate, then verify s. I
believe this breaks the Wagner generalized birthday attack because
every h(m_i, R_i, P_i)*h(c) included or omitted affects the c part of
h(m0, R0, P0)*h(c).
I'm not sure how badly this impacts the verification speed. It might
not be too bad for verification as it's amortized over the whole
block. For the miner doing the aggregation it's a bit slower as they
need to re-sort and hash all the pubkeys every time a new signature is
added. Might not be too slow.
I'm not super confident that this actually prevents the generalized
birthday attack though. I missed that attack in the previous post so
I'm 0 for 1 against Wagner so far :)
-----
Andrew: Right, commiting to all the R values would also work; is there
an advantage to using the R's instead of the P's? At first glance it
seems about the same.
Another possible optimization: instead of sorting, concatenate all the
R's or P's in the order they appear in the block. Then have the miner
commit to s*h(c)^1, the multiplicative inverse of the hash of all
those values. Then when nodes are verifying in IBD, they can just
multiply by h(c) and they don't have to compute the inverse. A bit
more work for the miner and a bit less for the nodes.
-Tadge

2023-06-07 20:00:51 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2017-05-07
📝 Original message:If / when Schnorr signatures are deployed in a future witness version, it
may be possible to have non-interactive partial aggregation of the
signatures on a per-block basis. This could save quite a bit of space. It
*seems* not to have any security problems but this mailing list is very
good at finding vulnerabilities so that type of feedback is the main reason
I'm writing :) (A quick explanation of why this is horribly broken could
save me lots of time!)
(also sorry if this has been discussed; didn't see anything)
Quick recap / context of Schnorr sigs:
There are a bunch of private keys x1, x2, x3...
multiply by generator G to get x1G = P1, x2G = P2, x3G = P3
Everyone makes their sighash m1, m2, m3, and their random nonces k1, k2, k3.
To sign, people calculate s values:
s1 = k1 - h(m1, R1, P1)x1
s2 = k2 - h(m2, R2, P2)x2
(adding the P2 into the e hash value is not in most literature /
explanations but helps with some attacks; I beleive that's the current
thinking. Anyway it doesn't matter for this idea)
Signature 1 is [R1, s1]. Verifiers check, given P1, m1, R1, s1:
s1G =? R1 - h(m1, R1, P1)P1
You can *interactively* make aggregate signatures, which requires
co-signers to build an aggregate R value by coming up with their own k
values, sharing their R with the co-signers, adding up the R's to get a
summed R, and using that to sign.
Non-interactively though, it seems like you can aggregate half the
signature. The R values are unique to the [m, P] pair, but the s's can be
summed up:
s1 + s2 = k1 + k2 - h(m1, R1, P1)x1 - h(m2, R2, P2)x2
(s1 + s2)G = R1 + R2 - h(m1, R1, P1)P1 - h(m2, R2, P2)P2
To use this property in Bitcoin, when making transactions, wallets can sign
in the normal way, and the signature, consisting of [R, s] goes into the
witness stack. When miners generate a block, they remove the s-value from
all compatible inputs, and commit to the aggregate s-value in the coinbase
transaction (either in a new OP_RETURN or alongside the existing witness
commitment structure).
The obvious advatage is that signatures go down to 32 bytes each, so you
can fit more of them in a block, and they take up less disk and network
space. (In IBD; if a node maintains a mempool they'll need to receive all
the separate s-values)
Another advatage is that block verification is sped up. For individual
signatures, the computation involves:
e = h(m1, R1, P1) <- hash function, super fast
e*P <- point multiplication, slowest
R - e*P <- point addidion, pretty fast
s*G <- base point multiplication, pretty slow
with s-aggregate verification, the first three steps are still carried out
on each signature, but the s*G operation only needs to be done once.
Instead another point addition per signature is needed, where you have some
accumulator and add in the left side:
A += R - e*P
this can be parallelized pretty well as it's commutative.
The main downside I can see (assuming this actually works) is that it's
hard to cache signatures and quickly validate a block after it has come
in. It might not be as bad as it first seems, as validation given chached
signatures looks possible without any elliptic curve operations. Keep an
aggregate s-value (which is a scalar) for all the txs in your mempool.
When a block comes in, subtract all the s-values for txs not included in
the block. If the block includes txs you weren't aware of, request them in
the same way compact blocks works, and get the full signature for those
txs. It could be several thousand operations, but those are all bigInt
modular additions / subtractions which I believe are pretty quick in
comparison with point additions / multiplications.
There may be other complications due to the fact that the witness-txids
change when building a block. TXIDs don't change though so should be
possible to keep track of things OK.
Also you can't "fail fast" for the signature verification; you have to add
everything up before you can tell if it's correct. Probably not a big deal
as PoW check comes first, and invalid blocks are pretty uncommon and quite
costly.
Would be interested to hear if this idea looks promising.
Andrew Polestra mentioned something like this in the context of CT /
mimblewimble transactions a while ago, but it seems it may be applicable to
regular bitcoin Schnorr txs.
-Tadge
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2023-06-07 19:55:04 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2017-01-03
📝 Original message:Mempool transactions have their place, but "unconfirmed" and "SPV" don't
belong together. Only a full node can tell if a transaction may get
confirmed, or is nonsense. Unfortunately all the light / SPV wallets I
know of show mempool transactions, which makes it hard to go back... (e.g.
"why doesn't your software show 0-conf! your wallet is broken!", somewhat
akin to people complaining about RBF)
So, this is easy, just don't worry about mempool filtering. Why are light
clients looking at the mempool anyway? Maybe if there were some way to
provide SPV proofs of all inputs, but that's a bit of a mess for full nodes
to do.
Without mempool filtering, I think the committed bloom filters would be a
great improvement over the current bloom filter setup, especially for
lightning network use cases (with lightning, not finding out about a
transaction can make you lose money). I want to work on it and may be able
to at some point as it's somewhat related to lightning.
Also, if you're running a light client, and storing the filters the way you
store block headers, there's really no reason to go all the way back to
height 0. You can start grabbing headers at some point a while ago, before
your set of keys was generated. I think it'd be very worth it even with
GB-scale disk usage.
-Tadge
On Tue, Jan 3, 2017 at 5:18 PM, Aaron Voisine via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Unconfirmed transactions are incredibly important for real world use.
> Merchants for instance are willing to accept credit card payments of
> thousands of dollars and ship the goods despite the fact that the
> transaction can be reversed up to 60 days later. There is a very large cost
> to losing the ability to have instant transactions in many or even most
> situations. This cost is typically well above the fraud risk.
>
> It's important to recognize that bitcoin serves a wide variety of use
> cases with different profiles for time sensitivity and fraud risk.
>
> Aaron
>
> On Tue, Jan 3, 2017 at 12:41 PM bfd--- via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.
> linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> The concept combined with the weak blocks system where miners commit
>>
>> to potential transaction inclusion with fractional difficulty blocks
>>
>> is possible. I'm not personally convinced that unconfirmed transaction
>>
>> display in a wallet is worth the privacy trade-off. The user has very
>>
>> little to gain from this knowledge until the txn is in a block.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2017-01-01 13:01, Jonas Schnelli via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>>
>> > Hi
>>
>> >> We introduce several concepts that rework the lightweight Bitcoin
>>
>> >> client model in a manner which is secure, efficient and privacy
>>
>> >> compatible.
>>
>> >>
>>
>> >> The BFD can be used verbatim in replacement of BIP37, where the filter
>>
>> >> can be cached between clients without needing to be recomputed. It can
>>
>> >> also be used by normal pruned nodes to do re-scans locally of their
>>
>> >> wallet without needing to have the block data available to scan, or
>>
>> >> without reading the entire block chain from disk.
>>
>> > I started exploring the potential of BFD after this specification.
>>
>> >
>>
>> > What would be the preferred/recommended way to handle 0-conf/mempool
>>
>> > filtering – if & once BDF would have been deployed (any type,
>>
>> > semi-trusted oracles or protocol-level/softfork)?
>>
>> >
>>
>> > From the user-experience perspective, this is probably pretty important
>>
>> > (otherwise the experience will be that incoming funds can take serval
>>
>> > minutes to hours until they appear).
>>
>> > Using BIP37 bloom filters just for mempool filtering would obviously
>>
>> > result in the same unwanted privacy-setup.
>>
>> >
>>
>> > </jonas>
>>
>> >
>>
>> >
>>
>> > _______________________________________________
>>
>> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>
>> > bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>
>> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>>
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>>
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
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2023-06-07 19:54:41 CEST

- reply

📅 Original date posted:2016-12-04
📝 Original message:Interesting stuff! I have some comments, mostly about the header.
The header of forcenet is mostly described in Luke’s BIP, but I have made
> some amendments as I implemented it. The format is (size in parentheses;
> little endian):
>
> Height (4), BIP9 signalling field (4), hardfork signalling field (3),
> merge-mining hard fork signalling field (1), prev hash (32), timestamp (4),
> nonce1 (4), nonce2 (4), nonce3 (compactSize + variable), Hash TMR (32),
> Hash WMR (32), total tx size (8) , total tx weight (8), total sigops (8),
> number of tx (4), merkle branches leading to header C (compactSize + 32 bit
> hashes)
>
First, I'd really rather not have variable length fields in the header.
It's so much nicer to just have a fixed size.
Is having both TMR and WMR really needed? As segwit would be required with
this header type, and the WMR covers a superset of the data that the TMR
does, couldn't you get rid of the TMR? The only disadvantage I can see is
that light clients may want a merkle proof of a transaction without having
to download the witnesses for that transaction. This seems pretty minor,
especially as once they're convinced of block inclusion they can discard
the witness data, and also the tradeoff is that light clients will have to
download and store and extra 32 bytes per block, likely offsetting any
savings from omitting witness data.
The other question is that there's a bit that's redundant: height is also
committed to in the coinbase tx via bip 34 (speaking of which, if there's a
hard-fork, how about reverting bip 34 and committing to the height with
coinbase tx nlocktime instead?)
Total size / weight / number of txs also feels pretty redundant. Not a lot
of space but it's hard to come up with a use for them. Number of tx could
be useful if you want to send all the leaves of a merkle tree, but you
could also do that by committing to the depth of the merkle tree in the
header, which is 1 byte.
Also how about making timestamp 8 bytes? 2106 is coming up soon :)
Maybe this is too nit-picky; maybe it's better to put lots of stuff in for
testing the forcenet and then take out all the stuff that wasn't used or
had issues as it progresses.
Thanks and looking forward to trying out forcenet!
-Tadge
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