Nostr notes by jostric

Oh lol

2026-05-19T23:55:45Z

In reply to nevent1q…nfsq
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Oh lol

🎯 well said. Neitzshe predicted the rise of Marxism as a ...

2026-05-19T23:51:59Z

In reply to nevent1q…4etw
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🎯 well said.

Neitzshe predicted the rise of Marxism as a result of western culture moving away from god and using inferior substitute.

Why does it say May Rothbard and not Murray Rothbard? Or does he ...

2026-05-19T21:15:16Z

In reply to nevent1q…fvc7
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Why does it say May Rothbard and not Murray Rothbard? Or does he go by May too

Cloaked Wireless is nice.

2026-04-29T15:04:04Z

In reply to nevent1q…lmuc
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Cloaked Wireless is nice.

Start9 version 0.4.0 hosted at home plus Start Tunnel on a VSP is ...

2026-04-28T00:02:20Z

In reply to nevent1q…qfuw
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Start9 version 0.4.0 hosted at home plus Start Tunnel on a VSP is supposed to make hosting websites easy without doxing your home IP. They have similar selfhosted sites to GitHub. I might give a blog/store a try, use btcpay. I'm just waiting on some new hardware.

I'd be interested to know if that's how it worked

2026-04-27T01:28:23Z

In reply to nevent1q…pfun
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I'd be interested to know if that's how it worked

I do get acting vibes from him the more I hear him speak, not ...

2026-04-16T17:10:49Z

In reply to nevent1q…3zxw
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I do get acting vibes from him the more I hear him speak, not sure if it's just my bias.

That's an excellent point. KYC defeats the purpose of money. ...

2026-04-09T15:46:21Z

That's an excellent point. KYC defeats the purpose of money.

quoting
nevent1q…a8zq
KYC is economic illiteracy note1nm4…rhc2

#nevent1q…r3n3

2026-04-08T23:50:16Z

quoting
nevent1q…r3n3
Joe Rogan: "There's some talk about journalists getting in trouble for leaking information about the downed pilot and that they want to prosecute these journalists."

"At the same time, no one’s being prosecuted for the Epstein files."

How does this compare to SimpleX ?

2026-04-08T18:25:42Z

In reply to nevent1q…w9r5
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How does this compare to SimpleX ?

Thanks for the interesting read. #naddr1qq…8lq8

2026-04-05T03:08:01Z

Thanks for the interesting read.

quoting
naddr1qq…8lq8

Bitcoin publishes every transaction to every participant in the network, permanently. The amounts, the addresses, the timing, the relationships between inputs and outputs: all of it sits in a data structure that anyone with an internet connection can query, analyze, and cross-reference until the end of time. This was a necessary tradeoff. In 2009, the only known way to achieve trustless consensus over a digital currency was to make every transaction visible to every node, letting the entire network verify that no coins were created from nothing and that the 21 million supply cap held. The transparency was never the goal. It was the cost of solving the double-spend problem without a central authority, and it produced a financial surveillance apparatus that would make any intelligence agency weep with envy if a government had built it.

What has changed in the years since is that newer protocols and cryptographic techniques have proven this cost was specific to the first generation of solutions, not inherent to the problem itself. You can verify monetary integrity without seeing every transaction and prove a state transition is valid without revealing its contents. The tools exist now. The approaches that have emerged diverge so dramatically in architecture, cryptographic foundations, and practical guarantees that comparing them requires more than a feature matrix. Each makes a bet about where in the stack privacy should live and how many other users you can hide among. That last variable, the anonymity set, turns out to be the single factor separating adequate plausible deniability from full untraceability.

The Transparent Baseline

Understanding what these systems protect against requires understanding what Bitcoin exposes by default. The UTXO model organizes ownership around discrete chunks of value: unspent transaction outputs that function like individual bills in a wallet. When you spend bitcoin, you consume one or more UTXOs as inputs and create new UTXOs as outputs. The blockchain records every such transformation with permanent, global visibility.

Chain analysis firms exploit several heuristics that work with disturbing reliability on this raw data. The common-input-ownership heuristic assumes that all inputs to a single transaction belong to the same entity, because constructing a transaction typically requires the private keys for every input. The change-output heuristic identifies which output is the payment and which is change returning to the sender, often by examining round numbers, address types, or which output gets spent next. Address reuse, still depressingly common, links transactions to the same controller across time. Combined with external data from exchanges, merchants, and leaked databases, these heuristics construct maps of financial activity detailed enough to satisfy law enforcement subpoenas and, increasingly, to sell as commercial products.

The privacy systems that follow are all, in one way or another, attempts to shatter these heuristics.

CoinJoin and the WabiSabi Protocol

CoinJoin is the oldest and most direct approach to Bitcoin privacy. Multiple users combine their transactions into a single large transaction so that the common-input-ownership heuristic breaks down: the inputs belong to different people, but the transaction structure makes it impossible to determine which input funded which output. If five participants each contribute one input and each receive one output of the same denomination, the transaction has 120 valid interpretations. An analyst looking at the blockchain cannot determine which mapping is real.

WabiSabi, the protocol deployed in Wasabi Wallet since version 2.0, solved the major practical limitation of earlier CoinJoin implementations. Classical CoinJoin required fixed denominations: every output had to be exactly the same amount, and any leftover value became "toxic change" linked back to your identity. WabiSabi replaces blind signatures with keyed-verification anonymous credentials carrying homomorphic amount commitments. Participants register inputs and receive credential tokens whose attributes are Pedersen commitments to amounts. Because Pedersen commitments are additively homomorphic, the coordinator can verify that total outputs do not exceed total inputs by checking a relationship between commitments, without ever learning any individual amount. Outputs can be any value. Toxic change disappears.

The privacy guarantee of a large WabiSabi round deserves quantification, because the numbers involved defy intuition. Consider a round with 400 inputs and 400 outputs, which is within the range of real WabiSabi transactions. An analyst trying to determine which inputs funded which outputs must solve a variant of the subset-sum problem: for each possible grouping of inputs, check whether any subset of outputs sums to the same value. This problem is #P-complete, meaning that even counting the number of valid solutions is believed to require exponential computational resources. The number of ways to partition 400 items into groups is given by the Bell number B_400, a quantity so large it dwarfs the number of atoms in the observable universe by hundreds of orders of magnitude. Even restricting the analysis to the most plausible mappings and applying every known heuristic, the combinatorial space remains computationally intractable. An analyst cannot enumerate all valid interpretations of the transaction because no computer that will ever exist can perform that enumeration. The exact Boltzmann entropy of the transaction is itself uncomputable; only lower bounds are tractable, and those lower bounds already guarantee that the probability of correctly identifying any single input-output link is vanishingly small.

Because WabiSabi allows arbitrary output amounts, every output in a round contributes to ambiguity. In the old fixed-denomination model, only the equal-amount outputs were private while the change outputs were fully linked. WabiSabi eliminates this distinction. A 0.037 BTC output could have been funded by any combination of inputs whose total exceeds that amount, with the remainder allocated to other outputs through credential reissuance on fresh Tor circuits. The coordinator verified that the math balanced using Pedersen commitment arithmetic, without ever seeing the amounts. The result is that every output in the transaction is plausibly linked to every subset of inputs whose values are consistent with the commitment equations. The analyst's problem is not finding a needle in a haystack; it is determining which of 2^400 possible haystacks is the real one.

The coordinator model deserves honest scrutiny, but its resilience also deserves recognition. WabiSabi requires a central coordinator to construct the joint transaction, and while the KVAC scheme prevents the coordinator from linking inputs to outputs within a round, the coordinator still sees that a particular Tor circuit registered a particular input. Fresh Tor circuits for output registration sever this link in practice, but the coordinator remains a point of potential failure. Coordinators have shut down under regulatory pressure, and new ones have appeared. The Wasabi team operated the original default coordinator until it closed; independent operators launched replacements, sometimes within days. The protocol's design makes this resilience structural: the coordinator code is open source, the cryptographic primitives are documented, and anyone with sufficient technical skill can run a coordinator. No single entity controls the ability to coordinate rounds, which means that shutting down CoinJoin mixing requires shutting down every coordinator simultaneously, a task that grows harder as the number of independent operators increases. The pattern resembles BitTorrent trackers: individual trackers fall, the protocol persists.

WabiSabi CoinJoin is a beautiful temporary solution with good enough results for most threat models. A typical round involves 150 to 300 inputs, creating an anonymity set that provides strong plausible deniability against commercial chain analysis. Larger rounds push the entropy into territory where even well-funded adversaries with access to specialized hardware face computational barriers that are not engineering problems but mathematical ones: the analysis is intractable because the underlying combinatorial problem is provably hard. The privacy is forward-looking: once your UTXOs have passed through a CoinJoin, analysts face this combinatorial explosion for every subsequent hop. Chain multiple rounds together and the ambiguity compounds multiplicatively, with each round's entropy building on the last.

The limitations are real and worth stating plainly. CoinJoin requires active participation; you must choose to mix, and you must wait for a round to complete. But this framing understates what Wasabi actually achieved at the wallet level: CoinJoin is the default behavior. When you deposit bitcoin into Wasabi, the wallet automatically enrolls your UTXOs in CoinJoin rounds without requiring manual intervention. The user does not need to understand ring sizes or Pedersen commitments; they deposit funds and the wallet mixes them. This matters because it suggests that Bitcoin may not need protocol-level privacy changes to achieve practical privacy for ordinary users. If the wallet layer handles mixing transparently, the base protocol's transparency becomes an implementation detail hidden behind software that makes the right choice by default. The anonymity set is still bounded by the number of participants in each round, and the privacy can be unwound by careless post-mix behavior: consolidating mixed outputs, spending them at an exchange that knows your identity, or combining mixed and unmixed UTXOs in the same transaction. Operational discipline matters. But Wasabi's design minimizes the discipline required by making the private path the path of least resistance.

Lightning: Privacy Through Transience

The Lightning Network takes an entirely different approach. Instead of obscuring on-chain transactions, it moves payments off-chain entirely. Two parties open a payment channel by locking funds in a multisignature on-chain transaction, then exchange signed commitment transactions that update the balance between them without broadcasting anything to the network. Payments route across channels through onion routing, where each hop in the path sees only the identity of the previous and next hop. When the channel eventually closes, a single on-chain transaction settles the final balance. Hundreds or thousands of intermediate payments leave no trace on the blockchain.

This gives Lightning strong payment-level privacy for the amounts and frequency of individual transactions. A routing node cannot determine whether it is forwarding a payment for a neighbor or for someone six hops away. The sender constructs the entire route and wraps payment instructions in layers of encryption, using the same onion routing principle as Tor, so that each hop peels one layer and learns only what it needs to forward the payment to the next node. The payment amount at each hop can differ (with fees), and multi-path payments split a single logical payment across several routes, further fragmenting the information available to any single observer. No routing node sees the full picture.

The privacy model breaks down at the edges and under active attack. Channel opens and closes are visible on-chain transactions that reveal the channel capacity and the two parties involved. An adversary monitoring the blockchain can map the Lightning network's channel graph with high accuracy, identifying which nodes have channels with each other and how much capital is locked in each. Unannounced channels provide some defense, hiding the channel from the public graph, but the on-chain funding transaction remains visible to anyone watching the blockchain, and sophisticated heuristics can identify Lightning channel opens by their distinctive multisignature structure.

Probing attacks represent a more active threat. An adversary sends payments designed to fail at specific points in the network, using the failure messages to deduce channel balances with high precision. By systematically probing channels, an attacker can build a real-time map of liquidity distribution across the network. When a payment routes through a probed channel and the balance shifts by the exact payment amount, the attacker can correlate sender and receiver with high confidence. Timing analysis compounds this: if an adversary controls or monitors multiple routing nodes along a path, the simultaneous arrival and departure of HTLCs (hash time-locked contracts) of the same amount within milliseconds creates a strong correlation signal. The move to PTLCs (point time-locked contracts), which use different payment preimages at each hop, will break the amount-correlation attack but not the timing correlation.

BOLT 12 and blinded paths close specific attack vectors. Blinded paths let a receiver construct an encrypted partial route from an introduction node to themselves, hiding their node identity from the sender. BOLT 12's offer protocol replaces single-use invoices with reusable payment endpoints, eliminating the correlation opportunities of BOLT 11. Together these help, but the structural tension remains: routing requires information flow, and information flow is always a potential privacy leak. The channel graph is largely public, balances can be probed, and a well-positioned adversary controlling multiple routing nodes can perform statistical correlation that grows more effective with each additional node they monitor. For ordinary commercial payments, Lightning provides adequate privacy against casual surveillance. For high-value payments where the adversary may control infrastructure, the channel-level metadata leakage is a real constraint.

Spark: Privacy From Everyone Except the Operators

Spark takes the statechain concept and scales it into a production Layer 2. The core mechanism is elegant: a Bitcoin UTXO sits in a 2-of-2 multisignature address shared between the user and a distributed operator set running FROST threshold signatures. When Alice pays Bob, the operators generate a new key share for Bob, tweak their own collective key, and destroy Alice's corresponding share. The bitcoin never moves on-chain. The UTXO stays in the same address, and an on-chain observer sees nothing at all.

This gives Spark strong on-chain privacy. Between deposit and exit, transfers produce zero blockchain footprint. A Spark UTXO looks like a normal Taproot output with no distinguishing marker. Chain analysis firms see a coin arrive at an address and eventually leave, with no information about what happened in between. Spark's "leaf" architecture extends this further by splitting and merging balances off-chain within a tree structure rooted in a single UTXO, enabling arbitrary payment amounts without the whole-UTXO limitation of classical statechains.

The privacy picture is worse than the architecture alone suggests. Spark's operators participate in every key rotation, which means they observe every amount, every sender, every receiver, every timestamp. But the surveillance extends beyond the operators. Until recently, all Spark transaction metadata was published by default to the Sparkscan block explorer API: sender and receiver addresses, amounts, counterparty details, token holdings, and historical balance curves, all queryable by anyone without authentication. Spark now offers a privacy mode that users can enable through the wallet SDK, which hides their transactions from public API queries. This is application-layer filtering, not cryptographic privacy: the operators still see everything, and the underlying data still exists in the Sparkscan database. Token transactions, including stablecoins, remain publicly visible even with privacy mode enabled.

The addressing model compounds the exposure. Spark addresses are permanently static, derived deterministically from the wallet's identity public key, meaning every Spark-to-Spark transfer and every Lightning payment links to the same permanent identifier. On the base layer, the SDK steers developers toward a single reusable deposit address per wallet and actively discourages single-use addresses in its documentation. The combination of static addresses, public-by-default metadata, and operator visibility creates a surveillance profile more detailed than a traditional bank account: the bank at least does not publish your transaction history to a public API. With two operators today, Lightspark and Flashnet, the surveillance surface is concentrated enough that a single legal demand could expose the entire network's internal transaction graph. Spark is live on mainnet with over twenty integrations. As a payment rail, it works. As a privacy tool, it protects against on-chain analysis while exposing everything to the operators and, unless users opt in to privacy mode, to anyone with an internet connection.

Ark: Batched Anonymity With a Trust Spectrum

Ark takes a different structural approach to off-chain Bitcoin. Multiple users' ownership claims aggregate into a single on-chain output called a batch output, locked by a Taproot script where all virtual UTXO owners and the operator are cosigners. Inside this output lives a tree of presigned transactions. Each user holds their branch and leaf, giving them a virtual UTXO that can be transferred off-chain, refreshed in a subsequent round, or unilaterally exited to the base layer by broadcasting the presigned transaction path.

The on-chain anonymity set is Ark's structural advantage over both Lightning and Spark. A batch round with 500 participants shares a single UTXO. An on-chain observer cannot determine how many users participate, what amounts are involved, or who owns what within the batch. Lightning channel opens reveal both parties and the capacity. Spark UTXOs exist individually on-chain even though they do not move during transfers. Ark's batch outputs compress hundreds of users into a single indistinguishable Taproot spend.

The operator visibility question is where Ark's two implementations diverge into structurally different privacy systems. Standard Ark, the Second implementation, gives the Ark Service Provider full visibility into VTXO ownership, amounts, and transaction patterns, much like Spark's operator model. Arkade, the alternative implementation, separates the operator from a signer running inside a Trusted Execution Environment. Users communicate with the TEE signer through end-to-end encrypted channels that the operator cannot decrypt. The operator coordinates rounds and manages infrastructure but cannot see what transactions the signer processes, cannot block transfers based on content, and cannot build behavioral profiles of users. The operator becomes a blind coordinator.

The TEE model introduces a different kind of trust. You must trust that the hardware enclave functions correctly, that side-channel attacks have not compromised it, and that remote attestation proves what it claims. Intel SGX has a documented history of side-channel vulnerabilities. Hardware trust is weaker than mathematical trust, which is what zero-knowledge systems provide. But it is stronger than policy trust, the promise that operators choose not to examine data they can freely access, which is all that Spark and standard Ark offer. Arkade occupies a middle position: not as strong as cryptographic privacy, not as weak as a gentleman's agreement.

Shielded Client-Side Validation: The Radical Bet

Shielded client-side validation takes the most architecturally radical position of any Bitcoin-native privacy approach: the blockchain should not contain transaction details at all. Not obscured details, not mixed details. Nothing. The chain serves purely as a timestamping and ordering service, publishing only opaque cryptographic commitments while all actual transaction data lives exclusively with the participants.

Client-side validation as a concept has roots in Peter Todd's early work and found its most developed expression in the RGB protocol. The insight is that Bitcoin transactions already support embedding arbitrary data through OP_RETURN outputs and taproot commitments. If you treat each UTXO as carrying a hidden state that only the owner knows about, you can build an entire parallel transaction system where the blockchain provides ordering and double-spend protection while revealing nothing about what is being transferred or to whom. When Alice sends RGB tokens to Bob, she creates a state transition that references her UTXO and assigns the new state to one of Bob's UTXOs. Bob validates the entire history of state transitions himself, verifying that every transfer in the chain was valid according to the contract rules. The blockchain sees only normal Bitcoin transactions with no visible indication that anything more is happening.

Shielded CSV adds a zero-knowledge layer on top of this foundation. A paper published in September 2024 proposed using proof-carrying data to make even the off-chain validation privacy-preserving. In standard client-side validation, the recipient must see the full transaction history to validate ownership, which means earlier senders lose privacy against later recipients as the chain of ownership grows. Shielded CSV wraps each state transition in a zero-knowledge proof that attests to the validity of the entire preceding history without revealing it. Bob can verify that Alice's transfer is valid without learning anything about the transactions that preceded it. The history collapses into a proof.

The development status is early. The reference implementation has five commits on GitHub and the paper is less than two years old. But the conceptual implications deserve attention. If shielded CSV matures into production software, Bitcoin gets privacy that is both cryptographically strong and protocol-compatible: no consensus changes, no soft forks, no permission from miners or node operators. The privacy layer would be an application built on top of Bitcoin's existing capabilities, invisible to the network itself. This is the purest expression of the cypherpunk principle that privacy should not require permission. The base layer does not need to know, and with shielded CSV, it would not.

Monero's Ring Signatures and RingCT

Monero approaches privacy from the opposite direction: build it into the base layer and make it mandatory for every transaction. There is no transparent mode, no opt-in shielded pool, no choice to make. Every Monero transaction applies multiple privacy mechanisms simultaneously. Ring signatures hide the real input among decoys selected from the blockchain. Stealth addresses generate a unique one-time destination for every payment, severing any visible link between transactions to the same recipient. RingCT conceals amounts behind Pedersen commitments while Bulletproofs compress the range proofs that prevent hidden inflation.

The mandatory nature of Monero's privacy eliminates the most corrosive problem facing optional-privacy systems: the shrinking anonymity set. When privacy is a choice, most users choose convenience, which means the few who opt into privacy stand out by virtue of opting in. Monero sidesteps this entirely. Every transaction looks the same as every other transaction.

The weakness is the ring size, and the attacks against it are more concrete than theoretical. Sixteen members per ring means an analyst starts with a one-in-sixteen chance of identifying the real input for any single transaction. Statistical analysis improves those odds through several well-documented techniques.

The most effective passive technique is temporal analysis: real spends tend to be recent, and while the decoy selection algorithm mimics this distribution, imperfect mimicry creates statistical leakage that lets an adversary applying Bayesian priors on output age concentrate probability mass on the two or three newest ring members, effectively shrinking the anonymity set from sixteen to perhaps four or five plausible candidates. Intersection attacks compound this: each output serves as a decoy in approximately sixteen other transactions over its lifetime, and if an adversary can identify the real spend in enough of those transactions through other means, the remaining ambiguous transaction is likely the real spend. Research by Möser et al. confirmed that for early Monero with smaller ring sizes a majority of real spends could be identified; ring size sixteen is better but still measurably weaker than the nominal one-in-sixteen. Active attacks are also viable: a flooding adversary who creates many outputs at the right time can dominate the decoy selection pool so that their known outputs constitute most of a target's ring, leaving the real spend as the only unfamiliar entry. The cost scales with outputs created and fees paid, but for a state-level adversary it is not prohibitive.

Monero's developers have responded by increasing the ring size over the years, from 4 to 7 to 11 to 16, and by improving the decoy selection algorithm (CLSAG signatures reduced transaction sizes while maintaining the same ring size, and the gamma distribution for decoy age selection was tuned to more closely match real spending patterns). But the structural limitation remains: a ring of sixteen candidates means every transaction reveals that the real input is drawn from a specific, identifiable set of sixteen outputs. The ring is a crowd, but it is a small one, and a sophisticated adversary with full blockchain access can thin it further.

FCMP++: Monero's Full-Chain Answer

Full Chain Membership Proofs, designated FCMP++, replace ring signatures with a proof system that uses the entire blockchain as the anonymity set. The concept is clean even if the cryptography is not: instead of proving that your output is one of sixteen candidates, prove that it exists somewhere in the entire set of all Monero outputs ever created. Reveal nothing about where.

The mechanism uses Curve Trees, a structure that resembles a Merkle tree but is built from elliptic curve points instead of hashes. The tree covers every output in the Monero blockchain and alternates between two elliptic curves in a "tower cycle" arrangement that enables efficient proof generation and verification. A spender constructs a proof that their output is a leaf in this tree, which the network can verify, but the proof reveals nothing about which leaf. The anonymity set jumps from 16 to millions of outputs, the entire UTXO history of the chain.

This eliminates every statistical attack that exploits ring size. There is no decoy selection to analyze because there are no decoys. The temporal analysis that narrows current rings to a handful of plausible candidates becomes meaningless when the candidate set is the entire chain. Intersection attacks fail because there are no rings to intersect. Flooding attacks fail because an adversary's outputs are lost in a sea of millions. The real spend is indistinguishable from every output that has ever existed on the chain, and the analytical techniques that chain surveillance firms have developed for current Monero become inapplicable overnight. Stealth addresses and RingCT remain in place: FCMP++ replaces only the membership proof mechanism, leaving amount hiding and destination unlinkability untouched. The result is a system where every privacy layer is mandatory and every anonymity set is maximal.

The development has passed well beyond theory. Luke Parker wrote the core Rust cryptographic library, which was archived in August 2025 after migration to the monero-oxide organization. j-berman has been submitting C++ integration pull requests to the main Monero repository since February 2026, with granular changes covering torsion clearing, ed25519 to Weierstrass curve conversions, the CurveTrees class implementation, and Rust FFI bindings. Every pull request carries an "audit pending" label and a "DO NOT MERGE" tag, which is standard Monero practice for code awaiting formal security review. A hard fork milestone exists in the repository. No launch date has been announced, but the pace of integration work suggests the code is approaching audit readiness, with mainnet activation plausible in late 2026 or 2027.

If FCMP++ ships successfully, Monero achieves what no other privacy system in this survey offers simultaneously: mandatory privacy for every transaction, an anonymity set equal to the entire output set, no trusted setup, and no opt-in fragmentation that lets statistical analysis find footholds.

Zcash: Zero-Knowledge From the Ground Up

Zcash took the most cryptographically ambitious approach from its launch in 2016: use zero-knowledge proofs to hide sender, receiver, and amount entirely. A shielded Zcash transaction publishes a proof that a valid state transition occurred, that coins moved from one owner to another with inputs equaling outputs and no double spend, all without revealing any underlying data. The blockchain stores only the proof and a nullifier that prevents the same coins from being spent twice.

The system has evolved through a sequence of shielded pools, each improving on the last. Sprout, the original pool at launch, used zk-SNARKs with a trusted setup ceremony that required six participants to generate and then destroy secret parameters called toxic waste. If every participant colluded or if no participant successfully destroyed their portion, the resulting trapdoor would allow forging proofs that create ZEC from nothing, undetectably inflating the supply. The setup is secure if even one participant was honest, but with only six participants the margin was thin. Sapling, activated in October 2018, made proof generation practical on consumer hardware, dropping the time from over a minute to a few seconds, and redesigned the key structure to support viewing keys that allow selective disclosure without spending authority. Sapling still required a trusted setup, though the Powers of Tau ceremony involved hundreds of participants and is widely considered secure.

Orchard, activated in May 2022 with Network Upgrade 5, eliminated the trusted setup entirely. Orchard uses the Halo 2 proving system, which achieves recursive proof composition without a structured reference string. No ceremony, no toxic waste, no trust assumption about any group of participants, and no degradation of proof strength over time. This is the current state of Zcash's privacy technology. Orchard remains the latest shielded pool.

Zcash's core technical challenge has always been adoption of shielded transactions. The protocol supports both transparent and shielded addresses, and the overwhelming majority of ZEC has historically lived in transparent pools. A shielded pool's anonymity set consists only of the funds actually in that pool. If 90% of ZEC is transparent, the shielded users share a much smaller crowd, and the pattern of funds moving between transparent and shielded pools creates its own metadata. When coins enter the shielded pool from a transparent address, observers know the amount and the sender. When coins exit from shielded to transparent, observers know the amount and the receiver. If the shielded pool is small enough that few transactions occur between a given deposit and withdrawal, timing and amount correlation can link the two. The shielded pool provides strong privacy only when it contains enough activity to break these correlations, and that requires a critical mass of shielded users that Zcash has struggled to achieve.

When used correctly, Zcash's shielded transactions provide strong mathematical privacy guarantees. A fully shielded Orchard transaction reveals nothing about sender, receiver, or amount to any observer, including miners, block explorers, and chain analysis firms. The zero-knowledge proof attests that the transaction is valid (inputs exist in the commitment tree, the nullifier is fresh, the value balance is correct) without revealing which inputs were consumed or what values were transferred. The nullifier system prevents double-spending: each note has a unique nullifier that is published when spent, but the nullifier cannot be linked to the note it nullifies without the spending key. Even the protocol's own developers cannot determine who sent a shielded transaction or how much it contained. Viewing keys allow selective disclosure: a user can grant a third party the ability to see incoming transactions to their address without granting spending authority or revealing outgoing transactions.

The paradox is that strong cryptographic privacy with weak adoption provides worse real-world anonymity than weaker cryptography with universal adoption. A system where privacy is optional and rarely used shrinks its own anonymity set through the corrosive cycle of opt-in: most users choose convenience, the shielded pool stays small, and the few who do use it become more conspicuous for having bothered. Zcash has been fighting this dynamic since its inception.

DarkFi: Anonymous Everything

DarkFi takes the logic of private transactions and extends it to its conclusion: if you can hide payments with zero-knowledge proofs, you can hide smart contracts, DAOs, governance votes, and atomic swaps with the same machinery. Built as an independent Layer 1 blockchain, DarkFi is designed so that anonymity is the default state of every operation on the chain, not a feature to opt into.

The technical foundation borrows directly from Zcash's research. DarkFi uses the Halo 2 proving system on the Pallas/Vesta elliptic curve cycle, the same cryptographic stack that powers Zcash's Orchard pool, which means no trusted setup. Transactions follow a Sapling-like model with mint and burn phases: minting creates a new coin commitment on-chain, burning proves a previously committed coin exists and spends it, and the zero-knowledge proof ensures validity without revealing sender, receiver, amount, or even which token type is being transferred. Pedersen commitments provide homomorphic amount hiding while an incremental Merkle tree of depth 32 supports anonymous inclusion proofs. The cryptographic guarantees for basic payments are comparable to Zcash's shielded transactions.

Where DarkFi diverges is in extending this privacy to programmable computation. Smart contracts execute in a WASM runtime, but the critical architectural difference is that ZK proofs are computed client-side and verified on-chain. The blockchain checks proofs; it does not execute computation in the clear. DarkFi provides a custom domain-specific assembly language called zkas for writing zero-knowledge circuits, compiled to bytecode that runs on a dedicated zkVM. This is not automatic privacy: contract developers must deliberately design their circuits to hide the information they want to protect. DarkFi calls this "anonymous engineering," and the framework makes privacy a conscious design choice at every layer of the application.

The anonymous DAO is the most striking application of this architecture. Governance proposals, votes, and execution all happen on-chain with member identities hidden. Token-weighted voting uses anonymous inclusion proofs to verify that a voter holds governance tokens without revealing which tokens or how many. Partial homomorphic encryption keeps vote choices private. Only the aggregate result, whether the proposal passed quorum and approval threshold, becomes visible. The DAO can call any smart contract on the chain, making it a general-purpose anonymous governance mechanism, not just a treasury manager.

DarkFi uses Proof-of-Work with Monero's RandomX algorithm, chosen because ASIC resistance keeps mining on consumer CPUs and because PoW enables fully anonymous token distribution without the airdrops or public sales that would compromise anonymity at the bootstrap layer. The project tested Ouroboros Crypsinous PoS first but abandoned it when the oligarchy dynamics of stake-based consensus proved incompatible with their design goals. Merge-mining with Monero is planned. The network layer supports TCP, Tor, and I2P transports with Nym mixnet integration planned, and a ZKSecurity audit of the core cryptographic code found the protocol "elegantly designed."

DarkFi's limitation is maturity. Testnet v0.2 alpha launched in December 2025. There is no mainnet. The codebase has nearly 11,000 commits and the project is actively seeking developers to ship a production release, but it remains pre-production software. The anonymity guarantees are strong in theory, the cryptography is sound (audited Halo 2 on a well-studied curve cycle), and the architectural ambition is real. But a privacy system that no one can use yet provides zero practical privacy, and the gap between an alpha testnet and a production chain carrying real value is measured in years of engineering, auditing, and battle-testing. DarkFi asks the right question: if we can make transactions private, why stop there? Whether it can deliver a working answer at production quality remains open.

What the Spectrum Reveals

These ten systems arrange themselves along axes that rarely align, and the reason each one falls short tells you what its designers valued most. CoinJoin accepts a bounded anonymity set as the price of working within Bitcoin's existing rules. Lightning accepts metadata leakage at channel boundaries for the ability to move payments off-chain. Spark and Ark accept operator visibility for a smooth user experience and zero on-chain footprint, with Arkade's TEE offering a partial remedy. Shielded CSV accepts years of immaturity for architectural purity. Monero accepts larger transactions and slower verification for mandatory privacy. Zcash accepts a fragmented anonymity set for giving users a choice. DarkFi accepts an unproven network for anonymous everything. No single system has solved the problem completely.

The most consequential divide may be between systems where privacy is optional and systems where it is not. Every optional-privacy system faces the same corrosive cycle: most users choose the convenient default, the privacy pool shrinks, using privacy becomes more conspicuous, which discourages further adoption, which shrinks the pool further. Mandatory privacy breaks this cycle at the cost of requiring every user to bear the computational and bandwidth overhead of private transactions whether they want privacy or not. Monero accepted that cost from the start. Zcash did not, and has been fighting the consequences ever since.

What matters is that every year the spectrum improves. CoinJoin works today. FCMP++ is in code review. Shielded CSV exists as a paper. DarkFi is on testnet. The trajectory runs in one direction: anonymity sets are growing, metadata leakage is shrinking, and the tools are getting easier to use. Ten years ago the only option for private bitcoin transactions was a manually coordinated CoinJoin with a handful of participants. Today you can choose from mixing protocols with computationally intractable entropy, payment networks with onion routing, Layer 2 systems with zero on-chain footprint, and entire blockchains where every operation is hidden behind zero-knowledge proofs. The mathematics of privacy do not respect loyalty to any particular cryptocurrency. They care about anonymity sets, metadata leakage, and whether the adversary has more patience than your privacy tool has entropy. But the builders are winning. The crowd you can disappear into gets larger every year.

Thanks I'll check it out.

2026-04-04T15:46:21Z

In reply to nevent1q…uce7
_________________________

Thanks I'll check it out.

https://frostsnap.com/ Thoughts? It's Bitcoin only, free and ...

2026-04-04T15:32:54Z

https://frostsnap.com/

Thoughts? It's Bitcoin only, free and open source, but it's not air gapped. The security model is different and allegedly is safer than passing transactions over a QR code, referencing Dark skippy attack according to their website. On the other hand most high end hardware wallets mitigate that by checking the firmware everytime it boots up like Passport or Coldcard, it's also a good practice to verify your downloads in the first place. All opinions and insults as are welcomed. I forget to mention it uses Taproot addresses. #asknostr

https://youtu.be/Y4-fq-Yr8AQ?

2026-04-02T20:31:48Z

https://youtu.be/Y4-fq-Yr8AQ?

Can normie with some self hosting experience run their own ...

2026-04-01T16:19:04Z

In reply to nevent1q…nkt2
_________________________

Can normie with some self hosting experience run their own server?

Regulation leads to centralization

2026-03-29T20:16:20Z

In reply to nevent1q…gxqe
_________________________

Regulation leads to centralization

Sadly #nevent1q…rn7z

2026-03-24T17:57:56Z

Sadly

quoting
nevent1q…rn7z
Mfers but like 20 bucks worth of btc and spend hundreds of dollars on signing devices…

https://keepandroidopen.org/ FDroid, Zapstore, degoogled phones ...

2026-03-15T19:28:37Z

https://keepandroidopen.org/

FDroid, Zapstore, degoogled phones +APK side load

🖕🏽 google

Frigate is an open source NVR, it has a dashboard for multiple ...

2026-02-15T23:17:55Z

In reply to nevent1q…9ye3
_________________________

Frigate is an open source NVR, it has a dashboard for multiple cameras and includes AI detection. The camera's are all right for the price but I'm probably not the right person to ask about camera my experience is limited. Take with grain of salt I suppose.

I've been trying out of a reolink camera, no hub. I like it ...

2026-02-15T21:38:13Z

In reply to nevent1q…9mrk
_________________________

I've been trying out of a reolink camera, no hub. I like it because you can set it to local only and you can feed the video to Frigate. I haven't tried locking the local access only with a firewall, but I know some smart devices don't work afterwards.

😆 #nevent1q…90tm

2026-01-21T17:36:16Z

😆

quoting
nevent1q…90tm
Banque de France Governor François Villeroy de Galhau: Central banks are more democratic and independent than "private issuers of bitcoin."

Brian Armstrong: "In the sense that central banks have independence, Bitcoin is even more independent. There's [no one] who controls it."

😂

2026-01-21T16:43:30Z

In reply to nevent1q…keuw
_________________________

😂

This is an old episode right? I don't really follow the show

2026-01-13T02:40:24Z

In reply to nevent1q…8kjp
_________________________

This is an old episode right? I don't really follow the show

The use different protocols and radio frequency if im not ...

2026-01-11T18:30:33Z

In reply to nevent1q…jq0e
_________________________

The use different protocols and radio frequency if im not mistaken, but I heard people talking about bridging the two together. I haven't seen anything built yet though.

I just flashed two Heltec V3 with Mehstastic firmware and I have ...

2026-01-11T18:27:29Z

In reply to nevent1q…xum7
_________________________

I just flashed two Heltec V3 with Mehstastic firmware and I have one more on order and the LilyGo T-Deck on the way. Completely new to this.

Use cash, Bitcoin, monero for businesses, break some rules ...

2026-01-06T19:53:39Z

Use cash, Bitcoin, monero for businesses, break some rules slowly.

quoting
nevent1q…p0qq
Congresswoman supports a #TaxRevolt

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YEPbrzI8sLw

This is an interesting take. Though I can all ready here some ...

2026-01-04T18:19:43Z

This is an interesting take. Though I can all ready here some maxis crying but credit is evil. To believe in freemarkets, it requires humality. It's not up to us as any individual to decide for the many. Free markets find their own solutions to problems.

quoting
naddr1qq…ydyq

The conventional wisdom among sound money advocates runs something like this: first accumulate gold (or Bitcoin), then build an economy. But history suggests the sequence often ran backward. Lancashire built the Industrial Revolution on bills of exchange before it accumulated coin. Colonial America developed a sophisticated commercial economy while chronically drained of specie. Medieval Italian merchants created the most advanced financial system in Europe precisely because gold and silver were scarce relative to trade volumes. The credit came first; the base money followed.

This pattern reveals something important about elastic credit under sound money. The problem with a fixed monetary base is not that it prevents economic growth but that it creates friction when liquidity needs fluctuate. A merchant who has shipped goods and awaits payment has created value but lacks money. He could wait, but waiting has costs. Time preference is universal: present goods are worth more than future goods. The merchant would prefer payment now.

Before central banks existed, markets developed a solution. The merchant drew a bill of exchange on his buyer, ordering payment of a specified sum on a specified future date. This bill could circulate. The mechanism worked through three parties: the seller who drew the bill, the buyer who would eventually pay it, and an investor who purchased the bill in the interim. The investor gave up present money; the seller received present money; and the investor now held a claim on the buyer's future payment. The bill traded at a discount reflecting time preference and risk, exactly as praxeological theory would predict.

The critical point is that no new purchasing power was created in this transaction. Time preferences were transferred, not conjured from nothing. The aggregate purchasing power in the economy remained unchanged. When the bill matured, the buyer paid the holder, and the bill extinguished itself. The system was self-liquidating.

Consider Lancashire in the late eighteenth century. The cotton industry was transforming England, but the industrial north faced a peculiar problem: chronic shortage of coin and no local banks issuing notes. Henry Thornton observed in 1802 that "Liverpool and Manchester effect the whole of their larger mercantile payments not by country bank notes, of which none are issued by the banks, but by bills at one or two months due." The region that launched the Industrial Revolution ran on trade credit, not money.

What made this system remarkable was not just that it economized on scarce coin but that it could actually attract money into the region. Bills circulated freely; anyone with surplus funds could purchase them, paying coin or banknotes to acquire a claim on future payment. Banks also rediscounted bills, converting this raw commercial credit into fungible banknotes that circulated more easily. Lancashire produced cotton textiles; those textiles were exported; and through this commerce, money flowed back to the industrial north. The bills enabled production that generated the revenues to retire them. Far from being inflationary, the system was self-liquidating and self-enriching.

Colonial America exhibited the same pattern. Perpetually drained of specie by mercantilist policies, the colonists developed extensive credit networks to economize on scarce money. Three-party settlements were common: if A owed B and B owed C, then B would direct A to pay C directly. The productive output of the colonies, tobacco and timber and furs shipped to the Caribbean and Europe, eventually brought Spanish dollars flowing back. By 1774, approximately three-quarters of the colonial money supply consisted of specie that had been accumulated through persistent trade surpluses built on credit.

These examples reveal a two-layer monetary architecture: an inelastic base of hard money and an elastic layer of credit instruments that expands and contracts with the needs of trade. The layers remained distinct because bills were not money. They were acknowledged claims on future money, and they traded at a discount that made this explicit. When a merchant accepted a bill for 98 pounds against a face value of 100 pounds due in sixty days, he understood he was exchanging present goods for future payment minus interest. The discount was the price of time made visible. No one confused the bill with coin in hand.

This distinction enabled automatic regulation of the credit layer without any central authority. When commerce expanded, whether due to seasonal harvest cycles, new trade routes, or general prosperity, more bills entered circulation. Merchants drew on buyers, investors purchased the bills, and the credit layer swelled to accommodate the activity. When commerce contracted, outstanding bills matured and were paid while fewer new bills were drawn. The credit layer deflated naturally. The monetary base, meanwhile, remained untouched throughout these fluctuations.

The market also disciplined excessive bill creation through the discount rate. If merchants drew too many bills relative to the pool of investors willing to hold them, bill prices fell, which is to say discount rates rose. A bill that might trade at 98 in normal times might fetch only 95 when credit was overextended. Higher discounts meant higher effective interest rates, which discouraged marginal borrowers and throttled new issuance. Conversely, when trade was slack and money plentiful relative to bills, discounts narrowed, making credit cheaper and encouraging its use. The system breathed with the rhythms of commerce, requiring no central bank to manage the money supply because the money supply was not being managed at all. Only the credit layer fluctuated, and it regulated itself through price signals.

The essential requirement is that the credit must be backed by real, exportable production. Bills drawn on anticipated output of goods that can be sold externally are genuinely self-liquidating because export revenues eventually settle them. Bills drawn to finance consumption or speculation, by contrast, create obligations without the means to discharge them. The market institution worked because merchants understood this distinction and because each endorser of a circulating bill added his own liability, creating strong incentives against drawing or accepting dubious paper.

The implications for sound money advocates are significant. Bitcoin maximalists sometimes imagine that adoption requires first accumulating sufficient Bitcoin to run an economy, as if the monetary base must precede commercial development. But the historical pattern suggests the opposite sequence is possible. A community with productive capacity but little base money can use credit instruments internally, export goods and services for Bitcoin, and gradually accumulate the monetary base through trade surpluses. The bills enable the production that earns the coin.

This means credit can exist without money creation, and elasticity can exist without central banks. Lancashire's cotton magnates knew something that modern monetary theorists have forgotten: you do not need money to build an economy, but you do need credit that honestly represents future production. The merchants of medieval Italy knew it too. Their bills of exchange system enabled cashless payments across Europe for centuries. We have merely forgotten what they knew.

The sequence is not coin then commerce, but commerce then coin, mediated by credit instruments that transfer time preferences rather than manufacture purchasing power. A Bitcoin economy need not wait until sufficient coins have been accumulated. Productive communities can bootstrap themselves into sound money through the honest representation of future claims, just as Lancashire bootstrapped itself into industrial dominance on nothing but bills of exchange and exportable cloth.

Oh okay, that make sense. I agree that's the ideal way

2026-01-01T20:27:41Z

In reply to nevent1q…6fjc
_________________________

Oh okay, that make sense. I agree that's the ideal way

I have a similar setup minus the non ISP modem, is your setup ...

2026-01-01T18:33:39Z

In reply to nevent1q…nm6u
_________________________

I have a similar setup minus the non ISP modem, is your setup have an additional security or privacy benift or is just more like redundancy? I ask because I thought Opnsense would just take care of ISP from monitoring what devices are on your network and a VPN will encrypt the data packets from them inspecting them.

Sounds interesting #naddr1qq…kw2j

2026-01-01T04:57:36Z

Sounds interesting

quoting
naddr1qq…kw2j

Location-Independent Infrastructure Using NCC-02, NCC-05, and NCC-06

Most internet services still rely on DNS as the root of discovery and trust. Even systems that describe themselves as decentralised often fall back to domain names, certificate authorities, and fixed hostnames once you look closely at how clients actually connect.

This article explores how services can function without DNS at all, using patterns that emerged from the Nostr ecosystem and were formalised through NCC-02, NCC-05, and NCC-06. While these conventions originated alongside Nostr, they are not limited to relays or social protocols. The same approach applies to content systems such as IPFS, media services like Blossom, private APIs, admin panels, and self-hosted infrastructure operating in unreliable or hostile networks.

The shift is subtle but significant. Instead of asking which domain should I connect to, clients ask which service key am I trying to reach.

Why DNS Becomes a Liability

DNS was designed for a network where services were relatively static, operators were identifiable, and intermediaries were trusted by default. None of those assumptions reliably hold today.

A DNS-based service is tightly coupled to external authorities: registrars, certificate issuers, recursive resolvers, and often hosting providers. Blocking or interference at any of these layers is usually sufficient to disrupt access. Even when services use literal IP addresses, DNS frequently re-enters indirectly through TLS validation, discovery mechanisms, or bootstrap endpoints.

The problem is not that DNS fails occasionally. The problem is that DNS collapses naming, trust, and location into a single fragile abstraction.

Identity First, Location Second

NCC-02, NCC-05, and NCC-06 deliberately separate these concerns.

In this model, a service is defined by a cryptographic public key. That key represents identity and continuity. Where or how the service is reachable becomes contextual information rather than a defining property.

Endpoints are treated as descriptive hints, not authoritative truth. Resolution becomes a matter of retrieving signed data and applying deterministic rules, rather than trusting a global naming hierarchy.

This is the same conceptual shift Nostr made for users, applied consistently to services.

NCC-02: Service Records as Signed Intent

NCC-02 introduces the concept of a service record. A service record is a signed statement published by the service operator, asserting that a given public key represents a specific service and optionally describing how it may be reached.

Crucially, NCC-02 does not require a hostname, nor does it assume public reachability. A record may list multiple endpoints, a single endpoint, or none at all. It may change over time without breaking identity.

From the client’s perspective, a service record answers only one question. If this key is trusted, what does the operator currently claim about this service?

NCC-05: Reachability Without Exposure

NCC-05 extends the model by allowing endpoint information to be encrypted and scoped.

Many services should not expose their location publicly. Admin interfaces, private relays, region-restricted backends, and censorship-sensitive deployments all benefit from being discoverable without being globally reachable.

With NCC-05, a service can publish its existence openly while revealing connection details only to authorised clients. Onion addresses can be preferred without advertising them. IPv4 or IPv6 endpoints can exist purely as fallback. Endpoint ordering expresses operator intent rather than promise.

An observer may learn that a service exists without learning how to reach it. DNS has no way to express that distinction.

NCC-06: Resolution as Data Retrieval

NCC-06 describes how clients turn published records into an actual connection attempt.

Rather than querying a central resolver or directory, clients retrieve signed service records from relays. Multiple relays may carry the same records. Records may be stale, partial, or conflicting.

Instead of treating these conditions as errors, NCC-06 treats them as expected states. Clients verify signatures, discard expired data, apply deterministic conflict resolution, and select the best reachable endpoint they can see.

Resolution becomes a data problem, not a naming problem. If nothing is reachable, the service is considered unavailable rather than broken.

How This Differs From Existing Approaches

The distinction becomes clearer when compared to existing systems.

Traditional DNS and TLS rely on human-readable names backed by central authorities. ENS replaces registrars with a blockchain but still treats names as the primary abstraction, often routing users back to DNS-hosted endpoints. Tor onion services derive addresses from keys, but operate entirely within the Tor ecosystem and do not generalise cleanly across mixed transports.

IPFS excels at content addressing, but when services are layered on top, DNS-based gateways frequently reappear. Blossom media servers today typically rely on standard URLs and HTTPS, inheriting the same structural fragility as conventional web services.

NCC differs by identifying services themselves by keys, not content and not names, and resolving reachability using signed data rather than global lookup infrastructure.

What This Model Does Not Solve

Being explicit about limits matters.

This approach does not solve the first-contact trust problem. If a client is given the wrong service key, it will resolve the wrong service correctly. This is not unique to NCC. The same bootstrap problem exists with domain names, TLS certificates, ENS names, and onion addresses. Initial trust establishment remains a social or application-layer concern.

It does not eliminate traffic analysis. NCC-05 can hide endpoint details, but it does not make network traffic invisible. Timing and connection metadata remain observable, even when Tor is used. The goal is to reduce resolution visibility, not to defeat a global passive adversary.

It does not make denial-of-service attacks impossible. Relays can be flooded and endpoints can be exhausted. What NCC provides instead is graceful degradation through multiple resolution paths and cached records, without a single resolver whose failure breaks the system.

The model also deliberately avoids human-readable naming. Keys are not memorable, and that is a trade-off. Naming systems can exist on top, but NCC keeps naming out of the trust path to avoid reintroducing the same fragility.

Finally, this is not a universal replacement for DNS. DNS remains effective for public websites and mass-market discovery. NCC is intended for environments where mobility, privacy, and resistance to interference matter more than convenience.

The Structural Shift

What NCC-02, NCC-05, and NCC-06 describe is not a new protocol layer so much as a design pattern.

Services publish signed intent. Clients resolve by retrieving and validating data. Trust is anchored in keys, not names.

Once this separation is made explicit, DNS stops being foundational. It becomes optional infrastructure rather than an assumed root of trust.

That change is small in implementation, but significant in consequence.

Closing Note: A Pattern, Not a Platform

Although NCC-02, NCC-05, and NCC-06 emerged from the Nostr ecosystem, the ideas they encode are not tied to Nostr itself. They describe a general infrastructure pattern for service discovery and reachability in environments where DNS is fragile, politicised, or simply unavailable.

The pattern is portable. Any system that can sign data, publish it to a retrievable medium, and verify signatures can adopt the same approach. Nostr provides a convenient substrate today, but it is not a prerequisite.

Seen this way, the value of these conventions is not that they replace DNS everywhere, but that they demonstrate how services can function cleanly without it when required. They make explicit a separation that has long been implicit: identity does not need to imply location, and discovery does not need to depend on names.

That distinction is likely to become more important, not less, as services continue to become more mobile, more private, and more contested at the network edge.

References

NCC-02 – Service Records https://github.com/imattau/ncc-02

NCC-05 – Dynamic and Encrypted Locators https://github.com/imattau/ncc-05

NCC-06 – Service Resolution and Sidecar Publishing https://github.com/imattau/ncc-06

npm Libraries

Reference implementations of the NCC conventions are also available as JavaScript libraries on npm. These are intended for client applications, tooling, and sidecar services rather than for defining the specifications themselves.

ncc-02-js https://www.npmjs.com/package/ncc-02-js

ncc-05-js https://www.npmjs.com/package/ncc-05-js

ncc-06-js https://www.npmjs.com/package/ncc-06-js

The libraries provide typed helpers, validation logic, and record-handling utilities aligned with the conventions, and are suitable for use in browsers, Node.js clients, and service sidecars.

#Nostr #DecentralisedInfrastructure #ProtocolDesign #DistributedSystems #ServiceDiscovery #CryptographicIdentity #PrivacyEngineering #CensorshipResistance #IPFS #Tor #SelfHosted #EdgeInfrastructure #NetworkResilience #nostrdev

Thanks for sharing this video. Though I don't agree with your ...

2025-12-23T16:52:33Z

In reply to nevent1q…w22u
_________________________

Thanks for sharing this video. Though I don't agree with your first statement regarding them being evil. Also Imho it's also unfair for BitcoinMechanic to leave out the fact some people did reach out to help samurai users with compromised mixes. It paints picture that they were left hung dry when in actuality help was offered with their forward privacy. Perhaps helping is better than critizing. I also agree using someone elses Dojo is not the way forward. That needs stop and it's slightly disappointing it's still thing.

Touche. Your right. But my point remians the same. You do end up ...

2025-12-22T05:02:12Z

In reply to nevent1q…xmf9
_________________________

Touche. Your right. But my point remians the same. You do end up leaking information when your not running your own node. But I guess our main difference is where the responsibility lays with. I believe it's with user and you believe it's with service.

When you use Blue wallet and connect to a random electrum server ...

2025-12-22T04:47:57Z

In reply to nevent1q…2hs6
_________________________

When you use Blue wallet and connect to a random electrum server you are sharing your XPUB.

This is same thing as using someone else's Electrum server on ...

2025-12-22T04:07:57Z

In reply to nevent1q…7qec
_________________________

This is same thing as using someone else's Electrum server on Blue wallet or using some Monero wallet while connecting to someone one else's node or paying for a VPN with a credit card. But no is busty Blue wallet or Sparrows wallet's balls over the same thing.

Privacy by trust based system is something that exists whether we like or not. Ultimately the end user/consumer has to do their own homework.

You don't have use Dojo bay, you can run your own Dojo on ...

2025-12-21T23:14:22Z

In reply to nevent1q…9226
_________________________

You don't have use Dojo bay, you can run your own Dojo on Start9 and not share your xpubs with a third party.

You don't have use Dojo bay, you can run your own Dojo on ...

2025-12-21T23:13:28Z

In reply to nevent1q…8ze5
_________________________

You don't have use Dojo bay, you can run your own Dojo on Start9 and not share your xpubs with a third party.

Fuck yeah! Tucker is right on this one. #nevent1q…77u8

2025-12-19T20:25:55Z

Fuck yeah! Tucker is right on this one.

quoting
nevent1q…77u8
holy fucking shit
good for Tucker
nevent1q…vq74

Nostr event nevent1qqsvn6yjpqxvk6qdqjtckcx8cg663t48e6djr2uvqqst40gldqr5wdgzyzh6xja8m4uuf0q8avv2ad878nrd3keqzt49nmw6wd2xaeq3ar5huaptnx4

2025-12-19T20:22:38Z

https://op3.dev/e/dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/pdcn.co/e/pscrb.fm/rss/p/serve.podhome.fm/episode/df3c7f87-bdab-41fe-1438-08dbf068e250/63901570763489472015bdd496-f9fc-4031-b458-56cf4607a81f.mp3

Same for me.

2025-12-19T03:58:03Z

In reply to nevent1q…see9
_________________________

Same for me.

Another reason to ditch centralized social media. ...

2025-12-17T03:25:41Z

Another reason to ditch centralized social media.

quoting
nevent1q…m3rl
Just got a notification from X about an update to their privacy policy… Interesting…

“We’ve updated our Terms to explain that in some places, for example, the EU and UK, we may need to remove not only illegal content but also content considered harmful or unsafe under local laws.”

Thanks for using your platform to share this.

2025-12-17T03:23:17Z

In reply to nevent1q…euf7
_________________________

Thanks for using your platform to share this.

🤞🏼🤞🏼🤞🏼 #nevent1q…nhgy

2025-12-16T00:42:15Z

🤞🏼🤞🏼🤞🏼

quoting
nevent1q…nhgy
BOOM: President Trump just said he’ll look into a pardon for Keonne Rodriguez, co-founder of Samourai Wallet.

(He should also pardon Bill).

nevent1q…jnxr

Sign the petition and don't ask for permission, use Ashigaru. ...

2025-12-14T03:14:23Z

In reply to nevent1q…kvka
_________________________

Sign the petition and don't ask for permission, use Ashigaru. Simple.

He's definitely a boomer with wool pulled over his eyes.

2025-12-06T00:06:09Z

In reply to nevent1q…v8y3
_________________________

He's definitely a boomer with wool pulled over his eyes.

I wasn't referring to myself. Fiat is a failure it creates ...

2025-12-06T00:04:26Z

In reply to nevent1q…zuqv
_________________________

I wasn't referring to myself. Fiat is a failure it creates all sorts of injustices and is breeding ground for Marxism.

It works so-so? You must either live under rock or dare I say ...

2025-12-05T00:50:36Z

In reply to nevent1q…g5p9
_________________________

It works so-so? You must either live under rock or dare I say privalaged. How did you find NOSTR?

I have to agree with Lopp on this one.

2025-12-04T21:43:53Z

In reply to nevent1q…2avn
_________________________

I have to agree with Lopp on this one.

a human fight.

2025-11-30T04:42:17Z

In reply to nevent1q…lxmn
_________________________

a human fight.

https://c.org/jcWVmRZqgt

2025-11-29T17:06:41Z

https://c.org/jcWVmRZqgt

The Bitcoin Standard Podcast: 299. Property Rights: The Root of ...

2025-11-12T04:27:04Z

The Bitcoin Standard Podcast: 299. Property Rights: The Root of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Episode webpage: https://saifedean.com/podcast/

Media file: https://www.buzzsprout.com/1849151/episodes/18169755-299-property-rights-the-root-of-the-palestinian-israeli-conflict.mp3

Democracy is imperfect and both have their trade offs.

2025-11-04T17:39:13Z

In reply to nevent1q…l43n
_________________________

Democracy is imperfect and both have their trade offs.

Normally I don't unless I have no choice.

2025-11-04T02:13:59Z

In reply to nevent1q…tqxv
_________________________

Normally I don't unless I have no choice.

It would be cool if you can sign messages with OpenKeychain ...

2025-11-02T20:00:43Z

In reply to nevent1q…yjpe
_________________________

It would be cool if you can sign messages with OpenKeychain offline and then share it via QR like how some airgapped hardware wallets share their transactions

Pardon my ignorance but what's the point of building a L2 on ...

2025-10-22T00:35:56Z

In reply to nevent1q…eqk8
_________________________

Pardon my ignorance but what's the point of building a L2 on Cashu? Is there an article or post I could check out

I used to watch his youtube videos a while back when I first ...

2025-10-16T22:21:45Z

In reply to nevent1q…qmzg
_________________________

I used to watch his youtube videos a while back when I first became interested in learning about privacy. What are the implications, incompetentance, fraud or something else?

I'm asking the samething too 😆

2025-10-04T01:02:13Z

In reply to nevent1q…98jp
_________________________

I'm asking the samething too 😆

It was enjoyable listen. #nevent1q…ugpu

2025-10-04T01:01:08Z

It was enjoyable listen.

quoting
nevent1q…ugpu
Will go live with Max (npub1klk…x3vt) in 2 hours to discuss his new project: White Noise

A Nostr-based privacy messaging platform which comes at the right time to counter Chat Control in Europe.

Join us if you would like to learn more!

https://youtube.com/live/amNaZ35KIo8?feature=share

#nevent1q…rwrt

2025-09-30T16:53:34Z

quoting
nevent1q…rwrt
Google’s Android developer registration requirement will kill F-Droid

https://www.osnews.com/story/143450/googles-android-developer-registration-requirement-will-kill-f-droid/

OP_Return data is prunable, so maybe Udi's interruptation of ...

2025-09-27T20:18:14Z

In reply to nevent1q…0qf9
_________________________

OP_Return data is prunable, so maybe Udi's interruptation of Luke's message a little out there idk

If technical details is what she is lacking then that would imply ...

2025-09-27T20:04:21Z

In reply to nevent1q…zsa0
_________________________

If technical details is what she is lacking then that would imply that her story wasn't intentional slander and that it was simply ignorance in her interruption of the alleged text messages. I give her the benefit of the doubt she's not scammer, she does a lot of good reporting on global concerns in regards to privacy to which most of the Bitcoin community sadly ignores.

The Urdi's interruption of the Luke's messages is pretty nuanced in details, assuming this favorable interruption is correct. Luke's intentions is to remove CP while still maintenaning the transactions are still valid using Zero Knowledge Proofs thus avoiding the need to fork the network. Now is this technically possibly? I don't know, is the proposed solution free of contraversy? Probably not, does it reintroduce trust, yes technically clients would need to trust the people determining the filter.

But one thing is for sure ego makes it hard to admit when we are wrong, so it's unlikely for L0ala to continue this dialogue.

I don't even know Udis, just saw his his piece that he wrote. ...

2025-09-26T16:40:32Z

In reply to nevent1q…hw39
_________________________

I don't even know Udis, just saw his his piece that he wrote. I don't even run knots. Your soul searching comment is not helpful. Just provide an actual counter argument to the piece. What Udis wrote is plausible, it could be possible wrong too.

@nprofile…7z5t any comments?

2025-09-26T14:46:33Z

In reply to nevent1q…70q2
_________________________

L0laL33tz (nprofile…7z5t) any comments?

@nprofile…thz4 Thanks for taking the time to write this piece. ...

2025-09-26T14:40:53Z

In reply to nevent1q…70q2
_________________________

udi (nprofile…thz4) Thanks for taking the time to write this piece. It seems truth lays within in the middle, within the details and within the right context.

#nevent1q…73c5

2025-09-23T01:20:37Z

quoting
nevent1q…73c5
The gaslighting and refusal to release the Epstein Files is one of the few times that the general public cannot ignore that there are two systems of justice in America. One for the rich and powerful and one for everyone else. It is right in front of their faces and they barely blink.

It's a good read, some valid points were made. ...

2025-09-22T01:00:01Z

It's a good read, some valid points were made.

quoting
naddr1qq…j8yc

There is little to no debate that self-custodial Bitcoin and Lightning wallets are the most ideal from a censorship-resistant, resilient, and sovereign way to custody and spend your bitcoin. A self-custodial or non-custodial wallet is a wallet where you have access to your private keys for your Bitcoin. You have full control over your funds. A custodial wallet is when a third-party holds the private keys to your Bitcoin or is in some way custodying the means to access your funds. This means the custodian could censor, freeze, or otherwise control or take your Bitcoin. A threat actor who attacks the custodian could likewise do the same. These facts cause people to get very animated and angry about the value, notion, or mention of any form of custodial wallet.

Self-custodial is definitely ideal, in an ideal world.

But, this world aint that.

Before you chant “custodial bad, self-custodial good”, grab some context with your black and white coffee. Binary framing of custodial versus self-custodial ignores some real-world shitstorms where custodial solutions not only enable Bitcoin transactions for real world needs, and actually save lives or at least preserve life-saving funds.

Self-Custodial In High-Fee Environments and Low Values of Sats

On the date of this writing, fees are low. But that's not always the case.

During times of high activity, transaction fees can skyrocket" — Reddit

In the global south, Bitcoin can be very useful as a medium-of-exchange-in low-fee environment. In high-fee environments, paying $20 to open a Lightning channel for a $25 transaction, does NOT work. Anita Posch of Bitcoin for Fairness and Crack the Orange–works in the Global South to enable both education and enablement of education via train the trainers programs. At the 2024 BTC Prague conference, she discussed how she gets constant feedback on material issues that occur when fees are high.

In high-fee environments in the Global South, people need to get creative in order to use Bitcoin for spending. This usually means custodial solutions like Wallet of Satoshi or Liquid network (via Aqua). For people with small amounts of satoshis amidst high fees, they sometimes start with a custodial wallet, then move to self-custodial when they have accumulated a higher stack of sats.

In 2025, another option was implemented by both Blitz and Zeus wallets. Users can receive Cashu ecash into a custodial wallet and then move it to a self-custodial wallet when they have enough funds for a Lightning channels to transact via Lightning.

Self-custodial wallets just don't work for small holders of Bitcoin in high-fee environments or with lower amounts of money. Using a custodial wallet, the Liquid network, or a wallet that facilitates custodial to self-custodial funds are all useful options in the current wallet landscape.

Self-Custodial In Wartime

© Vladimir Efimov| Dreamstime.com

How do self-custodial wallets hold up in wartime, outages, bombs, drones, drones with bombs–situations where you, your phone, or computer can be obliterated or you might be forced to flee in a life-threatening hurry.

First, take the example of someone who is new to Bitcoin and is in the middle of an invasion or other violence or fog of war, a disorienting state way more taxing for cognitive functioning than your debilitating morning or afternoon brain stupor.

Very well-meaning Bitcoiners (including myself) would say to get yourself a self-custodial Lightning wallet, fund it with sats, open some Lightning channels, make payments or withdraw donations. (In addition, deal with all the issues when possible high-fee environments may be in play).

It’s a war, so make sure someone else has the seed in case you “go down” or your phone or computer is demolished. Teach this other person how to use this self-custodial Lightning wallet because if you think it’s hard to onboard people to BItcoin or Lightning wallets, try to onboard in the middle of a shitstorm of violence, hunger, or physical flight.

While onboarding others, make sure that your backup person doesn’t restore that self-custodial wallet with your seed while you are still using the wallet, because that will bork the Lightning channel state.

Make sure you communicate if you die or are disabled and can’t use the wallet and want to turn the funds over to your backup person. (Did we mention how communication means are not stable in war?) Net-net:

The person in the midst of war or any sort of physical and emotional instability needs the simplest wallet they can get to onboard and use immediately.

They need a wallet they can enable others to access should the worst befall them or their phone.

They need a wallet that doesn’t require extra communication touch points and is easy and fast to download, send, and receive.

A custodial wallet CAN be the better option–despite the fact that the custodian could be forced to censor or freeze the funds. In these dire circumstances, a custodian could actually be seen as managing and safeguarding the funds.

Also, what if several people need to access the funds, or you need a backup person in case the main owner is killed or incapacitated? With some custodial wallets, multiple people can log into the same custodial account to access the funds. Being able to share credentials with a backup person who can log onto a custodial Lightning wallet at any time and use the funds, can actually save others’ lives in the case that one user’s life is ended.

We may soon have better solutions for people, with ease of cost and onboarding. As of this writing, that’s not the operationally state of the ecosystem. Even on nostr, allmost all wallets are custodial. And in most cases, wallets require Internet.

Self-Custodial Under Poor Internet

© Loren Markle| Dreamstime.com

To the above scenarios, add poor internet that is often the case in the Global South and certainly in war. In some situations, Internet is cut off in order to prevent communication or financial transactions. In other places, power outages are common, which takes down the Internet. In just the first few months of 2025, many large areas--including Cuba, Puerto Rico, Spain and Portugal--have had large-scale power outages.

Internet access is an issue for both self-custodial AND custodial lightning wallets.

With little to no internet, it’s useful to have a tool you can use to transfer funds offline to a person with poor or no internet who can then receive them later with Internet connectivity. Cashu--whatever brand of custodial you call it--can and has helped in these situations. Cashu wallets work in different ways in a couple of different Internet scenarios:

Table 1: Offline Cashu scenarios.

Note: For even more details, see this article Transacting with ecash while offline.

Cuba Bitcoin has a guide and information about how they use and have used Cashu ecash during power outages.

From Cuba Bitcoin Cashu site

For the Cuban Bitcoin group, "Cashu is not just a protocol, it is a way to empower the Cuban people." Under poor or no Internet, it's good to have different options that enable you to pay with and receive sats.

Finally, don't forget the privacy aspects of Cashu, which help in war and in authoritarian oppression. In this divided world, private transactions can also help protect views and action that may not be popular with the current and next regime of government and banking.

Means, Ends, and Privilege.

If it's is your best or only option for the situation, custodial is the way to go. In many cases, the means and the ability to self-custody–is a privilege. In other situations, custodial solutions are the best option to transact or receive life-saving donations to meet one’s basic needs.

In these cases, the custodial means justify the end of being able to use Bitcoin. If you’re starving, you’re going to eat what food you can get regardless of your morals about veggies, meat, or carbs and sugar. Same goes true for how you hold the money that you need to transact for your food, drink, and shelter.

Maslow said nothing about your custodial versus self-custodial puritanism--in his hierarchy of human needs.

Could you elaborate or share a source that would help explain?

2025-09-20T01:09:48Z

In reply to nevent1q…r680
_________________________

Could you elaborate or share a source that would help explain?

Ashigaru yes. https://github.com/linkinparkrulz

2025-09-19T13:37:54Z

In reply to nevent1q…wy83
_________________________

Ashigaru yes.
https://github.com/linkinparkrulz

That's an interesting observation and point.

2025-09-18T23:10:41Z

In reply to nevent1q…h8sa
_________________________

That's an interesting observation and point.

I hope this AI generated. He's doesn't give a shit about ...

2025-09-18T13:35:08Z

In reply to nevent1q…j5cy
_________________________

I hope this AI generated. He's doesn't give a shit about the problems Bitcoin was intended to solve.

We need more client options than just Core or knots.

2025-09-18T03:00:07Z

In reply to nevent1q…q9gc
_________________________

We need more client options than just Core or knots.

No warrent, trial, jury, or attorney, just a straight military ...

2025-09-17T19:59:48Z

No warrent, trial, jury, or attorney, just a straight military strike. But don't worry it's for our safety. Gotta love the state. Think twice before you sail the Caribbean on a speed boat.

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2025/09/07/rand-paul-lashes-jd-vance-venezuela-drug-boat-comments/86022532007/

Nostr event nevent1qqs02mfzvvsjut50tlv9srz2uxj68hmcd2pauyzrxmwcyyfh9vta3hszyzh6xja8m4uuf0q8avv2ad878nrd3keqzt49nmw6wd2xaeq3ar5huw8chsf

2025-09-17T14:54:11Z

https://traffic.libsyn.com/secure/watchmanprivacy/203_The_END_of_Monero.mp3?dest-id=2727836

💯 #nevent1q…k6sa

2025-09-17T13:47:04Z

💯

quoting
nevent1q…k6sa
If we want a less chaotic world, we need to get more people using #Bitcoin for peer to peer payments

Not true.

2025-09-12T17:30:01Z

In reply to nevent1q…qz7e
_________________________

Not true.

Not true. I'm running Start9, you can choose.

2025-09-12T17:29:09Z

In reply to nevent1q…qsq0
_________________________

Not true. I'm running Start9, you can choose.

Again fuck them 🖕 #nevent1q…px6m

2025-09-11T14:43:53Z

Again fuck them 🖕

quoting
nevent1q…px6m
These people are fucking deranged.

nevent1q…xq9u

I don't like to draw conclusions immediately but this is odly ...

2025-09-11T14:24:23Z

In reply to nevent1q…nn2f
_________________________

I don't like to draw conclusions immediately but this is odly suspicious. Is this a coincidence? I don't know. Thanks for sharing this info.

🤣 #nevent1q…yr4z

2025-09-11T02:16:01Z

🤣

quoting
nevent1q…yr4z

Unfortunately I agree #nevent1q…qza0

2025-09-10T23:21:26Z

Unfortunately I agree

quoting
nevent1q…qza0

I agree. My heart goes out to his family. #nevent1q…7a3y

2025-09-10T21:14:28Z

I agree. My heart goes out to his family.

quoting
nevent1q…7a3y
Charlie Kirk is known for engaging in respectful Socratic dialogue with people that vehemently disagree with his political views, which is something that is desperately needed today.

The fact that he was attacked during one of these events is an attack on the medium itself and an admission by the radical left that they don't care to engage in dialogue, but prefer to brute force their views on the world.

A very sad and frightening day.

There's an app for Robosats or is that PWA?

2025-09-05T02:38:36Z

In reply to nevent1q…6dlc
_________________________

There's an app for Robosats or is that PWA?

🧡 #nevent1q…0rc3

2025-09-04T13:54:46Z

🧡

quoting
nevent1q…0rc3
By printing endless money governments made themselves practically omnipotent

Interfering with every single aspect of your life

#Bitcoin defunds the state and puts it back in its place

Absolutely. We can just do things #nevent1q…0lh4

2025-09-04T13:48:56Z

Absolutely. We can just do things

quoting
nevent1q…0lh4
Anyone who thinks AI (open code) can be tamed, regulated, or stopped is kidding themselves. Like #Bitcoin, the genie is out of the bottle. Learn it, use it, or get left behind. Rules, warnings, or licenses are worthless against someone who ignores them. Wasting time whining only holds YOU back.

The fear is of the unknown. Educate yourself, and that anxiety magically disappears. If you need help, ask.

👋 I mostly just repost stuff but a follow would be nice

2025-09-04T13:45:46Z

In reply to nevent1q…09dk
_________________________

👋 I mostly just repost stuff but a follow would be nice

Nostr event nevent1qqsvju7lxm9dm697fhwr8amf0nu0trmwm0sufsndnljfrr3tnj4kakczyzh6xja8m4uuf0q8avv2ad878nrd3keqzt49nmw6wd2xaeq3ar5hu44ceuq

2025-09-03T19:30:12Z

https://op3.dev/e/dts.podtrac.com/redirect.mp3/pdcn.co/e/pscrb.fm/rss/p/serve.podhome.fm/episode/df3c7f87-bdab-41fe-1438-08dbf068e250/638923244150099930a7b98643-4b6b-4976-8517-175f98128a97v2.mp3

🔥🔥⚡⚡🔥 keep it coming.

2025-08-30T03:09:33Z

In reply to nevent1q…y3v3
_________________________

🔥🔥⚡⚡🔥 keep it coming.

https://fountain.fm/episode/5L17JxcHm6DlHnHjEKWS

2025-08-28T15:52:57Z

https://fountain.fm/episode/5L17JxcHm6DlHnHjEKWS

#nevent1q…4fhl

2025-08-26T18:33:01Z

quoting
nevent1q…4fhl
You will see that most NPCs defend the state security forces, both police and military.

Have they ever helped you? Because the police always help after the fact, that is, they are rarely at the scene of the crime and prevent crime, they are really useless.

They are only effective in defending the interests of the state, so if you try to evade taxes, you'll see what happens, or if you get traffic fines to raise money, or if you don't show up at a polling station, then the police will come to your house.

For robberies, murders, assaults, etc., forget about them, they are not there to defend you, and they also have orders to defend illegal immigrants in Europe.

Did you write a response?

2025-08-24T16:04:48Z

In reply to nevent1q…3g4f
_________________________

Did you write a response?

#nevent1q…h4dr

2025-08-23T14:43:42Z

quoting
nevent1q…h4dr
how do you turn off a decentralized social network?

nevent1q…06wp

What exactly is this in pleb terms?

2025-08-21T00:19:37Z

In reply to nevent1q…38f9
_________________________

What exactly is this in pleb terms?

Wow that's a really enlighting take. Governments always try ...

2025-08-20T19:12:01Z

Wow that's a really enlighting take. Governments always try to solve every problem with money. I can't even big to imagine how flawed that logic would be if applied to our personal lives lol

quoting
nevent1q…vwxq
Life Is More Than Money #vlog

Fuck them all, banks and governments are complete scum ...

2025-08-19T19:15:04Z

Fuck them all, banks and governments are complete scum

quoting
nevent1q…kcaw
Bifurcation intensifies.
nevent1q…nunh

#nevent1q…6a6q

2025-08-18T01:55:07Z

quoting
nevent1q…6a6q
"To incorporate this new solution in their iPhone apps, developers will need to enter into a commercial agreement with Apple, request the NFC and SE entitlement, and pay the associated fees. This ensures that only authorized developers who meet certain industry and regulatory requirements, and commit to Apple’s ongoing security and privacy standards, can access the relevant APIs."

nevent1q…fq0e

WTF again #nevent1q…jryg

2025-08-11T23:38:22Z

WTF again

quoting
nevent1q…jryg
Ethereum Core developer Federico Carrone was arrested at passport controls in Turkey over his contributions to a paper that assessed privacy on Ethereum and Tornado Cash.

Full story 👇
https://www.therage.co/developer-arrested-over-tornado-cash-research/

I've read it, it's on my book shelf. Just let me know ...

2025-08-11T11:02:40Z

In reply to nevent1q…qlpk
_________________________

I've read it, it's on my book shelf. Just let me know which part to reread. This is my simple quest. Perhaps your right but I'm human and failable.

I need exact qoutes, paragraphs and page numbers. Por favor

2025-08-11T01:37:48Z

In reply to nevent1q…jylw
_________________________

I need exact qoutes, paragraphs and page numbers. Por favor

Wait for reals, you sat down for a podcast with Lex that never ...

2025-08-07T03:19:13Z

In reply to nevent1q…xxnq
_________________________

Wait for reals, you sat down for a podcast with Lex that never aired?

This is the message I got after a few seconds opening the app on ...

2025-07-31T15:07:27Z

In reply to nevent1q…zm9g
_________________________

This is the message I got after a few seconds opening the app on a Graphene phone. Downloaded from Aurora store. Is there a way around this or maybe I should download the APK file instead?

Can we get this to work without google play services? For ...

2025-07-31T03:41:52Z

In reply to nevent1q…dz82
_________________________

Can we get this to work without google play services? For Graphene users