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    <id>https://nostr.ae/nevent1qqsdquxm7symn9auptewz7pg8ns3m9uzlhvahjhr2t0cr5j4pr0gxpgzyzhxe98rvt2nw8dxnekuhzl8unvqnls8rqj0n7tnyj34rde43vcmjv8tpx6</id>
    
      <title type="html">📅 Original date posted:2021-03-01 📝 Original message:On ...</title>
    
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://nostr.ae/nevent1qqsdquxm7symn9auptewz7pg8ns3m9uzlhvahjhr2t0cr5j4pr0gxpgzyzhxe98rvt2nw8dxnekuhzl8unvqnls8rqj0n7tnyj34rde43vcmjv8tpx6" />
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      In reply to &lt;a href=&#39;/nevent1qqsywl43g6gzsqy9ajpknase3csplxdy7f3hjan0ang4nj3g35hp0tcejxsju&#39;&gt;nevent1q…xsju&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;_________________________&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;📅 Original date posted:2021-03-01&lt;br/&gt;📝 Original message:On Tue, Mar 02, 2021 at 01:06:14AM &#43;1000, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev wrote:&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; On Sun, Feb 28, 2021 at 07:33:30PM &#43;0000, Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev wrote:&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; As we saw in 2017 with BIP 9, coordinating activation by miner signal alone, &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; despite its potential benefits, also leaves open the door to a miner veto. &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; To the contrary, we saw in 2017 that miners could *not* successfully&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; veto a BIP 9 activation. It was certainly more effort and risk than was&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; desirable to override the attempted veto, but the attempt at vetoing&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; nevertheless failed.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;You cannot prove a statement to be false by making another statement.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; It wouldn&amp;#39;t be much different than adding back the inflation bug &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; (CVE-2018-17144) and trusting miners not to exploit it.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; That is ridiculous FUD.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;That is an analogy not FUD. A strong one nevertheless but still an analogy.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; With LOT=False in the picture, however, things can get messy:&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; LOT=false is always in the picture if we are talking about a soft-fork:&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; the defining feature of a soft-fork is that old node software continues&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; to work, and old node software will be entirely indifferent to whether&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; activation is signalled or not.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;That is the correct description of how soft-forks should work in principle.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; some users will &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; enforce Taproot(eg) (those running LOT=True), while others will not (those &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; with LOT=False)&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; If you are following bip8 with lockinontimeout=false, you will enforce&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; taproot rules if activation occurs, you will simply not reject blocks if&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; activation does not occur.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Also correct in principle.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; Users with LOT=True will still get all the safety thereof, &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; but those with LOT=False will (in the event of miners deciding to produce a &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; chain split) face an unreliable chain, being replaced by the LOT=True chain &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; every time it overtakes the LOT=False chain in work.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; This assumes anyone mining the chain where taproot does not activate is&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; not able to avoid a reorg, despite having majority hashpower (as implied&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; by the lot=true chain having to overtake them repeatedly). That&amp;#39;s absurd;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; avoiding a reorg is trivially achieved via running &amp;#34;invalidateblock&amp;#34;, or&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; via pool software examining block headers, or via a patch along the lines&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; of MUST_SIGNAL enforcement, but doing the opposite. For concreteness,&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; here&amp;#39;s a sketch of such a patch:&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&#34;https://github.com/ajtowns/bitcoin/commit/f195688bd1eff3780f200e7a049e23b30ca4fe2f&#34;&gt;https://github.com/ajtowns/bitcoin/commit/f195688bd1eff3780f200e7a049e23b30ca4fe2f&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;If lot=true has majority of hashpower it wins.&lt;br/&gt;Having to overtake them repeatedly assumes a 50/50 split one chain taking&lt;br/&gt;over the other repeatedly.&lt;br/&gt;In which case OP&amp;#39;s statement that the LOT=True chain is safer holds true.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; For 2 weeks, users with LOT=False would not have a usable network.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; That&amp;#39;s also ridiculous FUD.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;In context thats not FUD and most certainly it&amp;#39;s not ridiculous FUD.&lt;br/&gt;Assuming a 50/50 hashpower split the Lot=False chain has no stability&lt;br/&gt;till difficulty re-adjustment. &lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; If it were true, it would mean the activation mechanism was not&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; acceptable, as non-upgraded nodes would also not have a usable network&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; for the same reason.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; Fortunately, it&amp;#39;s not true.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;In the split scenario non-upgraded nodes don&amp;#39;t play, right? aka they&amp;#39;re part of&lt;br/&gt;both chains.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; More generally, if miners are willing to lose significant amounts of&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; money mining orphan blocks, they can do that at any time. If they&amp;#39;re&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; not inclined to do so, it&amp;#39;s incredibly straightforward for them to avoid&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; doing so, whatever a minority of other miners might do.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Except that when incentives change so does miner behavior.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; The overall risk is maximally reduced by LOT=True being the only deployed &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; parameter, and any introduction of LOT=False only increases risk probability &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;gt; and severity.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; LOT=false is the default behaviour of everything single piece of node&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; software out there. That behaviour doesn&amp;#39;t need to be introduced, it&amp;#39;s&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; already universal.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;You are again making an &amp;#34;in principle&amp;#34; statement.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; Cheers,&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; aj&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;If you meant this to be a rebuttal, it is not.&lt;br/&gt;It is mostly blanket statements and attacking OP.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;--
    </content>
    <updated>2023-06-07T18:29:44Z</updated>
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