<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <updated></updated>
  <generator>https://nostr.ae</generator>

  <title>Nostr notes by </title>
  <author>
    <name></name>
  </author>
  <link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="https://nostr.ae/npub18cagy0gpu9gmpdcu6052xg0fnp86cm0m5gsanv6j25myfecdjqhqsw4acy.rss" />
  <link href="https://nostr.ae/npub18cagy0gpu9gmpdcu6052xg0fnp86cm0m5gsanv6j25myfecdjqhqsw4acy" />
  <id>https://nostr.ae/npub18cagy0gpu9gmpdcu6052xg0fnp86cm0m5gsanv6j25myfecdjqhqsw4acy</id>
  <icon></icon>
  <logo></logo>




  <entry>
    <id>https://nostr.ae/nevent1qqsr7npltamjeajr5xe738uywl3359qa3e9wqj234cwgwrrpta4fp7qzyqlr4q3aq8s4rv9hrnf73gepaxvyltrdlw3zrkdn2f2nv388pkgzuql9pg8</id>
    
      <title type="html">📅 Original date posted:2021-02-23 📝 Original ...</title>
    
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://nostr.ae/nevent1qqsr7npltamjeajr5xe738uywl3359qa3e9wqj234cwgwrrpta4fp7qzyqlr4q3aq8s4rv9hrnf73gepaxvyltrdlw3zrkdn2f2nv388pkgzuql9pg8" />
    <content type="html">
      In reply to &lt;a href=&#39;/nevent1qqsq9xrcluk7ctutf46rw9lac24qxjj0d2qhqutze85fwavrsqn54gq3s9kwe&#39;&gt;nevent1q…9kwe&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;_________________________&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;📅 Original date posted:2021-02-23&lt;br/&gt;📝 Original message:Relative to your arguments, Keagan and Jeremy, and speaking in favor of&lt;br/&gt;LOT=false, from my limited perspective:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; As Jeremy points out, the LOT=true possibility always exists here, and we&lt;br/&gt;have multiple high profile people saying they will be running that&lt;br/&gt;regardless of how things turn out. It seems to me that in this scenario,&lt;br/&gt;LOT=false does less to prevent a chain split.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; So if the goal is to prevent a chain split, and the soft fork is benign&lt;br/&gt;and essentially &amp;#34;annexing unoccupied territory&amp;#34; with respect to script&lt;br/&gt;versions, and no one actually has opposed Taproot itself, then I fail to&lt;br/&gt;see how LOT=false is safer in the presence of a grenade defense by the&lt;br/&gt;LOT=true crowd.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;I don&amp;#39;t believe the goal is to avoid a chain split, nor to activate&lt;br/&gt;Taproot. Over the long term it will not have been important when exactly&lt;br/&gt;Taproot activated, or whether a minority forked off, but what culture and&lt;br/&gt;norms we adopted in putting forward this change. A culture of deference to&lt;br/&gt;the network makes Core worthy of remaining the reference implementation of&lt;br/&gt;Bitcoin.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Given Core&amp;#39;s special position in the client ecosystem, I see these outcomes&lt;br/&gt;are asymmetric:&lt;br/&gt;a) If an intolerant minority signals LOT=true in contradiction to core,&lt;br/&gt;they are splitting consensus / forking off consensus, which is their right&lt;br/&gt;to do in our open ecosystem.&lt;br/&gt;b) If Core ships LOT=true, we are in fact imposing a change on the network.&lt;br/&gt;This may be justified in the end, but it should be used with discretion.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;If LOT=false fails to activate, then the failure will have revealed&lt;br/&gt;information about sentiments and elements of the network, and we will have&lt;br/&gt;an opportunity then to address that information before proceeding with&lt;br/&gt;LOT=true.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;To adopt b) as a pre-emptive defense against a) is to express will without&lt;br/&gt;evidence of necessity or opportunity for justification.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Finally, as others have said, I think this option is likely to be moot -&lt;br/&gt;let&amp;#39;s not act defensively out of SEGWIT trauma, but with trust in the&lt;br/&gt;network.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Best,&lt;br/&gt;Ben&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;On Tue, Feb 23, 2021 at 12:09 PM Keagan McClelland via bitcoin-dev &amp;lt;&lt;br/&gt;bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&amp;gt; wrote:&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; I wanted to follow up on what Jeremy and others are saying regards finding&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; consensus on LOT. I&amp;#39;ve seen a few other opinions saying that finding&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; consensus on the LOT value is far more important than what the LOT value&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; actually is. This makes sense because if 100% of economic activity is&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; running the same rule set, there is no divergence, regardless of which&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; value is picked.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; It is my understanding that those who oppose LOT=true are mostly opposed&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; on the grounds of it *appearing* &amp;#34;unnecessarily coercive&amp;#34; and that this&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; lack of consensus can precipitate a chain split at the&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;#34;brinksmanship period&amp;#34; as Jeremy refers to it. I don&amp;#39;t think that we can&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; say that LOT=true is coercive at all unless there is some opposition to&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; Taproot itself. Opposition on the grounds that it *may* be opposed by&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; others and Core does not want to assert control over the protocol is a&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; conservative view but ultimately contingent upon opposition to Taproot for&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; more fundamental reasons. If no one opposes it, then by definition you have&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; consensus, and in that case I also don&amp;#39;t think that the LOT=true (or false)&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; in that regard sets meaningful precedent, as I would expect precedents to&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; only be meaningful if they were established during a contentious scenario.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; As it stands we have precedents for both MASF&amp;#39;s and UASF&amp;#39;s to execute soft&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; forks in Bitcoin.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; Of course it seems intractable to ascertain the views of ~100% of the&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; Bitcoin constituency, and therefore it gives credibility to the argument&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; that by coming to consensus on LOT=false among those who *are* speaking&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; up is safer with the embedded assumptions that modifying consensus beyond&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; what core ships is an active choice, presumably by those who know what they&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; are doing. However, the simple act of Core choosing to ship an&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; unconfigurable LOT=false value does not *prevent* the forking and&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; creation of a UASF client. As Jeremy points out, the LOT=true possibility&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; always exists here, and we have multiple high profile people saying they&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; will be running that regardless of how things turn out. It seems to me that&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; in this scenario, LOT=false does less to prevent a chain split.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; In regards to precedent, there may be good reasons to force that minority&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; to fork themselves off the network, as would be the case if a hypothetical&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; soft fork was a consensus action to blacklist some UTXO&amp;#39;s or something else&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; that weaponizes consensus against some subset of Bitcoin&amp;#39;s user base, but I&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; haven&amp;#39;t heard a single person who advocates for LOT=false on the grounds&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; that they *themselves* oppose the consensus change that is being proposed&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; here. So if the goal is to prevent a chain split, and the soft fork is&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; benign and essentially &amp;#34;annexing unoccupied territory&amp;#34; with respect to&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; script versions, and no one actually has opposed Taproot itself, then I&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; fail to see how LOT=false is safer in the presence of a grenade defense by&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; the LOT=true crowd.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; I personally *prefer* LOT=true for these reasons, but I am NOT going to&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; be joining the ranks of the intolerant minority if Core ultimately ships&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; LOT=false. I think it is more important to stay in consensus, and as a&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; result I am able to be convinced that false is the right answer. My&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; question to everyone else (true AND false advocates) is this: what would&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; you have to observe, in order to change your mind or is it immutably made&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; up? If we have a significant portion of the community that is immutably&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; made up to go false, and another portion that is going to go true, the&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; asymmetry of the fork almost *requires* that those of us whose opinions&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; are malleable to break for true.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; If social consensus is what drives technical consensus and not the other&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; way around it seems as if there cannot exist a valid (rational?) reason to&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; oppose Taproot itself, and then by extension with the arguments laid out&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; above, LOT=true seems to be the logical conclusion of all of this, even if&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; Core ships LOT=false at the outset.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; Where am I wrong here?&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; Keagan&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 7:11 PM Jeremy via bitcoin-dev &amp;lt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&amp;gt; wrote:&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; Not responding to anyone in particular, but it strikes me that one can&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; think about the case where a small minority (let&amp;#39;s say H = 20%?) of nodes&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; select the opposite of what Core releases (LOT=false, LOT=true). I&amp;#39;m&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; ignoring the case where a critical bug is discovered in Taproot for reasons&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; I could expand on if anyone is interested (I don&amp;#39;t think LOT=true/false has&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; much of a diff in that regard).&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; You&amp;#39;ll note an asymmetry with LOT=true / false analysis. LOT=true nodes&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; are clearly updated (or lying), LOT=false nodes may be un-upgraded (or&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; however you want to interpret it).&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; *# 80% on LOT=false, 20% LOT=True*&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; - Case 1: Activates ahead of time anyways&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; No issues.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; - Case 2: Fails to Activate before timeout...&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; 20% *may* fork off with LOT=true. Bitcoin hashrate reduced, chance of&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; multi block reorgs at time of fork relatively high, especially if network&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; does not partition.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; Implication is that activation % being 90%, then X% fewer than 70% of&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; miners are signaling for Taproot at this time.  If X% is small the&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; increased orphan rate caused by the LOT=true miners will cause it to&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; activate anyways. If X% is larger, then there will be a consensus split.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; *# 80% on LOT=true, 20% LOT=False*&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; - Case 1: Activates ahead of time Anyways&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; No issues.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; - Case 2: Fails to Activate before timeout...&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; A% &#43; B% &#43; C% = 20%&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; A% (upgraded, signal activate) remain on majority chain with LOT=false,&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; blocks mined universally valid.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; B% (upgraded, not signaling) succeeds in activating and maintaining&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; consensus, blocks are temporarily lost during the final period, but&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; consensus re-emerges.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; C% (not upgraded/not signalling) both fail to activate (not upgraded) and&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; blocks are rejected (not signaling) during mandatory signalling.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; Essentially becomes an SPV miner, should still not select transactions&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; improperly given mempool policy, but may mine a bad tip.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; (I argue that group B is irrational entirely, as in this case the&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; majority has upgraded, inevitably winning, and is orphaning their blocks so&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; B should effectively be 0% or can be combined with group C as being somehow&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; not upgraded if they are unable to switch once it becomes clear after say&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; the first 100 blocks in the period that LOT &amp;gt; 50%. The only difference in&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; lumping B with C is that group C SPV mines after the fork and B should, in&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; theory, have full validation.).&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; Apologies if my base analysis is off -- happy to take corrections.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; My overall summary is thus:&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; 1) People care what Core releases because we assume the majority will&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; likely run it. If core were a minority project, we wouldn&amp;#39;t really care&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; what core released.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; 2) People are upset with LOT=true being suggested as release parameters&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; because of the *narrative* that it puts devs in control.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; 3) LOT=true having a sizeable minority running it presents major issues&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; to majority LOT=false in terms of lost blocks during the final period and&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; in terms of a longer term fork.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; 4) Majority LOT=true has no long term instability on consensus (majority&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; LOT=true means the final period always activates, any instability is short&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; lived &#43; irrational).&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; 5) On the balance, the safer parameter to release *seems* to be LOT=true.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; But because devs are sensitive to control narrative, LOT=false is preferred&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; by devs.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; 6) Almost paradoxically, choosing a *less safe* option for a narrative&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; reason is more of a show of dev control than choosing a more safe option&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; despite appearances.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; 7) This all comes down to if we think that a reasonable number of&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; important nodes will run LOT=true.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; 8) This all doesn&amp;#39;t matter *that much* because taproot will have many&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; opportunities to activate before the brinksmanship period.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; As a plan of action, I think that means that either:&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; A) Core should release LOT=true, as a less disruptive option given stated&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; community intentions to do LOT=true&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; B) Core  community should vehemently anti-advocate running LOT=true to&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; ensure the % is as small as possible&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; C) Do nothing&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; D) Core community should release LOT=false and vehemently advocate&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; manually changing to LOT=true to ensure the % is supermajority, but leaving&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; it as a user choice.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; Overall, I worry that plan B has a mild Streissand effect and would&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; result in boosting LOT=true (which could be OK, so long as LOT=true &#43;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; LOT=false&#43;signal yes becomes the large majority, but would be not fun for&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; anyone if LOT=true &#43; LOT=false&#43;signal yes are a small majority). Plan C&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; most likely ends up with some % doing LOT=true anyways. D feels a little&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; silly, but maybe a good tradeoff.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; If I had to summarize the emotional dynamic among developers around&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; LOT=true, I think devs wish it didn&amp;#39;t exist because it is clear LOT=true&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; *creates* the issues here. LOT=false would be fine if the LOT=true strategy&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; didn&amp;#39;t exist at all. But unfortunately the cat is out of the bag and cannot&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; be put back in. To validate the emotions, I think it is fine to be angry&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; about LOT=true and not like it, but we should either accept that it is most&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; likely to create consensus OR we should find a new game theoretic&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; activation strategy with better pro-social equilibriums.&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; Personally, I think with either plan the ultimate risk of forking is low&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; given probability to activate before timeout, so we should just pick&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; something and move on, accepting that we aren&amp;#39;t setting a precedent by&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; which all future forks should abide. Given my understanding of the&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; tradeoffs, I believe that the safest choice is LOT=true, but I wouldn&amp;#39;t&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; move to hold back a plan of LOT=false (but would probably take mitigative&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; steps on community advocacy if it looks like there is non majority but non&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; negligible LOT=true uptake).&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; Cheers,&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; Jeremy&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; _______________________________________________&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; bitcoin-dev mailing list&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&#34;https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev&#34;&gt;https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; _______________________________________________&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; bitcoin-dev mailing list&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;a href=&#34;https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev&#34;&gt;https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;br/&gt;-------------- next part --------------&lt;br/&gt;An HTML attachment was scrubbed...&lt;br/&gt;URL: &amp;lt;&lt;a href=&#34;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20210223/90c7bfe1/attachment-0001.html&amp;gt&#34;&gt;http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20210223/90c7bfe1/attachment-0001.html&amp;gt&lt;/a&gt;;
    </content>
    <updated>2023-06-07T18:29:01Z</updated>
  </entry>

</feed>