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📅 Original date posted:2021-03-06 📝 Original message:On ...

2023-06-07T18:30:35Z

In reply to nevent1q…93du
_________________________

📅 Original date posted:2021-03-06
📝 Original message:On Sat, Mar 6, 2021 at 10:11 AM Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> I'm really unsure that three months is a short enough time window that there wouldn't be a material effort to split the
> network with divergent consensus rules. Instead, a three month window is certainly long enough to organize and make a
> lot of noise around such an effort, given BIP 148 was organized and reached its peak within a similar such window.
>
> Worse, because the obvious alternative after a three month activation failure is a significant delay prior to
> activation, the vocal UASF minority may be encouraged to pursue such a route to avoid such a delay.
>

I agree with your concern, a three month window motivates a small
group to constantly tell people to upgrade as soon as possible. Which
is mostly fine, but if this group gets near 51% mining support in the
three months it will embolden them to switch the messaging from
"upgrade the client" to "run this new client that has the LOT flag
switched to true" (UASF)
This marketing group will attempt a UASF regardless of the timelines
because there is no cost if they fail a UASF and there is great reward
if they succeed by activating in 3 months. They can run an alt-node,
scare everyone else of being reorged, pretend they have a majority,
and say their chain is the safe one. I say there is no cost because
the leaders of that movement are likely savvy enough to give up the
effort and move back to running core even after the chain split. The
ones who get hurt are the followers of the UASF movement that don't
fully understand the discussion and drink the kool aid.
A short time window doesn't preclude this group from attempting a UASF.

> One alternative may be to reduce the signaling windows involved and start slightly later. Instead of the likelihood of
> failure growing on the horizon, simply have two signaling windows (maybe two weeks, maybe a moth each?). In order to
> ensure success remains likely, begin them somewhat later after software release to give pools and miners a chance to
> configure their mining software in advance.
>
> Matt

The shorter the signaling windows the more unlikely they are to reach
a mining power supermajority.
With a short signaling window the supermajority threshold will
probably be configured to low levels (80% 70% 60%). Which makes the
activation period dangerous because it forces the other miners (20%
30% 40%) to upgrade really suddenly once the threshold is reached.
Unless the LOCKED_IN period is made really long (1 year) but then we
have to wait a really long time.
As long as the mining power running the soft fork is above 50% the
chain will stay together. Anything above that is just a safety margin
to prevent orphan blocks.

So why not encode this 50%+ dynamic into the activation logic.
Spread the deployment window out to a year, make the activation
threshold 95%, and at the end of the window the feature can activate
if there is above 51% signaling.
By definition, the activation will happen if either 95% is reached
early or if at the end of the deployment window mining support is
between 51% and 95%. With this setup the chain is guaranteed to stay
together and no need to rush miners and users.

Cheers
Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces

>
> On 3/5/21 22:43, David A. Harding via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > On the ##taproot-activation IRC channel, Russell O'Connor recently
> > proposed a modification of the "Let's see what happens" activation
> > proposal.[1] The idea received significant discussion and seemed
> > acceptable to several people who could not previously agree on a
> > proposal (although this doesn't necessarily make it their first
> > choice). The following is my attempt at a description.
> >
> > 1. Start soon: shortly after the release of software containing this
> > proposed activation logic, nodes will begin counting blocks towards
> > the 90% threshold required to lock in taproot.[2]
> >
> > 2. Stop soon: if the lockin threshold isn't reached within approximately
> > three months, the activation attempt fails. There is no mandatory
> > activation and everyone is encouraged to try again using different
> > activation parameters.
> >
> > 2. Delayed activation: in the happy occasion where the lockin threshold
> > is reached, taproot is guaranteed to eventually activate---but not
> > until approximately six months after signal tracking started.
> >
> > ## Example timeline
> >
> > (All dates approximate; see the section below about BIP9 vs BIP8.)
> >
> > - T+0: release of one or more full nodes with activation code
> > - T+14: signal tracking begins
> > - T+28: earliest possible lock in
> > - T+104: locked in by this date or need to try a different activation process
> > - T+194: activation (if lockin occurred)
> >
> > ## Analysis
> >
> > The goal of Speedy Trial is to allow a taproot activation attempt to
> > either quickly succeed or quickly fail---without compromising safety in
> > either case. Details below:
> >
> > ### Mitigating the problems of early success
> >
> > New rules added in a soft fork need to be enforced by a large part of
> > the economy or there's a risk that a long chain of blocks breaking the
> > rules will be accepted by some users and rejected by others, causing a
> > chain split that can result in large direct losses to transaction
> > receivers and potentially even larger indirect losses to holders due to
> > reduced confidence in the safety of the Bitcoin system.
> >
> > One step developers have taken in the past to ensure widespread adoption
> > of new consensus rules is programming in a delay between the time software
> > with those rules is expected to be released and when the software starts
> > tracking which blocks signal for activation. For example:
> >
> > Soft fork | Release | Start | Delta
> > -----------------+------------+------------+----------
> > BIP68 (v0.12.1) | 2016-04-15 | 2016-05-11 | 26 days
> > BIP141 (v0.13.1) | 2016-10-27 | 2016-11-18 | 24 days
> >
> > Sources: BitcoinCore.org, https://gist.github.com/ajtowns/1c5e3b8bdead01124c04c45f01c817bc
> >
> > Speedy Trial replaces most of that upfront delay with a backend delay.
> > No matter how fast taproot's activation threshold is reached by miners,
> > there will be six months between the time signal tracking starts and when
> > nodes will begin enforcing taproot's rules. This gives the userbase even
> > more time to upgrade than if we had used the most recently proposed start
> > date for a BIP8 activation (~July 23rd).[2]
> >
> > ### Succeed, or fail fast
> >
> > The earlier version of this proposal was documented over 200 days ago[3]
> > and taproot's underlying code was merged into Bitcoin Core over 140 days
> > ago.[4] If we had started Speedy Trial at the time taproot
> > was merged (which is a bit unrealistic), we would've either be less than
> > two months away from having taproot or we would have moved on to the
> > next activation attempt over a month ago.
> >
> > Instead, we've debated at length and don't appear to be any closer to
> > what I think is a widely acceptable solution than when the mailing list
> > began discussing post-segwit activation schemes over a year ago.[5] I
> > think Speedy Trial is a way to generate fast progress that will either
> > end the debate (for now, if activation is successful) or give us some
> > actual data upon which to base future taproot activation proposals.
> >
> > Of course, for those who enjoy the debate, discussion can continue while
> > waiting for the results of Speedy Trial.
> >
> > ### Base activation protocol
> >
> > The idea can be implemented on top of either Bitcoin Core's existing
> > BIP9 code or its proposed BIP8 patchset.[6]
> >
> > - BIP9 uses two time-based[7] parameters, starttime and timeout. Using
> > these values plus a time-based parameter for the minimum activation
> > delay would give three months for miners to activate taproot, but some
> > of that time near the start or the end might not be usable due to
> > signals only being measured in full retarget periods. However, the
> > six month time for users to upgrade their node would be not be
> > affected by either slow or fast block production.
> >
> > BIP9 is already part of Bitcoin Core and I think the changes being
> > proposed would be relatively small, resulting in a small patch that
> > could be easy to review.
> >
> > - BIP8 uses two height-based parameters, startheight and timeoutheight.
> > Using height values would ensure miners had a certain number of
> > retarget periods (6) to lock in taproot and that there'd be a certain
> > number of blocks (about 24,000) until activation, although latest lock
> > in and expected activation could occur moderately earlier or later
> > than the estimated three and six months.
> >
> > BIP8 would likely be used if Speedy Trial fails, so it could be
> > advantageous to base this proposal on BIP8 so that we gain
> > experience running that code in production.
> >
> > For additional discussion about using times versus heights, see today's
> > log for ##taproot-activation.[11]
> >
> > ### Additional concerns
> >
> > - Encourages false signaling: false signaling is when miners signal
> > readiness to enforce rules that their nodes don't actually support.
> > This was partially responsible for a six-block reorg shortly after the
> > final BIP66 activation[8] and was found to still be a problem during
> > the BIP68 lockin period despite BIP9 being designed to avoid it.[9]
> >
> > Because Speedy Trial only gives miners a maximum of three months to
> > signal support for taproot, it may encourage such false signaling. If
> > taproot locks in as a result of their signaling but most of them fail
> > to upgrade by the activation date several months later, unprepared
> > miners could lose large amounts of money and users could see long
> > reorgs (with unupgraded nodes and SPV lite clients potentially losing
> > money).
> >
> > Compared to other activation proposals, I think the only difference is
> > Speedy Trial's short timeline. False signaling is possible with any
> > other proposal and the same problems can occur if miners fail to
> > upgrade for any mandatory activation.
> >
> > ### Additional advantages
> >
> > - No mandatory signaling: at no time are miners required to signal by
> > Speedy Trial. This includes no mandatory signaling during the
> > locked_in period(s), although such signaling will be encouraged (as it
> > was with BIP9[10]).
> >
> > - Party time: to a lesser degree, a benefit mentioned for flag day
> > activation may also apply here: we could get up to six months
> > advanced notice of taproot activation, allowing users, developers, and
> > organizations to prepare software, announcements, and celebrations for
> > that event.
> >
> > ## Implementation details and next steps
> >
> > Initial discussion about implementation may be found in today's
> > ##taproot-activation log.[11] If it appears Speedy Trial may have
> > traction, Russell O'Connor has offered to work on a patch against BIP8
> > implementing it.
> >
> > ## Acknowledgments
> >
> > The original idea for a short-duration attempt was discussed in the
> > ##taproot-activation IRC channel last July and the revised idea saw
> > additional evaluation there this week. Despite growing frustration,
> > discussion has been overwhelmingly constructive, for which all the
> > contributors should be commended. Although this should not in any way
> > imply endorsement, I'm grateful for the review and comments on a draft
> > of this email by Adam Gibson, Andrew Chow, Anthony Towns, Chris Belcher,
> > Jeremy Rubin, Jonas Nick, Luke Dashjr, Michael Folkson, Russell
> > O'Connor, and IRC users maybehuman and proofofkeags
> >
> > ## Footnotes
> >
> > [1] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Taproot_activation_proposals#Let.E2.80.99s_see_what_happens.2C_BIP8.28false.2C_3m.29
> >
> > [2] A threshold of 1,815/2,016 blocks (90%) in a single retarget period
> > seemed to have near-universal support during the 2021-02-16 IRC
> > meeting. See: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Taproot_activation_proposal_202102
> >
> > [3] https://en.bitcoin.it/w/index.php?title=Taproot_activation_proposals&oldid=68062
> >
> > [4] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19953
> >
> > [5] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2020-January/017547.html
> >
> > [6] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19573
> >
> > [7] BIP9's times are based on the median of the past 11 blocks, which
> > usually trails UTC by about 90 minutes but which can trail behind
> > realtime significantly if miners are doing weird things.
> >
> > [8] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/July_2015_chain_forks
> >
> > [9] https://buildingbitcoin.org/bitcoin-core-dev/log-2016-06-21.html#l-32
> >
> > [10] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/ed25cb58f605ba583c735f330482df0bf9348f3a/src/test/versionbits_tests.cpp#L337-L339
> >
> > [11] http://gnusha.org/taproot-activation/2021-03-05.log
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

📅 Original date posted:2021-02-24 📝 Original message:On ...

2023-06-07T18:29:01Z

In reply to nevent1q…ktcp
_________________________

📅 Original date posted:2021-02-24
📝 Original message:On Tue, Feb 23, 2021 at 12:09 PM Keagan McClelland via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> If social consensus is what drives technical consensus and not the other way around it seems as if there cannot exist a valid (rational?) reason to oppose Taproot itself, and then by extension with the arguments laid out above, LOT=true seems to be the logical conclusion of all of this, even if Core ships LOT=false at the outset.
>
> Where am I wrong here?
>
> Keagan
>
> On Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 7:11 PM Jeremy via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>> Personally, I think with either plan the ultimate risk of forking is low given probability to activate before timeout, so we should just pick something and move on, accepting that we aren't setting a precedent by which all future forks should abide. Given my understanding of the tradeoffs, I believe that the safest choice is LOT=true, but I wouldn't move to hold back a plan of LOT=false (but would probably take mitigative steps on community advocacy if it looks like there is non majority but non negligible LOT=true uptake).
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Jeremy
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

To favor LOT=true because it seems like the inevitable result is like
playing the prisoner's dilemma and never cooperating instead of using
the most optimal strategy which is tit-for-tat (cooperating at first
and then cheating once for every time your counterparty cheats).

During segwit users started by cooperating (BIP9, or "LOT=false"),
then a minority of
miners didn't cooperate (small veto but remember the majority of
miners cooperated), then users stopped cooperating in response (UASF),
then miners
reverted to cooperating (MASF while intolerant miners forked off).
Today users should start cooperating again to continue using the
optimal strategy.

Cheers
Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces

📅 Original date posted:2021-02-19 📝 Original message:Hi ...

2023-06-07T18:28:53Z

In reply to nevent1q…xjyj
_________________________

📅 Original date posted:2021-02-19
📝 Original message:Hi Michael
I think you're right, sorry for getting a little apocalyptic at the
end there lol.

> On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 3:08 AM Michael Folkson via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>
> Thanks for your response Ariel. It would be useful if you responded to specific points I have made in the mailing list post or at least quote these ephemeral "people" you speak of. I don't know if you're responding to conversation on the IRC channel or on social media etc.
> > The argument comes from a naive assumption that users MUST upgrade to the choice that is submitted into code. But in fact this isn't true and some voices in this discussion need to be more humble about what users must or must not run.
> I personally have never made this assumption. Of course users aren't forced to run any particular software version, quite the opposite. Defaults set in software versions matter though as many users won't change them.

I'm mostly referring to the two IRC discussions. I normally try to
avoid singling people out that's why I didn't refer to anyone in
perticular.
Here I'll list a couple of quotes from these ephemeral people, while
reading them keep in mind what would happen if a majority users and
miners decide to just avoid the latest version.
- 11:06: "LOT=true does not split the chain. It strictly reduces the
liklihood of that."
- 11:06: "LOT=false has chainsplit risks, not LOT=true"
- 08:59 "I guess it would be helpful to hear miners' answers to that question."
Response: 09:01 "not sure why; miners don't decide anything in this
regard it's more of `Taproot is activating. Please accelerate it if
you can`"
Reading the logs again I see some voices that do consider the right
that users and miners have to run whatever version they want
Response: 09:03 "I ask because you said something that's equivalent to
`miners don't get to decide which version of core their run`."
- T1, T2, T3, and T6 have language that assumes mass support for a
UASF and then proceed to make conclusions on what is safer and easier
to coordinate
A voice in the discussion expressed the same point I'm making:
10:53 "I disagree with T1: i don't think there is any logical
consequence in hardcoding LOT=true ensuring Taproot activation and
even less ensuring no political shenanigans. We obviously need
economic majority to run it and that would open way more political
arguments that they bluntly take part in an UASF without any bad
behaviour from miners."
- 11:14 "we know people will run LOT=true regardless of the default,
so it will be safer if LOT=true is made the default"
- 11:18 "With LOT=true, attempted UASFs are not necessary"
- 11:18 "why give them the ability to act maliciously in the first place?"
Response:11:18"LOT=false does not; people choosing to run software
that will enforce taproot under some reasonable circumstances provides
the information. LOT=false just reduces the risk of unexpected
results from resulting in danger."
Response: 11:18 "LOT=false strictly increases the risks though.."
Response: 11:18 "please stop saying that, there are tradeoffs both ways."
- 11:11 "LOT=false gives miners the ability to decide [in response to
someone saying that LOT=false gives everyone else in the community the
ability to decide]"
This quote is a bit more nuanced because the implication is that
LOT=true doesn't give the ability to decide. But in reality they have
the ability to decide to not upgrade. Users can also not upgrade to
be in solidarity with miners to protect them from unfair distrust and
aggression.
All the arguments above for LOT=true are rooted in the assumption that
everyone must upgrade to the latest version because of course they
will...? But that's not a given.

There are examples of people being aware that miners and users can run
any version they want. I misjudged the number of people who know that
LOT=true doesn't guarantee anything.
- 11:17 "The LOT=True crowd seems to have an underlying assumption
that a UASF will occur instead of something more orderly like Modern
Softfork Activation suggested, why? I don't think chances of that
happening are very high unless things play out similarly to Segwit but
it doesn't look like that."
- 11:17 "UASFs can be made much more difficult with a counter-UASF....
UASFs like this one and segwit relied on intolerant-minority effects"
(I'm assuming counter-UASF means not upgrading as opposed to upgrading
to a new client that rejects the activation flag)

> There is the (unlikely but possible) possibility of a wasted year if LOT is set to false and miners fail to activate. I'm not convinced by this perception that LOT=true is antagonistic to miners. I actually think it offers them clarity on what will happen over a year time period and removes the need for coordinated or uncoordinated community UASF efforts on top of LOT=false.
If you look at https://taprootactivation.com/ no miners seem to be
expressing any support at all for lot=true. To pre-empt the counter
argument, I know that miners don't decide, I'm just using that poll as
a proxy to estimate whether they would be antagonized by the promotion
of LOT=true.
I'm not a miner and I think the "fork will happen regardless of the
consequences" attitude is antagonistic towards everyone in general,
not just miners.
The LOT=true activation mechanism may be tolerated today because
Taproot has wide support. But in order to prevent future antagonistic
behavior around future network changes (possibly more controversial
ones) we should continue the norm of including miners in the
activation process, as the friends they are.
This idea that LOT=true provides clarity is another is another example
of an argument rooted in the assumption that users will upgrade
because of course they will. No activation mechanism provides ANY
guarantees and neither does LOT=true so it's infair to frame it as if
it does.
This is your argument Michael, please don't take anything I say
personally I'm just arguing the points.

> It is a possible outcome but the likely outcome is that miners activate Taproot before LOT is even relevant. I think it is prudent to prepare for the unlikely but possible outcome that miners fail to activate and hence have this discussion now rather than be unprepared for that eventuality. If LOT is set to false in a software release there is the possibility (T2 in https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/018380.html) of individuals or a proportion of the community changing LOT to true. In that sense setting LOT=false in a software release appears to be no more safe than LOT=true.
If a LOT=true client is released I think the likely outcome is that
people won't upgrade at all and I would say that miners failing to
activate will become more likely than you think, strictly due to a
loud group promoting LOT=true.
It's true that some will stubbornly run LOT=true regardless. But if
they have not been provoked to do so then I would hope the community
promotes unity and shuns needlessly conflictive attitudes to avoid
the, admittedly inevitable, network split from gathering momentum (a
counter-UASF).
I hope individuals opt for unity and become intolerant (counter-UASF)
of intolerance (unprovoked-UASF).

> TL;DR It sounds like you agree with my recommendation to set LOT=false in protocol implementations in my email :)
Yes I do agree with the recommendation of LOT=false. Thank you for
organizing the discussion.

On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 3:12 AM Samson Mow <samson.mow at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> "An activation mechanism is a consensus change like any other change, can be contentious like any other change, and we must resolve it like any other change. Otherwise we risk arriving at the darkest timeline."
>
> Who's we here?
By "we" I meant everyone involved in the discussion of the activation
mechanism. The discussion is slowly growing and eventually has to
reach social media.
>
> Release both and let the network decide.
If two clients are released with matching activation parameters except
for opposing LOT then LOT=true kind of spoils the LOT=false choice
(only if LOT=true manages to gather support) because running LOT=false
is being complicit/tolerant of the aggressive attitude of LOT=true.
In the case of both being released I would opt for running neither and
I hope most users and miners do too. Again, with the caveat that only
if there is visible significant support for LOT=true. And yes, the
"significant" is a subjective word and, based on risk appetite, is
different for everyone. That's part of the issue.
A funny metaphor is that if someone is visibly pissing in a pool I'm
not going to swim on the other side of the pool, I just won't swim at
all and go do whatever I was doing before.

Cheers
Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces

On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 7:18 AM Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is absolutely the case, however note that the activation method itself is consensus code which executes as a part
> of a fork, and one which deserves as much scrutiny as anything else. While taproot is a model of how a soft-fork should
> be designed, this doesn't imply anything about the consensus code which represents the activation thereof.
>
> Hence all the debate around activation - ultimately its also defining a fork, and given the politics around it, one
> which almost certainly carries significantly more risk than Taproot.
>
> Note that I don't believe anyone is advocating for "try to activate, and if it fails, move on". Various people have
> various views on how conservative and timelines for what to do at that point, but I believe most in this discussion are
> OK with flag-day-based activation (given some level of care) if it becomes clear Taproot is supported by a vast majority
> of Bitcoin users and is only not activating due to lagging miner upgrades.
>
> Matt
>
> On 2/18/21 10:04, Keagan McClelland wrote:
> > Hi all,
> >
> > I think it's important for us to consider what is actually being considered for activation here.
> >
> > The designation of "soft fork" is accurate but I don't think it adequately conveys how non-intrusive a change like this
> > is. All that taproot does (unless I'm completely missing something) is imbue a previously undefined script version with
> > actual semantics. In order for a chain reorg to take place it would mean that someone would have to have a use case for
> > that script version today. This is something I think that we can easily check by digging through the UTXO set or
> > history. If anyone is using that script version, we absolutely should not be using it, but that doesn't mean that we
> > can't switch to a script version that no one is actually using.
> >
> > If no one is even attempting to use the script version, then the change has no effect on whether a chain split occurs
> > because there is simply no block that contains a transaction that only some of the network will accept.
> >
> > Furthermore, I don't know how Bitcoin can stand the test of time if we allow developers who rely on "undefined behavior"
> > (which the taproot script version presently is) to exert tremendous influence over what code does or does not get run.
> > This isn't a soft fork that makes some particular UTXO's unspendable. It isn't one that bans miners from collecting
> > fees. It is a change that means that certain "always accept" transactions actually have real conditions you have to
> > meet. I can't imagine a less intrusive change.
> >
> > On the other hand, choosing to let L=F be a somewhat final call sets a very real precedent that 10% of what I estimate
> > to be 1% of bitcoin users can effectively block any change from here on forward. At that point we are saying that miners
> > are in control of network consensus in ways they have not been up until now. I don't think this is a more desirable
> > outcome to let ~0.1% of the network get to block /non-intrusive/ changes that the rest of the network wants.
> >
> > I can certainly live with an L=F attempt as a way to punt on the discussion, maybe the activation happens and this will
> > all be fine. But if it doesn't, I hardly think that users of Bitcoin are just going to be like "well, guess that's it
> > for Taproot". I have no idea what ensues at that point, but probably another community led UASF movement.
> >
> > I wasn't super well educated on this stuff back in '17 when Segwit went down, as I was new at that time, so if I'm
> > missing something please say so. But from my point of view, we can't treat all soft forks as equal.
> >
> > Keagan
> >
> > On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 7:43 AM Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>> wrote:
> >
> > We've had several softforks in Bitcoin which, through the course of their activation, had a several-block reorg. That
> > should be indication enough that we need to very carefully consider activation to ensure we reduce the risk of that as
> > much as absolutely possible. Again, while I think Taproot is a huge improvement and am looking forward to being able to
> > use it, getting unlucky and hitting a 4-block reorg that happens to include a double-spend and some PR around an
> > exchange losing millions would be worse than having Taproot is good.
> >
> > Matt
> >
> > On 2/18/21 09:26, Michael Folkson wrote:
> > > Thanks for your response Matt. It is a fair challenge. There is always going to be an element of risk with soft
> > forks,
> > > all we can do is attempt to minimize that risk. I would argue that risk has been minimized for Taproot.
> > >
> > > You know (better than I do in fact) that Bitcoin (and layers built on top of it) greatly benefit from upgrades
> > such as
> > > Taproot. To say we shouldn't do Taproot or any future soft forks because there is a small but real risk of chain
> > splits
> > > I think is shortsighted. Indeed I think even if we collectively decided not to do any future soft fork upgrades ever
> > > again on this mailing list that wouldn't stop soft fork attempts from other people in future.
> > >
> > > I don't think there is anything else we can do to minimize that risk for the Taproot soft fork at this point
> > though I'm
> > > open to ideas. To reiterate that risk will never be zero. I don't think I see Bitcoin as fragile as you seem to
> > (though
> > > admittedly you have a much better understanding than me of what happened in 2017).
> > >
> > > The likely scenario for the Taproot soft fork is LOT turns out to be entirely irrelevant and miners activate Taproot
> > > before it becomes relevant. And even the unlikely worst case scenario would only cause short term disruption and
> > > wouldn't kill Bitcoin long term.
> > >
> > > On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 2:01 PM Matt Corallo <lf-lists at mattcorallo.com <mailto:lf-lists at mattcorallo.com>
> > <mailto:lf-lists at mattcorallo.com <mailto:lf-lists at mattcorallo.com>>> wrote:
> > >
> > > If the eventual outcome is that different implementations (that have material *transaction processing* userbases,
> > > and I’m not sure to what extent that’s true with Knots) ship different consensus rules, we should stop here
> > and not
> > > activate Taproot. Seriously.
> > >
> > > Bitcoin is a consensus system. The absolute worst outcome at all possible is to have it fall out of consensus.
> > >
> > > Matt
> > >
> > >> On Feb 18, 2021, at 08:11, Michael Folkson via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> > >> <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>>> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Right, that is one option. Personally I would prefer a Bitcoin Core release sets LOT=false (based on what I have
> > >> heard from Bitcoin Core contributors) and a community effort releases a version with LOT=true. I don't think
> > users
> > >> should be forced to choose something they may have no context on before they are allowed to use Bitcoin Core.
> > >>
> > >> My current understanding is that roasbeef is planning to set LOT=false on btcd (an alternative protocol
> > >> implementation to Bitcoin Core) and Luke Dashjr hasn't yet decided on Bitcoin Knots.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 11:52 AM ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com <mailto:ZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com>
> > <mailto:ZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com <mailto:ZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com>>> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> Good morning all,
> > >>
> > >> > "An activation mechanism is a consensus change like any other change, can be contentious like any other
> > >> change, and we must resolve it like any other change. Otherwise we risk arriving at the darkest timeline."
> > >> >
> > >> > Who's we here?
> > >> >
> > >> > Release both and let the network decide.
> > >>
> > >> A thing that could be done, without mandating either LOT=true or LOT=false, would be to have a release that
> > >> requires a `taprootlot=1` or `taprootlot=0` and refuses to start if the parameter is not set.
> > >>
> > >> This assures everyone that neither choice is being forced on users, and instead what is being forced on
> > users,
> > >> is for users to make that choice themselves.
> > >>
> > >> Regards,
> > >> ZmnSCPxj
> > >>
> > >> >
> > >> > On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 3:08 AM Michael Folkson via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> > >> <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>>> wrote:
> > >> >
> > >> > > Thanks for your response Ariel. It would be useful if you responded to specific points I have made
> > in the
> > >> mailing list post or at least quote these ephemeral "people" you speak of. I don't know if you're responding
> > >> to conversation on the IRC channel or on social media etc.
> > >> > >
> > >> > > > The argument comes from a naive assumption that users MUST upgrade to the choice that is submitted
> > into
> > >> code. But in fact this isn't true and some voices in this discussion need to be more humble about what users
> > >> must or must not run.
> > >> > >
> > >> > > I personally have never made this assumption. Of course users aren't forced to run any particular
> > software
> > >> version, quite the opposite. Defaults set in software versions matter though as many users won't change
> > them.
> > >> > >
> > >> > > > Does no one realize that it is a very possible outcome that if LOT=true is released there may be
> > only a
> > >> handful of people that begin running it while everyone else delays their upgrade (with the very good
> > reason of
> > >> not getting involved in politics) and a year later those handful of people just become stuck at the
> > moment of
> > >> MUST_SIGNAL, unable to mine new blocks?
> > >> > >
> > >> > > It is a possible outcome but the likely outcome is that miners activate Taproot before LOT is even
> > >> relevant. I think it is prudent to prepare for the unlikely but possible outcome that miners fail to
> > activate
> > >> and hence have this discussion now rather than be unprepared for that eventuality. If LOT is set to
> > false in a
> > >> software release there is the possibility (T2 in
> > >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/018380.html
> > <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/018380.html>;
> > >> <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/018380.html
> > <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/018380.html>>;) of individuals or a
> > >> proportion of the community changing LOT to true. In that sense setting LOT=false in a software release
> > >> appears to be no more safe than LOT=true.
> > >> > >
> > >> > > > The result: a wasted year of waiting and a minority of people who didn't want to be lenient with
> > miners
> > >> by default.
> > >> > >
> > >> > > There is the (unlikely but possible) possibility of a wasted year if LOT is set to false and miners fail
> > >> to activate. I'm not convinced by this perception that LOT=true is antagonistic to miners. I actually
> > think it
> > >> offers them clarity on what will happen over a year time period and removes the need for coordinated or
> > >> uncoordinated community UASF efforts on top of LOT=false.
> > >> > >
> > >> > > > An activation mechanism is a consensus change like any other change, can be contentious like any other
> > >> change, and we must resolve it like any other change. Otherwise we risk arriving at the darkest timeline.
> > >> > >
> > >> > > I don't know what you are recommending here to avoid "this darkest timeline". Open discussions have
> > >> occurred and are continuing and in my mailing list post that you responded to **I recommended we propose
> > >> LOT=false be set in protocol implementations such as Bitcoin Core**. I do think this apocalyptic language
> > >> isn't particularly helpful. In an open consensus system discussion is healthy, we should prepare for bad or
> > >> worst case scenarios in advance and doing so is not antagonistic or destructive. Mining pools have pledged
> > >> support for Taproot but we don't build secure systems based on pledges of support, we build them to minimize
> > >> trust in any human actors. We can be grateful that people like Alejandro have worked hard on
> > >> taprootactivation.com <http://taprootactivation.com>; <http://taprootactivation.com
> > <http://taprootactivation.com>>; (and this effort has informed the discussion) without
> > >> taking pledges of support as cast iron guarantees.
> > >> > >
> > >> > > TL;DR It sounds like you agree with my recommendation to set LOT=false in protocol implementations in my
> > >> email :)
> > >> > >
> > >> > > On Thu, Feb 18, 2021 at 5:43 AM Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces <arielluaces at gmail.com
> > <mailto:arielluaces at gmail.com>
> > >> <mailto:arielluaces at gmail.com <mailto:arielluaces at gmail.com>>> wrote:
> > >> > >
> > >> > > > Something what strikes me about the conversation is the emotion surrounding the letters UASF.
> > >> > > > It appears as if people discuss UASF as if it's a massive tidal wave of support that is
> > inevitable, like
> > >> we saw during segwit activation. But the actual definition is "any activation that is not a MASF".
> > >> > > > A UASF can consist of a single node, ten nodes, a thousand, half of all nodes, all business' nodes, or
> > >> even all the non mining nodes. On another dimension it can have zero mining support, 51% support, 49%
> > support,
> > >> or any support right up against a miner activation threshold.
> > >> > > > Hell a UASF doesn't even need code or even a single node running as long as it exists as a possibility
> > >> in people's minds.
> > >> > > > The only thing a UASF doesn't have is miner support above an agreed activation threshold (some number
> > >> above %51).
> > >> > > > I say this because it strikes me when people say that they are for LOT=true with the logic that
> > since a
> > >> UASF is guaranteed to happen then it's better to just make it default from the beginning. Words like
> > >> coordination and safety are sometimes sprinkled into the argument.
> > >> > > > The argument comes from a naive assumption that users MUST upgrade to the choice that is submitted
> > into
> > >> code. But in fact this isn't true and some voices in this discussion need to be more humble about what users
> > >> must or must not run.
> > >> > > > Does no one realize that it is a very possible outcome that if LOT=true is released there may be
> > only a
> > >> handful of people that begin running it while everyone else delays their upgrade (with the very good
> > reason of
> > >> not getting involved in politics) and a year later those handful of people just become stuck at the
> > moment of
> > >> MUST_SIGNAL, unable to mine new blocks? Or attracting a minority of miners, activating, and forking off
> > into a
> > >> minority fork. Then a lot=false could be started that ends up activating the feature now that the stubborn
> > >> option has ran its course.
> > >> > > > The result: a wasted year of waiting and a minority of people who didn't want to be lenient with
> > miners
> > >> by default. The chains could be called BitcoinLenient and BitcoinStubborn.
> > >> > > > How is that strictly safer or more coordinated?
> > >> > > > I may be in the minority, or maybe a silent majority, or maybe a majority that just hasn't considered
> > >> this as a choice but honestly if there is contention about whether we're going to be stubborn or lenient
> > with
> > >> miners for Taproot and in the future then I prefer to just not activate anything at all. I'm fine for
> > calling
> > >> bitcoin ossified, accepting that segwit is Bitcoin's last network upgrade. Taproot is amazing but no new
> > >> feature is worth a network split down the middle.
> > >> > > > Maybe in 10 or 20 years, when other blockchains implement features like Taproot and many more, we will
> > >> become envious enough to put aside our differences on how to behave towards miners and finally activate
> > Taproot.
> > >> > > > An activation mechanism is a consensus change like any other change, can be contentious like any other
> > >> change, and we must resolve it like any other change. Otherwise we risk arriving at the darkest timeline.
> > >> > > > Cheers
> > >> > > > Ariel Lorenzo-Luaces
> > >> > > > On Feb 17, 2021, at 7:05 AM, Michael Folkson via bitcoin-dev
> > <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> > >> <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>>> wrote:
> > >> > > >
> > >> > > > > Yesterday (February 16th) we held a second meeting on Taproot
> > >> > > > > activation on IRC which again was open to all. Despite what appeared
> > >> > > > > to be majority support for LOT=false over LOT=true in the first
> > >> > > > > meeting I (and others) thought the arguments had not been explored in
> > >> > > > > depth and that we should have a follow up meeting almost entirely
> > >> > > > > focused on whether LOT (lockinontimeout) should be set to true or
> > >> > > > > false.
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > The meeting was announced here:
> > >> > > > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/018380.html
> > <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/018380.html>;
> > >> <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/018380.html
> > <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/018380.html>>;
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > In that mailing list post I outlined the arguments for LOT=true (T1 to
> > >> > > > > T6) and arguments for LOT=false (F1 to F6) in their strongest form I
> > >> > > > > could. David Harding responded with an additional argument for
> > >> > > > > LOT=false (F7) here:
> > >> > > > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/018415.html
> > <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/018415.html>;
> > >> <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/018415.html
> > <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/018415.html>>;
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > These meetings are very challenging given they are open to all, you
> > >> > > > > don’t know who will attend and you don’t know most people’s views in
> > >> > > > > advance. I tried to give time for both the LOT=true arguments and the
> > >> > > > > LOT=false arguments to be discussed as I knew there was support for
> > >> > > > > both. We only tried evaluating which had more support and which had
> > >> > > > > more strong opposition towards the end of the meeting.
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > The conversation log is here:
> > >> > > > > http://gnusha.org/taproot-activation/2021-02-16.log
> > <http://gnusha.org/taproot-activation/2021-02-16.log>; <http://gnusha.org/taproot-activation/2021-02-16.log
> > <http://gnusha.org/taproot-activation/2021-02-16.log>>;
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > (If you are so inclined you can watch a video of the meeting here.
> > >> > > > > Thanks to the YouTube account “Bitcoin” for setting up the livestream:
> > >> > > > > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vpl5q1ovMLM <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vpl5q1ovMLM>;
> > <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vpl5q1ovMLM <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vpl5q1ovMLM>>;)
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > A summary of the meeting was provided by Luke Dashjr on Mastodon here:
> > >> > > > > https://bitcoinhackers.org/@lukedashjr/105742918779234566
> > <https://bitcoinhackers.org/@lukedashjr/105742918779234566>;
> > >> <https://bitcoinhackers.org/@lukedashjr/105742918779234566
> > <https://bitcoinhackers.org/@lukedashjr/105742918779234566>>;
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > Today's #Bitcoin #Taproot meeting was IMO largely unproductive, but we
> > >> > > > > did manage to come to consensus on everything but LockinOnTimeout.
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > Activation height range: 693504-745920
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > MASF threshold: 1815/2016 blocks (90%)
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > Keep in mind only ~100 people showed for the meetings, hardly
> > >> > > > > representative of the entire community.
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > So, these details remain JUST a proposal for now.
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > It seems inevitable that there won't be consensus on LOT.
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > Everyone will have to choose for himself. :/
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > Personally I agree with most of this. I agree that there wasn’t
> > >> > > > > overwhelming consensus for either LOT=true or LOT=false. However, from
> > >> > > > > my perspective there was clearly more strong opposition (what would
> > >> > > > > usually be deemed a NACK in Bitcoin Core review terminology) from
> > >> > > > > Bitcoin Core contributors, Lightning developers and other community
> > >> > > > > members against LOT=true than there was for LOT=false. Andrew Chow
> > >> > > > > tried to summarize views from the meeting in this analysis:
> > >> > > > > https://gist.github.com/achow101/3e179501290abb7049de198d46894c7c
> > <https://gist.github.com/achow101/3e179501290abb7049de198d46894c7c>;
> > >> <https://gist.github.com/achow101/3e179501290abb7049de198d46894c7c
> > <https://gist.github.com/achow101/3e179501290abb7049de198d46894c7c>>;
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > I am also aware of other current and previous Bitcoin Core
> > >> > > > > contributors and Lightning developers who didn’t attend the meeting in
> > >> > > > > person who are opposed to LOT=true. I don’t want to put them in the
> > >> > > > > spotlight for no reason but if you go through the conversation logs of
> > >> > > > > not only the meeting but the weeks of discussion prior to this meeting
> > >> > > > > you will see their views evaluated on the ##taproot-activation
> > >> > > > > channel. In addition, on taprootactivation.com <http://taprootactivation.com>;
> > <http://taprootactivation.com <http://taprootactivation.com>>; some mining pools
> > >> > > > > expressed a preference for lot=false though I don’t know how strong
> > >> > > > > that preference was.
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > I am only one voice but it is my current assessment that if we are to
> > >> > > > > attempt to finalize Taproot activation parameters and propose them to
> > >> > > > > the community at this time our only option is to propose LOT=false.
> > >> > > > > Any further delay appears to me counterproductive in our collective
> > >> > > > > aim to get the Taproot soft fork activated as early as possible.
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > Obviously others are free to disagree with that assessment and
> > >> > > > > continue discussions but personally I will be attempting to avoid
> > >> > > > > those discussions unless prominent new information comes to light or
> > >> > > > > various specific individuals change their minds.
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > Next week we are planning a code review of the Bitcoin Core PR #19573
> > >> > > > > which was initially delayed because of this LOT discussion. As I’ve
> > >> > > > > said previously that will be loosely following the format of the
> > >> > > > > Bitcoin Core PR review club and will be lower level and more
> > >> > > > > technical. That is planned for Tuesday February 23rd at 19:00 UTC on
> > >> > > > > the IRC channel ##taproot-activation.
> > >> > > > >
> > >> > > > > Thanks to the meeting participants (and those who joined the
> > >> > > > > discussion on the channel prior and post the meeting) for engaging
> > >> > > > > productively and in good faith.
> > >> > >
> > >> > > --
> > >> > > Michael Folkson
> > >> > > Email: michaelfolkson at gmail.com <mailto:michaelfolkson at gmail.com> <mailto:michaelfolkson at gmail.com
> > <mailto:michaelfolkson at gmail.com>>
> > >> > > Keybase: michaelfolkson
> > >> > > PGP: 43ED C999 9F85 1D40 EAF4 9835 92D6 0159 214C FEE3
> > >> > > _______________________________________________
> > >> > > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > >> > > bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> > <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>>
> > >> > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> > <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>;
> > >> <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> > <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>>;
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> --
> > >> Michael Folkson
> > >> Email: michaelfolkson at gmail.com <mailto:michaelfolkson at gmail.com> <mailto:michaelfolkson at gmail.com
> > <mailto:michaelfolkson at gmail.com>>
> > >> Keybase: michaelfolkson
> > >> PGP: 43ED C999 9F85 1D40 EAF4 9835 92D6 0159 214C FEE3
> > >> _______________________________________________
> > >> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > >> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> > <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>>
> > >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> > <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>;
> > >> <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> > <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>>;
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Michael Folkson
> > > Email: michaelfolkson at gmail.com <mailto:michaelfolkson at gmail.com> <mailto:michaelfolkson at gmail.com
> > <mailto:michaelfolkson at gmail.com>>
> > > Keybase: michaelfolkson
> > > PGP: 43ED C999 9F85 1D40 EAF4 9835 92D6 0159 214C FEE3
> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org <mailto:bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org>
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> > <https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev>;
> >
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