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📅 Original date posted:2015-12-28 📝 Original message:> ...

2023-06-07T17:46:58Z

In reply to nevent1q…xuy9
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📅 Original date posted:2015-12-28
📝 Original message:>
> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 2:12 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Far more concerning is network propagation effects between large and
> small miners. For that class of issues, if you are in an environemnt
> where selfish mining is possible - a fairly flat, easily DoS/sybil
> attacked network topology - the profitability difference between small
> and large miners even *without* attacks going on is a hugely worrying
> problem. OTOH, if you're blocksize is small enough that propagation time
> is negligable to profitability, then selfish mining attacks with <30%
> hashing power aren't much of a concern - they'll be naturally defeated
> by anti-DoS/anti-sybil measures.
>

Let's agree that one factor in mining profitability is bandwidth/network
reliability/stability. Why focus on that vs electricity contracts or
vertically integrated chip manufacturers? Surely, sufficient network
bandwidth is a more broadly available commodity than <$0.02/kwh
electricity, for example. I'm not sure that your stranded hydroelectric
miner is any more desirable than thousands of dorm room miners with access
to 10gbit university connections and free electricity.
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📅 Original date posted:2015-06-28 📝 Original message:On ...

2023-06-07T15:40:40Z

In reply to nevent1q…pu33
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📅 Original date posted:2015-06-28
📝 Original message:On Sun, Jun 28, 2015 at 8:13 AM, Jorge Timón <jtimon at jtimon.cc> wrote:

>
> No, this is very important. The majority has no right to dictate on
> the minority.
>

While an interesting philosophical question, I don't think that this is
accurate. First off, bitcoin doesn't imbue any 'rights' on individuals -
it provides the choice of participating or not, nothing more.

Secondly, from a technical perspective, how is it that the majority (or
super-majority) are prevented from imposing their will? The best answer is
that they are incentivized to not override a minority group since that
reduces the inherent value in the system. However, presuming that the
majority calculate that the reward for imposing a change is greater than
the value lost in such disruption, I don't see how there would be any
stopping this change. The longest chain with the greatest number of users
valuing the token on that chain "wins".
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📅 Original date posted:2015-06-26 📝 Original message:On ...

2023-06-07T15:39:46Z

In reply to nevent1q…3xrj
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📅 Original date posted:2015-06-26
📝 Original message:On Fri, Jun 26, 2015 at 3:08 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:

> On Tue, Jun 23, 2015 at 05:24:23PM -0400, Gavin Andresen wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 23, 2015 at 4:46 PM, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> >
> > > Pieter Wuille showed with simulations that miners with bad connectivity
> > > are negatively affected by other miners creating larger blocks.
> > >
> >
> > ... but the effect is only significant if they have an absurdly
> > low-bandwidth connection and do NOTHING to work around it (like rent a
> > server on the other side of the bandwidth bottleneck and write some code
> to
> > make sure you're creating blocks that will propagate quickly on both
> sides
> > of the bottleneck).
>
> "Just rent a server" forces miners into deploying insecure hosted
> infrastructure that's vulnerable to hacking and seizure; that we
> encourage this already is worrying; requiring it for miners to be
> profitable isn't acceptable.
>

There are a number of factors that contribute to mining vulnerabilities.
For example, presuming a miner is a meaningful contributor to the network,
they'll be using more electricity than their neighbors and will be easily
identifiable in the same way illegal grow-houses are identified by the
local power company working with authorities. A hacked or seized hosted
server is far easier to recover from than seized equipment. Its hard to see
how requiring a reasonably reliable internet connection is a particularly
high barrier to entry when compared to the other mining requirements, such
as funds to purchase ASICs, competitive electricity costs, reasonable
belief that equipment won't be stolen or seized, the technical knowledge
for setting up a p2pool node, etc.
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📅 Original date posted:2015-06-20 📝 Original message:Yep - ...

2023-06-07T15:39:00Z

In reply to nevent1q…v4ty
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📅 Original date posted:2015-06-20
📝 Original message:Yep - similarly: you live in a neighborhood with a local coffee store. Sure
you could use a stolen credit card or a fake $5 bill, but it's not worth
the risk of being caught for a $3 coffee. And on the other side, the store
can deal with 1% of transactions getting reversed or having a fake bill so
they don't change their procedures.

Perfection is not necessary in all situations.

On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 12:02 AM, Eric Lombrozo <elombrozo at gmail.com> wrote:

>
> > On Jun 19, 2015, at 8:48 PM, Luke Dashjr <luke at dashjr.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Saturday, June 20, 2015 1:23:03 AM Aaron Voisine wrote:
> >> They don't need to be made cryptographically safe, they just have to be
> >> safer than, for instance, credit card payments that can be charged
> back. As
> >> long as it's reasonably good in practice, that's fine.
> >
> > They never will be. You can get a decent rate of success merely by
> making one
> > transaction propagate fast (eg, 1 input, 1 output) and the other slow
> (eg,
> > 1000 inputs, 1000 outputs) and choosing your peers carefully. The only
> reason
> > unconfirmed transactions aren't double spent today is because nobody is
> > seriously *trying*.
> >
> > Luke
> >
>
>
> Newspapers are often sold in vending machines that make it possible for
> anyone to just pay the price of one and take them all…and most of the time
> they are not that carefully monitored. Why? Because most people have better
> things to do than try to steal a few newspapers. They probably were much
> more closely monitored earlier in their history…but once it became clear
> that despite the obvious attack vector very few people actually try to game
> it, vendors figured it wasn’t really that big a risk. Same thing applies to
> people trying to steal a piece of bubble gum at the cash register at a
> convenience store by double-spending.
>
> - Eric Lombrozo
>
> >
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > _______________________________________________
> > Bitcoin-development mailing list
> > Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
> > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>
>
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