{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"Ava (npub1f6…azcka)","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1f6ugxyxkknket3kkdgu4k0fu74vmshawermkj8d06sz6jts9t4kslazcka","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"This is concerning.\n\nThe FCC moved to deny authorization for new foreign-made consumer router models. That means upcoming models can’t legally be imported or sold in the U.S.\n\nIt also issued only a temporary waiver allowing firmware/security updates for already-approved devices through March 2027. That creates a potential update cliff unless extended.\n\nHardware trust isn’t a one-direction problem. Snowden documents described NSA “interdiction”—intercepting networking gear in transit, implanting surveillance tooling, then resealing and shipping it onward. Even Cisco publicly complained after those revelations.\n\nSnowden’s operational takeaway was basically:\n• minimize trust in vendor firmware\n• prefer open-source firmware where possible\n• segment your network\n• assume routers are hostile infrastructure\n• disable remote management\n• encrypt above the router\n\nThere’s another issue: many privacy-friendly routers are foreign-made. Devices commonly used for OpenWrt and auditability—like GL.iNet_ models (Beryl, Slate, Flint)—are manufactured overseas.\n\n\"American” brands don’t necessarily solve this; companies like Linksys are foreign-owned and build hardware abroad.\n\nRouters are inherently high-risk supply-chain devices—regardless of origin.\n\nThis policy doesn’t change that reality.\nIt just shifts which supply chain you’re being asked to trust."}