{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1798ncudyucap9jzzujjsgufx8tdykm8auzfledjcs6f6wf4ekqvq8lpmjt","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1798ncudyucap9jzzujjsgufx8tdykm8auzfledjcs6f6wf4ekqvq8lpmjt","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-02-12\n📝 Original message:Den 12 feb 2015 16:15 skrev \"Mike Hearn\" \u003cmike at plan99.net\u003e:\n\u003e\n\u003e The first is that this setup means miners can steal arbitrary payments if\nthey work together with the sender of the money. The model assumes this\ncollaboration won't happen, but it will. Because no existing wallet has a\n\"double spend this\" button, to make the scheme work the dishonest miners\nmust create and distribute such a wallet that implements the whole\nscorched-earth protocol. At that point it's easy for miners to reward the\npayment fraudster with some of the stolen money the merchant lost, meaning\nit now makes sense for the fraudster to always do this. The situation isn't\nstable at all.\n\u003e\n\u003e The second is that it incentivises competitors to engage in payment fraud\nagainst each other. A big rich coffee shop chain that is facing competition\nfrom a small, scrappy newcomer can simply walk into the new shop and buy\nthings, then trigger the \"scorched earth\". Even with no miner\ncollaboration, this means the big company is down the cost of the product\nbut so is the little company who lost everything. Whoever can outspend the\nother wins.\n\u003e\n\u003e We don't really need game theory to tell us that this plan is a bad idea.\nJust imagine trying to explain it to an actual shop keeper. They would\nthink you were crazy. Bitcoin is already a hard enough concept to\nunderstand without throwing into the mix \"anyone can burn the money they\ngave you after walking out of the shop\".\n\nI see no fundamental difference in outcome from miner collusion in\nscorched-fee (which isn't guaranteed to pay the \"right\" pool!) and miner\ncollusion in knowingly mining a doublespend transaction.\n\nBoth outcomes pay the miner and thief equally when successful. The merchant\nloses in both.\n\nZero-conf needs something else for security. A guarantee it can not be\ndoublespent in the relevant time frame.\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150212/1da9aa24/attachment.html\u003e"}