{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1swfeusu3ua9trup00qcnrgc2yndksyvgku4epk5tec7u4fmrez6qxpul5t","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1swfeusu3ua9trup00qcnrgc2yndksyvgku4epk5tec7u4fmrez6qxpul5t","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2014-04-23\n📝 Original message:\u003e And it still would. Non-collusive miners cast votes based on the outcome\n\u003e of their own attempts to double spend.\n\u003e\n\nIndividually rational strategy is to vote for coinbase reallocation on\nevery block.\n\nYes, in that case nobody will get reward. It is similar to prisoner's\ndilemma: equilibrium has worst pay-off.\nIn practice that would mean that simple game-theoretic models are no longer\napplicable, as they lead to absurd results.\n\n\n\u003e I'm using it in the same sense Satoshi used it. Honest miners work to\n\u003e prevent double spends. That's the entire justification for their existence.\n\u003e Miners that are deliberately trying to double spend are worse than useless.\n\u003e\n\nMiners work to get rewards.\nIt absolutely doesn't matter whether they are deliberately trying to\ndouble-spend or not: they won't be able to double-spend without a collusion.\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20140423/94b5255c/attachment.html\u003e"}