{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1fx98zxt3lzspjs5f4msr0fxysx5euucm29ghysryju7vpc9j0jzqtcl2d8","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1fx98zxt3lzspjs5f4msr0fxysx5euucm29ghysryju7vpc9j0jzqtcl2d8","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2014-04-24\n📝 Original message:On 4/23/14, Mike Hearn \u003cmike at plan99.net\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e I guess word \"honest\" might have different meanings, that can be a source\n\u003e\u003e of confusing.\n\u003e\u003e 1. Honest -- not trying to destroy bitcoin\n\u003e\u003e 2. Honest -- following rules which are not required by the protocol\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e I'm using it in the same sense Satoshi used it. Honest miners work to\n\u003e prevent double spends. That's the entire justification for their existence.\n\nI thought the mechanism they used to prevent double-spends was proof of work.\nTherefore dishonest miners where only those who mine on top of a block\nwhich is not the longest valid chain they've seen.\nTo distinguish this definition from your own \"honest miners are those\nwho decide on double-spends by mining the transaction they saw first\"\ndefinition I propose to give another new name to the later, instead of\nchanging the definition of the former.\nSo inside the group of honest miners we have some that decide on\ntransactions based on reception times and others that simply maximize\ntheir revenue while respecting the protocol rules.\nI suggest \"stupid miners\" and \"smart miners\" respectively as more\nclear terms for what we're talking about here.\n\n\u003e Miners that are deliberately trying to double spend are worse than useless.\n\nI completely disagree.\nMiner's proof of work makes transactions irreversible. Even if zero\nconfirmation transactions weren't possible in a replace-by-fee\nenvironment, that's very useful.\nEven if you always had to wait for transactions to be confirmed with\nsome irreversible proof of work (as described in Satoshi's\nwhitepaper), it doesn't follow that \"automatically resolves the\nBitcoin experiment as a failure\". I don't understand how can you\nconclude that.\n\nBut in fact 0 conf txs are possible *precisely* using replace-by-fee,\nas described in the \"\n0 confirmation txs using replace-by-fee and game theory\" thread. So\nthat conclusion is definitely wrong.\n\nOn your concrete proposal, it seems to me that you're trying to\nprevent double-spending without relying on proof of work, which I\nthink it impossible in the context of a truly p2p system.\nI don't think your current proposal is secure and I fear that at best\nyou will end up with an \"invite only\" transaction processing network\nlike Ripple.com has with their consensus algorithm and Unique Node\nLists: that's not really p2p.\n\n-- \nJorge Timón\n\nhttp://freico.in/"}