{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2018-01-24\n📝 Original message:On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 10:49:34PM +0000, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev wrote:\n\u003e On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 10:19 PM, Rhavar via bitcoin-dev\n\u003e \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e Interesting. I didn't think about this before, but it seems like bip125 is\n\u003e \u003e rather incentive incompatible right now? If we're assuming a competitive\n\u003e \u003e mempool, it really doesn't seem generally rational to accept a replacement\n\u003e \u003e transaction of a lower fee rate.\n\u003e \n\u003e BIP125 replacement requires that the fee rate increases.  The text of\n\u003e the BIP document is written in a confusing way that doesn't make this\n\u003e clear.\n\nIn fact I considered only requiring an increase in fee rate, based on the\ntheory that if absolute fee went down, the transaction must be smaller and thus\nminers could overall earn more from the additional transactions they could fit\ninto their block. But to do that properly requires considering whether or not\nthat's actually true in the particular state the mempool as a whole happens to\nbe in, so I ditched that idea early on for the much simpler criteria of both a\nfeerate and absolute fee increase.\n\n-- \nhttps://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org\n-------------- next part --------------\nA non-text attachment was scrubbed...\nName: signature.asc\nType: application/pgp-signature\nSize: 455 bytes\nDesc: Digital signature\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20180124/473f7652/attachment.sig\u003e"}