{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1g5zswf6y48f7fy90jf3tlcuwdmjn8znhzaa4vkmtxaeskca8hpss23ms3l","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1g5zswf6y48f7fy90jf3tlcuwdmjn8znhzaa4vkmtxaeskca8hpss23ms3l","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2018-12-04\n📝 Original message:\nGood morning CJP,\n\n\n\u003e I think we could stop this type of attack by including some kind of\n\u003e shared secret in the onion message to the final node:\n\nI think we get this \"for free\" if we switch to path decorrelation and points+privkeys instead of hashes+preimages.\n\nPath decorrelation means that each hop is given a random point, to be added to the next SS \"HTLC\".\nThe final node needs to be given the total of the scalars of each hop random point along the route, most likely within the last hop of the onion.\nThe final node also cannot differentiate between an incorrect total for this scalar, or an incorrect \"invoice hash\"/invoice point.\n\nHence, some intermediate node along the way cannot guess this, and the final node will give the same error, i.e. \"invoice point not found\".\n\nRegards,\nZmnSCPxj"}