{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub17cwk7hm623dm5npjzu8cvv994h43k2keanegs8w78xyvlez8hqqsqqmtzy","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub17cwk7hm623dm5npjzu8cvv994h43k2keanegs8w78xyvlez8hqqsqqmtzy","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2020-03-04\n📝 Original message:I forgot one:\n\n=============\n5. The current BIP itself is poorly written and/or unnecessarily\ncomplex: e.g. remove the multi-proof support, and/or remove the\nextensibility stuff for a future proof-of-funds extension, and/or\nfocus solely on the generic sign message stuff.\n\n=============\n6. Some other solution\n\nOn Wed, Mar 4, 2020 at 3:23 PM Karl-Johan Alm\n\u003ckarljohan-alm at garage.co.jp\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e Hello,\n\u003e\n\u003e I noticed recently that a PR to Bitcoin Core that pretty much touched\n\u003e everything my BIP-322 pull request touches (around the same\n\u003e complexity) was merged without a thought given to BIP-322\n\u003e compatibility, despite the BIP-322 PR being open for 2x the time. I\n\u003e can only conclude from this that people dislike BIP-322 in its current\n\u003e form, which the 9 month old pull request stagnating can probably\n\u003e attest to.\n\u003e\n\u003e There are several things that I can do to make this a bit more\n\u003e appealing to people, which would hopefully kick the progress on this\n\u003e forward. I have already put in a non-trivial amount of energy and\n\u003e effort into maintaining the pull request as is, so I'd prefer if\n\u003e people were harsh and unfiltered in their criticism rather than polite\n\u003e and buffered, so I can beat this thing into shape (or abandon it, in\n\u003e the worst case).\n\u003e\n\u003e =============\n\u003e 1. People use signmessage as a way to prove funds. This is misleading\n\u003e and should be discouraged; throw the sign message stuff out and\n\u003e replace it entirely with a prove funds system.\n\u003e\n\u003e I know in particular luke-jr is of this opinion, and Greg Maxwell in\n\u003e https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/16440#issuecomment-568194168\n\u003e leans towards this opinion as well, it seems.\n\u003e\n\u003e =============\n\u003e 2. Use a transaction rather than a new format; make the first input's\n\u003e txid the message hash to ensure the tx cannot be broadcasted. This has\n\u003e the benefit of being able to provide to an existing hardware wallet\n\u003e without making any modifications to its firmware.\n\u003e\n\u003e I think Mark Friedenbach and Johnson Lau are of this opinion, except\n\u003e Johnson Lau also suggests that the signature hash is modified, see\n\u003e https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/725#issuecomment-420040430 --\n\u003e which defeats the benefit above since now hw wallets can no longer\n\u003e sign.\n\u003e\n\u003e Prusnak (I think he works at Trezor; apologies if I am mistaken) is\n\u003e against this idea, and proposes (3) below:\n\u003e https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/725#issuecomment-420210488\n\u003e\n\u003e =============\n\u003e 3. Use Trezor style\n\u003e\n\u003e See https://github.com/trezor/trezor-mcu/issues/169\n\u003e\n\u003e This has the benefit of already being adopted (which clearly BIP-322\n\u003e is failing hard at right now), but has the drawback that we can no\n\u003e longer do *generic* signing; we are stuck with the exact same\n\u003e limitations as in the legacy system, which we kinda wanted to fix in\n\u003e the updated version.\n\u003e\n\u003e =============\n\u003e 4. Introduce OP_MESSAGEONLY\n\u003e\n\u003e Quoting Johnson Lau at\n\u003e https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/725#issuecomment-420421058 :\n\u003e \"\"\"\n\u003e OP_MESSAGEONLY means the script following the code would never be\n\u003e valid. For example, a scriptPubKey:\n\u003e\n\u003e OP_IF OP_MESSAGEONLY \u003ckey_m\u003e OP_ELSE \u003ckey_s\u003e OP_ENDIF OP_CHECKSIG\n\u003e\n\u003e For messaging purpose, OP_MESSAGEONLY is considered as OP_NOP and is\n\u003e ignored. A message could be signed with either key_m or key_s.\n\u003e\n\u003e For spending, only key_s is valid.\n\u003e\n\u003e I don't think it is a big problem to consume a op_code. If this is a\n\u003e real concern, I could modify it as follow: in message system,\n\u003e OP_RETURN will pop the top stack. If top stack is msg in hex, it is\n\u003e ignored. Otherwise, the script fails.\n\u003e \"\"\"\n\u003e\n\u003e =============\n\u003e 5. Some other solution"}