{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1vjzmc45k8dgujppapp2ue20h3l9apnsntgv4c0ukncvv549q64gsz4x8dd","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1vjzmc45k8dgujppapp2ue20h3l9apnsntgv4c0ukncvv549q64gsz4x8dd","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2020-05-17\n📝 Original message:\u003e * At the same time, it retains your-keys-your-coins noncustodiality,\nbecause every update of a Lightning channel requires your keys to sign off\non it.\n\nYes I agree, I can foresee an easier step where managing low-value channel\nand get your familiar with smooth key management maybe a first step before\nrunning a full-node and getting a more full-fledged key management solution.\n\n\u003e It may even be possible, that the Lightning future with massive SPV might\nend up with more economic weight in SPV nodes, than in the world without\nLightning and dependent on centralized custodial services to scale.\n\nEven evaluating economic weight in Lightning is hard, both parties have\ntheir own chain view, and it's likely if you assume a hub-and-spoke\ntopology, leaf nodes are going to be SPV and internal nodes full-nodes ?\n\n\u003e Money makes the world go round, so such backup servers that are\npublicly-facing rather than privately-owned should be somehow incentivized\nto do so, or else they would not exist in the first place.\n\nI was thinking about the current workflow, Alice downloads her New Shiny\nLN-wallet, she is asked to backup the seed, she is asked to pick-up\nbackup(s) nodes among her friends, relatives or business partners and is\nNOT provided any automatic hint and register backup nodes addresses, maybe\neven do out-of-band key exchange with this full-node operator. Therefore\nyou may avoid centralization by having not such publicly-facing servers. Of\ncourse, Alice can still scrawl the web to and be lured to pickup malicious\npublic servers but if she is severely notified to not do so that may be\nenough.\n\nSo it would be a combination of UX+user education+fallback security\nmechanism to avoid economy hijack. That maybe a better solution rather than\nPoW-only SPV. We have an open network so you can't prevent someone to run\nsuch type of client but at least if they have to do so you can provide them\nwith a better option ?\n\nAntoine\n\n\n\n\nLe jeu. 14 mai 2020 à 00:02, ZmnSCPxj \u003cZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com\u003e a écrit :\n\n\u003e Good morning Antoine,\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e While approaching this question, I think you should consider economic\n\u003e weight of nodes in evaluating miner consensus-hijack success. Even if you\n\u003e expect a disproportionate ratio of full-nodes-vs-SPV, they may not have the\n\u003e same  economic weight at all, therefore even if miners are able to lure a\n\u003e majority of SPV clients they may not be able to stir economic nodes. SPV\n\u003e clients users will now have an incentive to cancel their hijacked history\n\u003e to stay on the most economic meaningful chain. And it's already assumed,\n\u003e that if you run a bitcoin business or LN routing node, you do want to run\n\u003e your own full-node.\n\u003e\n\u003e One hope I have for Lightning is that it will replace centralized\n\u003e custodial services, because:\n\u003e\n\u003e * Lightning gains some of the scalability advantage of centralized\n\u003e custodial services, because you can now transfer to any Lightning client\n\u003e without touching the blockchain, for much reduced transfer fees.\n\u003e * At the same time, it retains your-keys-your-coins noncustodiality,\n\u003e because every update of a Lightning channel requires your keys to sign off\n\u003e on it.\n\u003e\n\u003e If most Lightning clients are SPV, then if we compare these two worlds:\n\u003e\n\u003e * There are a few highly-important centralized custodial services with\n\u003e significant economic weight running fullnodes (i.e. now).\n\u003e * There are no highly-important centralized custodial services, and most\n\u003e everyone uses Lightning, but with SPV (i.e. a Lightning future).\n\u003e\n\u003e Then the distribution of economic weight would be different between these\n\u003e two worlds.\n\u003e It may even be possible, that the Lightning future with massive SPV might\n\u003e end up with more economic weight in SPV nodes, than in the world without\n\u003e Lightning and dependent on centralized custodial services to scale.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e It is also entirely possible that custodial services for Lightning will\n\u003e arise anyway and my hope is already dashed, come on universe, work harder\n\u003e will you, would you really disappoint some randomly-generated Internet\n\u003e person like that.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e I agree it may be hard to evaluate economic-weight-to-chain-backend\n\u003e segments, specially with offchain you disentangle an onchain output value\n\u003e from its real payment traffic. To strengthen SPV, you may implement forks\n\u003e detection and fallback to some backup node(s) which would serve as an\n\u003e authoritative source to arbiter between branches. Such backup node(s) must\n\u003e be picked up manually at client initialization, before any risk of conflict\n\u003e to avoid Reddit-style of hijack during contentious period or other massive\n\u003e social engineering. You don't want autopilot-style of recommendations for\n\u003e picking up a backup nodes and avoid cenralization of backups, but somehow a\n\u003e uniform distribution. A backup node may be a private one, it won't serve\n\u003e you any data beyond headers, and therefore you preserve public nodes\n\u003e bandwidth, which IMO is the real bottleneck. I concede it won't work well\n\u003e if you have a ratio of 1000-SPV for 1-full-node and people are not\n\u003e effectively able to pickup a backup among their social environment.\n\u003e \u003e What do you think about this model ?\n\u003e\n\u003e Money makes the world go round, so such backup servers that are\n\u003e publicly-facing rather than privately-owned should be somehow incentivized\n\u003e to do so, or else they would not exist in the first place.\n\u003e Of course, a free market tends towards monopoly, because any entity that\n\u003e happens to have even a slight advantage at the business will have more\n\u003e money to use towards business reinvestment and increase its advantage\n\u003e further, until they beat the competition to dust, anyone who has won a 4X\n\u003e game knows to search for and stack those little advantages until you\n\u003e snowball and conquer the world/galaxy/petri dish which is why the endgame\n\u003e of 4X games is so boring compared to the start, we have seen this happen in\n\u003e mining and exchanges and so on, and this works against your desire to have\n\u003e a uniform distribution.\n\u003e\n\u003e If everyone runs such a privately-owned server, on the other hand, this is\n\u003e not so different from having a Lightning node you run at your home that has\n\u003e a fullnode as well and which you access via a remote control mobile device,\n\u003e and it is the inconvenience of having such a server at your home that\n\u003e prevents this in the first place.\n\u003e\n\u003e Regards,\n\u003e ZmnSCPxj\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20200516/5aa4025e/attachment.html\u003e"}