{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1azvhdrf9fu6n0tm7yez4j6zcxcedp2ct6nrcq3z74naqs7kgpk8s5t2krq","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1azvhdrf9fu6n0tm7yez4j6zcxcedp2ct6nrcq3z74naqs7kgpk8s5t2krq","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2011-12-21\n🗒️ Summary of this message: Supernodes may emerge to validate transactions for other nodes, keeping lists of trustworthy nodes and partitioning them into a hashspace. Trustworthiness could be incentivized.\n📝 Original message:Is it just me or does it seem inevitable that at some point supernodes\nwill emerge that other nodes trust to validate transactions for them?\nSupernodes needn't even store the entire block chain and transaction\npool...it would be sufficient that they keep lists of IP addresses of\nother trustworthy nodes and partition them into a hashspace.\n\nAnonymous peers have no reputation to defend...but a trusted supernode\nwould, which could provide just enough incentive for the supernode to\ndo its best to ensure the nodes it vouches for are indeed legit. Of\ncourse, unless the supernode is validating the entire block chain and\ntransaction pool itself, it could only assess the trustworthiness of\nother nodes by performing random sampling.\n\nMichael, I really like your ideas and the clarity you bring to the\nissue. Regarding the potential attack vector you mention, would it be\npossible to partition the hashspace to minimize the risk that an\nattacker can manage to disproportionately gain control over a part of\nthe hashspace?"}