{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1f2nvlx49er5c7sqa43src6ssyp6snd4qwvtkwm5avc2l84cs84esecrwet","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1f2nvlx49er5c7sqa43src6ssyp6snd4qwvtkwm5avc2l84cs84esecrwet","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2014-11-27\n📝 Original message:\u003e Since this attack vector has been discussed, I started making some\n\u003e measurements on how effective it is to connect to Bitcoin using Tor,\n\u003e and I found that the number of connections dropping to near-zero is\n\u003e a situation which occurs rather frequently, which suggests that there\n\u003e is still room to improve on the DoS handling.\n\nI'm confused by this, I run quite a few nodes exclusively on tor and\nchart their connectivity and have seen no such connection dropping\nbehaviour.\n\nCan you tell me more about how you measured this?\n\n[As an aside I agree that there are lots of things to improve here,\nbut the fact that users can in theory be forced off of tor via DOS\nattacks is not immediately concerning to me because its a conscious\nchoice users would make to abandon their privacy (and the behaviour of\nthe system here is known and intentional). There are other mechanisms\navailable for people to relay their transactions than connecting\ndirectly to the bitcoin network; so their choice isn't just abandon\nprivacy or don't use bitcoin at all.]"}
