{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-06-26\n📝 Original message:On Tue, Jun 23, 2015 at 05:24:23PM -0400, Gavin Andresen wrote:\n\u003e On Tue, Jun 23, 2015 at 4:46 PM, Peter Todd \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \n\u003e \u003e Pieter Wuille showed with simulations that miners with bad connectivity\n\u003e \u003e are negatively affected by other miners creating larger blocks.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \n\u003e ... but the effect is only significant if they have an absurdly\n\u003e low-bandwidth connection and do NOTHING to work around it (like rent a\n\u003e server on the other side of the bandwidth bottleneck and write some code to\n\u003e make sure you're creating blocks that will propagate quickly on both sides\n\u003e of the bottleneck).\n\n\"Just rent a server\" forces miners into deploying insecure hosted\ninfrastructure that's vulnerable to hacking and seizure; that we\nencourage this already is worrying; requiring it for miners to be\nprofitable isn't acceptable.\n\n\u003e Why do you think connectivity is a centralizing effect? It is just one\n\u003e factor in the profitability-of-mining equation. A location with bad\n\u003e connectivity (the US, maybe) but 10% cheaper electricity might be just as\n\u003e good as one with great connectivity but more expensive electricity.\n\nSee above. The obvious thing to do if connectivity matters is keep your\nhashing in the cheapest possible place and sell that hashing power to\ncentralized miners, an effect we're already seeing. Making this effect\nabout an order of magnitude worse, then doubling the problem every two\nyears is dangerous.\n\n\u003e Having lots of variables in the profitability equation is a decentralizing\n\u003e force, it means there is very likely to be several different places in the\n\u003e world / on the net where mining is equally profitable.\n\nAs mining and hashing can be trivially separated that theory just\ndoesn't work.\n\nAgain, what concretely works against centralization of mining control?\nA proper proposal would discuss this issue, and explain what the\nexpected effect will be.\n\n\u003e \u003e These block propagation improvements are both already implemented (Matt\n\u003e \u003e Corallo's relay network, p2pool) and require co-operation.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \n\u003e Long term the p2p protocol will evolve to incorporate those optimizations,\n\u003e so will require no co-operation.\n\nThe co-operation comes form the fact that mempool policies have to be\nsyncronized, not the protocol itself.\n\n-- \n'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org\n0000000000000000007fc13ce02072d9cb2a6d51fae41fefcde7b3b283803d24\n-------------- next part --------------\nA non-text attachment was scrubbed...\nName: signature.asc\nType: application/pgp-signature\nSize: 650 bytes\nDesc: Digital signature\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150626/94de4a1b/attachment.sig\u003e"}