{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1aslmpzentw224n3s6yccru4dq2qdlx7rfudfnqevfck637cjt6esswfqmx","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1aslmpzentw224n3s6yccru4dq2qdlx7rfudfnqevfck637cjt6esswfqmx","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2021-10-15\n📝 Original message:\nOn Fri, Oct 15, 2021 at 4:21 PM Owen Gunden \u003cogunden at phauna.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e On Thu, Oct 14, 2021 at 09:48:27AM +0200, Joost Jager wrote:\n\u003e \u003e So how would things work out with a combination of both of the\n\u003e \u003e proposals described in this mail? First we make probing free (free as\n\u003e \u003e in no liquidity locked up) and then we'll require senders to pay for\n\u003e \u003e failed payment attempts too. Failed payment attempts after a\n\u003e \u003e successful probe should be extremely rate, so doesn't this fix the ux\n\u003e \u003e issue with upfront fees?\n\u003e\n\u003e Why couldn't a malicious routing node (or group of colluding routing\n\u003e nodes) succeed the probe and then fail the payment in order to collect\n\u003e the failed payment fee?\n\u003e\n\nYes they could, but senders should be really suspicious when this happens.\nIt could happen occasionally because balances may have shifted in between\nprobe and payment. But if it keeps happening they may want to ban this\nrouting node for a long time. This may disincentivize the routing node\nenough to respond honestly to probes.\n\nJoost\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20211015/a7713880/attachment.html\u003e"}