{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1xqcwcttsyk0a64d63crrwsxp88pa42np37rw87hrfn4uku78g2aqltcnns","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1xqcwcttsyk0a64d63crrwsxp88pa42np37rw87hrfn4uku78g2aqltcnns","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2021-05-23\n📝 Original message:@Lloyd\n\n\u003e  Proof-of-SquareSpace\n\nI agree with your points about delegated proof of stake. I wrote my own\ncritique about that\n\u003chttps://github.com/fresheneesz/quantificationOfConsensusProtocolSecurity#analysis-of-delegated-proof-of-stake-dpos\u003e\nas\nwell. And your point, that other forms of PoS devolve to DPoS by virtue of\npeople wanting to actively mint blocks without exposing their coins in hot\nwallets, is an interesting one.\n\n\u003e how are the users meant to redelegate their stake to honest pools?\n\nThis could be mitigated partially if delegation didn't require any kind of\nblockchain transaction. For example, users could simply send a signed\nmessage saying \"this other key can mint blocks with my coins\", and then\nminting a block using those coins would require presenting the delegation\nsignature. This only partially mitigates the problem since the dishonest\npool would still be able to use those coins as well, so it would be a race\nat that point. Still better than nothing. And pools could simply require\nfull custody of the coins.\n\n\u003eFrom what you mentioned, it sounds like maybe Algorand does something\nsimilar to this.\n\n\u003e I don't see a way to get around the conflicting requirement that the keys\nfor large amounts of coins should be kept offline but those are exactly the\ncoins we need online to make the scheme secure.\n\nThere are a couple solutions you didn't mention. One is your \"traditional\"\nlocked-stake kind of systems, where participants are required to lock their\nstake for long periods of time. Since normal users aren't likely to want to\ndo this, it will likely be left to more sophisticated stakers likely\nstaking very large amounts.\n\nBoth mechanisms you mentioned allow delegation, and it might seem like\nmaybe there'd be a way to disallow delegation, however since users can\nalways give custody of their coins to trusted pools, that would be a\ndelgation mechanism of last resort that can't be removed. So you can do\nthings that make it hard (for both users and pool operators) to delegate\ntrustlessly, but you can't get rid of the ability to delgate entirely.\n\nIn general, the situations where I see people not pooling are:\n\nA. They are entirely prevented by technical means. It seems reasonably\nclear that this is impossible.\nB. The downsides are more than unsophisticated users are willing to incur\n(eg stake locking).\nC. The rewards are so small that it isn't worth it for people to put in\nmuch effort to gain them.\nD. The rewards are so frequent that pooling is unnecessary.\n\nB excludes a lot of people from being able to help secure the chain, but\nthis is not materially different from PoW mining in that regard. D is a bit\nborder line. With 1 billion people attempting to participate and 10 minute\nblocks, 232 people would need to share the block reward in order to expect\na payout on average once per month. With 8 billion people that would turn\ninto more like 1700 people. This seems potentially doable (eg via cosigner\nrequirements on minted blocks), but it is a lot of participants per block.\n\nI think options C and D combined would be an ideal approach here. Because\nminting uses very few real resources, minting could be pretty much have\narbitrarily low ongoing costs. This means fees can be low and blocks can\nhave low payouts. If the reward was low and people could expect to see it\nonce every couple years, people could simply treat it like a lottery. Great\nif they win it now, but nothing that anyone needs to rely on (which would\nincentivize the pools to reduce variance that we want to avoid). If there\nis no locked stake or other major barriers in place to minting blocks, that\nwould also help avoid the compultion to use a pool.\n\nIn any case, you bring up good points, and they certainly complicate the\nissue. By the way, if you were confused as to what VPoS was in the section\nfrom my above link, this might satisfy your curiosity\n\u003chttps://github.com/fresheneesz/ValidatedProofOfStake\u003e.\n\nCheers\n\n\n\n\nOn Sat, May 22, 2021 at 5:41 PM Lloyd Fournier \u003clloyd.fourn at gmail.com\u003e\nwrote:\n\n\u003e Hi Billy,\n\u003e\n\u003e I was going to write a post which started by dismissing many of the weak\n\u003e arguments that are made against PoS made in this thread and elsewhere.\n\u003e Although I don't agree with all your points you have done a decent job\n\u003e here so I'll focus on the second part: why I think Proof-of-Stake is\n\u003e inappropriate for a Bitcoin-like system.\n\u003e\n\u003e Proof of stake is not fit for purpose for a global settlement layer in a\n\u003e pure digital asset (i.e. \"digital gold\") which is what Bitcoin is trying to\n\u003e be.\n\u003e PoS necessarily gives responsibilities to the holders of coins that they\n\u003e do not want and cannot handle.\n\u003e In Bitcoin, large unsophisticated coin holders can put their coins in cold\n\u003e storage without a second thought given to the health of the underlying\n\u003e ledger.\n\u003e As much as hardcore Bitcoiners try to convince them to run their own node,\n\u003e most don't, and that's perfectly acceptable.\n\u003e At no point do their personal decisions affect the underlying consensus --\n\u003e it only affects their personal security assurance (not that of the system\n\u003e itself).\n\u003e In PoS systems this clean separation of responsibilities does not exist.\n\u003e\n\u003e I think that the more rigorously studied PoS protocols will work fine\n\u003e within the security claims made in their papers.\n\u003e People who believe that these protocols are destined for catastrophic\n\u003e consensus failure are certainly in for a surprise.\n\u003e But the devil is in the detail.\n\u003e Let's look at what the implications of using the leading proof of stake\n\u003e protocols would have on Bitcoin:\n\u003e\n\u003e ### Proof of SquareSpace (Cardano, Polkdadot)\n\u003e\n\u003e Cardano is a UTXO based PoS coin based on Ouroboros Praos[3] with an\n\u003e inbuilt on-chain delegation system[5].\n\u003e In these protocols, coin holders who do not want to run their node with\n\u003e their hot keys in it delegate it to a \"Stake Pool\".\n\u003e I call the resulting system Proof-of-SquareSpace since most will choose a\n\u003e pool by looking around for one with a nice website and offering the largest\n\u003e share of the block reward.\n\u003e On the surface this might sound no different than someone with an mining\n\u003e rig shopping around for a good mining pool but there are crucial\n\u003e differences:\n\u003e\n\u003e 1. The person making the decision is forced into it just because they own\n\u003e the currency -- someone with a mining rig has purchased it with the intent\n\u003e to make profit by participating in consensus.\n\u003e\n\u003e 2. When you join a mining pool your systems are very much still online.\n\u003e You are just partaking in a pool to reduce your profit variance. You still\n\u003e see every block that you help create and *you never help create a block\n\u003e without seeing it first*.\n\u003e\n\u003e 3. If by SquareSpace sybil attack you gain a dishonest majority and start\n\u003e censoring transactions how are the users meant to redelegate their stake to\n\u003e honest pools?\n\u003e I guess they can just send a transaction delegating to another pool...oh\n\u003e wait I guess that might be censored too! This seems really really bad.\n\u003e In Bitcoin, miners can just join a different pool at a whim. There is\n\u003e nothing the attacker can do to stop them. A temporary dishonest majority\n\u003e heals relatively well.\n\u003e\n\u003e There is another severe disadvantage to this on-chain delegation system:\n\u003e every UTXO must indicate which staking account this UTXO belongs to so the\n\u003e appropriate share of block rewards can be transferred there.\n\u003e Being able to associate every UTXO to an account ruins one of the main\n\u003e privacy advantages of the UTXO model.\n\u003e It also grows the size of the blockchain significantly.\n\u003e\n\u003e ### \"Pure\" proof of stake (Algorand)\n\u003e\n\u003e Algorand's[4] approach is to only allow online stake to participate in the\n\u003e protocol.\n\u003e Theoretically, This means that keys holding funds have to be online in\n\u003e order for them to author blocks when they are chosen.\n\u003e Of course in reality no one wants to keep their coin holding keys online\n\u003e so in Alogorand you can authorize a set of \"participation keys\"[1] that\n\u003e will be used to create blocks on your coin holding key's behalf.\n\u003e Hopefully you've spotted the problem.\n\u003e You can send your participation keys to any malicious party with a nice\n\u003e website (see random example [2]) offering you a good return.\n\u003e Damn it's still Proof-of-SquareSpace!\n\u003e The minor advantage is that at least the participation keys expire after a\n\u003e certain amount of time so eventually the SquareSpace attacker will lose\n\u003e their hold on consensus.\n\u003e Importantly there is also less junk on the blockchain because the\n\u003e participation keys are delegated off-chain and so are not making as much of\n\u003e a mess.\n\u003e\n\u003e ### Conclusion\n\u003e\n\u003e I don't see a way to get around the conflicting requirement that the keys\n\u003e for large amounts of coins should be kept offline but those are exactly the\n\u003e coins we need online to make the scheme secure.\n\u003e If we allow delegation then we open up a new social attack surface and it\n\u003e degenerates to Proof-of-SquareSpace.\n\u003e\n\u003e For a \"digital gold\" like system like Bitcoin we optimize for simplicity\n\u003e and desperately want to avoid extraneous responsibilities for the holder of\n\u003e the coin.\n\u003e After all, gold is an inert element on the periodic table that doesn't\n\u003e confer responsibilities on the holder to maintain the quality of all the\n\u003e other bars of gold out there.\n\u003e Bitcoin feels like this too and in many ways is more inert and beautifully\n\u003e boring than gold.\n\u003e For Bitcoin to succeed I think we need to keep it that way and\n\u003e Proof-of-Stake makes everything a bit too exciting.\n\u003e\n\u003e I suppose in the end the market will decide what is real digital gold and\n\u003e whether these bad technical trade offs are worth being able to say it uses\n\u003e less electricity. It goes without saying that making bad technical\n\u003e decisions to appease the current political climate is an anathema to\n\u003e Bitcoin.\n\u003e\n\u003e Would be interested to know if you or others think differently on these\n\u003e points.\n\u003e\n\u003e [1]:\n\u003e https://developer.algorand.org/docs/run-a-node/participate/generate_keys/\n\u003e [2]: https://staking.staked.us/algorand-staking\n\u003e [3]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573.pdf\n\u003e [4]:\n\u003e https://algorandcom.cdn.prismic.io/algorandcom%2Fece77f38-75b3-44de-bc7f-805f0e53a8d9_theoretical.pdf\n\u003e [5]:\n\u003e https://hydra.iohk.io/build/790053/download/1/delegation_design_spec.pdf\n\u003e\n\u003e Cheers,\n\u003e\n\u003e LL\n\u003e\n\u003e On Fri, 21 May 2021 at 19:21, Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e I think there is a lot of misinformation and bias against Proof of Stake.\n\u003e\u003e Yes there have been lots of shady coins that use insecure PoS mechanisms.\n\u003e\u003e Yes there have been massive issues with distribution of PoS coins (of\n\u003e\u003e course there have also been massive issues with PoW coins as well).\n\u003e\u003e However, I want to remind everyone that there is a difference between\n\u003e\u003e \"proved to be impossible\" and \"have not achieved recognized success yet\".\n\u003e\u003e Most of the arguments levied against PoS are out of date or rely on\n\u003e\u003e unproven assumptions or extrapolation from the analysis of a particular PoS\n\u003e\u003e system. I certainly don't think we should experiment with bitcoin by\n\u003e\u003e switching to PoS, but from my research, it seems very likely that there is\n\u003e\u003e a proof of stake consensus protocol we could build that has substantially\n\u003e\u003e higher security (cost / capital required to execute an attack) while at the\n\u003e\u003e same time costing far less resources (which do translate to fees on the\n\u003e\u003e network) *without* compromising any of the critical security properties\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin relies on. I think the critical piece of this is the disagreements\n\u003e\u003e around hardcoded checkpoints, which is a critical piece solving attacks\n\u003e\u003e that could be levied on a PoS chain, and how that does (or doesn't) affect\n\u003e\u003e the security model.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e @Eric Your proof of stake fallacy seems to be saying that PoS is worse\n\u003e\u003e when a 51% attack happens. While I agree, I think that line of thinking\n\u003e\u003e omits important facts:\n\u003e\u003e * The capital required to 51% attack a PoS chain can be made\n\u003e\u003e substantially greater than on a PoS chain.\n\u003e\u003e * The capital the attacker stands to lose can be substantially greater as\n\u003e\u003e well if the attack is successful.\n\u003e\u003e * The effectiveness of paying miners to raise the honest fraction of\n\u003e\u003e miners above 50% may be quite bad.\n\u003e\u003e * Allowing a 51% attack is already unacceptable. It should be considered\n\u003e\u003e whether what happens in the case of a 51% may not be significantly\n\u003e\u003e different. The currency would likely be critically damaged in a 51% attack\n\u003e\u003e regardless of consensus mechanism.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e Proof-of-stake tends towards oligopolistic control\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e People repeat this often, but the facts support this. There is no\n\u003e\u003e centralization pressure in any proof of stake mechanism that I'm aware of.\n\u003e\u003e IE if you have 10 times as much coin that you use to mint blocks, you\n\u003e\u003e should expect to earn 10x as much minting revenue - not more than 10x. By\n\u003e\u003e contrast, proof of work does in fact have clear centralization pressure -\n\u003e\u003e this is not disputed. Our goal in relation to that is to ensure that the\n\u003e\u003e centralization pressure remains insignifiant. Proof of work also clearly\n\u003e\u003e has a lot more barriers to entry than any proof of stake system does. Both\n\u003e\u003e of these mean the tendency towards oligopolistic control is worse for PoW.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e Energy usage, in-and-of-itself, is nothing to be ashamed of!!\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e I certainly agree. Bitcoin's energy usage at the moment is I think quite\n\u003e\u003e warranted. However, the question is: can we do substantially better. I\n\u003e\u003e think if we can, we probably should... eventually.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e Proof of Stake is only resilient to ⅓ of the network demonstrating a\n\u003e\u003e Byzantine Fault, whilst Proof of Work is resilient up to the ½ threshold\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e I see no mention of this in the pos.pdf\n\u003e\u003e \u003chttps://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/pos.pdf\u003e you linked to. I'm not\n\u003e\u003e aware of any proof that *all *PoS systems have a failure threshold of\n\u003e\u003e 1/3. I know that staking systems like Casper do in fact have that 1/3\n\u003e\u003e requirement. However there are PoS designs that should exceed that up to\n\u003e\u003e nearly 50% as far as I'm aware. Proof of work is not in fact resilient up\n\u003e\u003e to the 1/2 threshold in the way you would think. IE, if 100% of miners are\n\u003e\u003e currently honest and have a collective 100 exahashes/s hashpower, an\n\u003e\u003e attacker does not need to obtain 100 exahashes/s, but actually only needs\n\u003e\u003e to accumulate 50 exahashes/s. This is because as the attacker accumulates\n\u003e\u003e hashpower, it drives honest miners out of the market as the difficulty\n\u003e\u003e increases to beyond what is economically sustainable. Also, its been shown\n\u003e\u003e that the best proof of work can do is require an attacker to obtain 33% of\n\u003e\u003e the hashpower because of the selfish mining attack\n\u003e\u003e \u003chttps://github.com/fresheneesz/quantificationOfConsensusProtocolSecurity#the-selfish-economic-attack\u003e discussed\n\u003e\u003e in depth in this paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243. Together, both\n\u003e\u003e of these things reduce PoW's security by a factor of about 83% (1 -\n\u003e\u003e 50%*33%).\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e  \u003e Proof of Stake requires other trade-offs which are incompatible with\n\u003e\u003e Bitcoin's objective (to be a trustless digital cash) — specifically the\n\u003e\u003e famous \"security vs. liveness\" guarantee\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Do you have a good source that talks about why you think proof of stake\n\u003e\u003e cannot be used for a trustless digital cash?\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e You cannot gain tokens without someone choosing to give up those coins\n\u003e\u003e - a form of permission.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e This is not a practical constraint. Just like in mining, some nodes may\n\u003e\u003e reject you, but there will likely be more that will accept you, some\n\u003e\u003e sellers may reject you, but most would accept your money as payment for\n\u003e\u003e bitcoins. I don't think requiring the \"permission\" of one of millions of\n\u003e\u003e people in the market can be reasonably considered a \"permissioned\n\u003e\u003e currency\".\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e 2. Proof of stake must have a trusted means of timestamping to regulate\n\u003e\u003e overproduction of blocks\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Both PoW and PoS could mine/mint blocks twice as fast if everyone agreed\n\u003e\u003e to double their clock speeds. Both systems rely on an honest majority\n\u003e\u003e sticking to standard time.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 5:32 AM Michael Dubrovsky via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Ah sorry, I didn't realize this was, in fact, a different thread! :)\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 10:07 AM Michael Dubrovsky \u003cmike at powx.org\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Folks, I suggest we keep the discussion to PoW, oPoW, and the BIP\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e itself. PoS, VDFs, and so on are interesting but I guess there are other\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e threads going on these topics already where they would be relevant.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Also, it's important to distinguish between oPoW and these other\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \"alternatives\" to Hashcash. oPoW is a true Proof of Work that doesn't alter\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e the core game theory or security assumptions of Hashcash and actually\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e contains SHA (can be SHA3, SHA256, etc hash is interchangeable).\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Cheers,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Mike\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 4:55 PM Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e 1. i never suggested vdf's to replace pow.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e 2. my suggestion was specifically *in the context of* a working\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e proof-of-burn protocol\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - vdfs used only for timing (not block height)\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - blind-burned coins of a specific age used to replace proof of work\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - the required \"work\" per block would simply be a competition to\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e acquire rewards, and so miners would have to burn coins, well in\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e advance, and hope that their burned coins got rewarded in some far\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e future\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - the point of burned coins is to mimic, in every meaningful way, the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e value gained from proof of work... without some of the security\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e drawbacks\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - the miner risks losing all of his burned coins (like all miners risk\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e losing their work in each block)\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - new burns can't be used\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - old burns age out (like ASICs do)\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - other requirements on burns might be needed to properly mirror the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e properties of PoW and the incentives Bitcoin uses to mine honestly.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e 3. i do believe it is *possible* that a \"burned coin + vdf system\"\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e might be more secure in the long run, and that if the entire space\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e agreed that such an endeavor was worthwhile, a test net could be spun\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e up, and a hard-fork could be initiated.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e 4. i would never suggest such a thing unless i believed it was\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e possible that consensus was possible.  so no, this is not an \"alt\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e coin\"\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 10:02 AM Zac Greenwood \u003czachgrw at gmail.com\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e Hi ZmnSCPxj,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e Please note that I am not suggesting VDFs as a means to save energy,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e but solely as a means to make the time between blocks more constant.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e Zac\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e On Tue, 18 May 2021 at 12:42, ZmnSCPxj \u003cZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e Good morning Zac,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e VDFs might enable more constant block times, for instance by\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e having a two-step PoW:\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e 1. Use a VDF that takes say 9 minutes to resolve (VDF being\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e subject to difficulty adjustments similar to the as-is). As per the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e property of VDFs, miners are able show proof of work.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e 2. Use current PoW mechanism with lower difficulty so finding a\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e block takes 1 minute on average, again subject to as-is difficulty\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e adjustments.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e As a result, variation in block times will be greatly reduced.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e As I understand it, another weakness of VDFs is that they are not\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e inherently progress-free (their sequential nature prevents that; they are\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e inherently progress-requiring).\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e Thus, a miner which focuses on improving the amount of energy that\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e it can pump into the VDF circuitry (by overclocking and freezing the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e circuitry), could potentially get into a winner-takes-all situation,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e possibly leading to even *worse* competition and even *more* energy\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e consumption.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e After all, if you can start mining 0.1s faster than the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e competition, that is a 0.1s advantage where *only you* can mine *in the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e entire world*.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e Regards,\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e ZmnSCPxj\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e --\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Michael Dubrovsky\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Founder; PoWx\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e www.PoWx.org \u003chttp://www.powx.org/\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e --\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Michael Dubrovsky\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Founder; PoWx\n\u003e\u003e\u003e www.PoWx.org \u003chttp://www.powx.org/\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20210523/430ad500/attachment-0001.html\u003e"}