{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1sa86gng3pvs3jgyt5majwcrhn8ck5qxgy9pjqxkh79u638cd7dys28y304","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1sa86gng3pvs3jgyt5majwcrhn8ck5qxgy9pjqxkh79u638cd7dys28y304","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-08-13\n📝 Original message:\u003e On Aug 13, 2015, at 2:52 AM, Ashley Holman via bitcoin-dev \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \n\u003e A concern I have is about security (hash rate) as a function of block size.\n\u003e \n\u003e I am assuming that hash rate is correlated with revenue from mining.\n\u003e \n\u003e Total revenue from fees as a function of block size should be a curve.  On one extreme of the curve, if blocks are too big, fee revenue tends towards 0 as there is no competition for block space.\n\nThis isn’t necessarily true. Every miner has its own mining policy. If they choose to delay including transactions proportional to their fee + first seen, then you create a time based fee market. Want quick confirmation? Pay a high fee. Don’t care that much? Pay a low fee (and anywhere in between). This market would work just fine even if block capacity was unbounded.\n\njp\n-------------- next part --------------\nA non-text attachment was scrubbed...\nName: signature.asc\nType: application/pgp-signature\nSize: 842 bytes\nDesc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150813/9b9afe12/attachment.sig\u003e"}