{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1dalwmzu6f0yqdl0cy8qeaa6zcrzkara3jh8jjv7zky5s0tuypatsu07r9n","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1dalwmzu6f0yqdl0cy8qeaa6zcrzkara3jh8jjv7zky5s0tuypatsu07r9n","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2022-07-26\n📝 Original message:\"large holders who perform zero transactions will still mine in order to preserve the value of the network\"\nlet me slightly modify the sentence below:\n\"The Prisoner's Dilemma is a standard example of a game analyzed in game theory that shows why completely rational large holders might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so.\"\nI'm pretty sure we will have a textbook case of Prisoner's Dilemma here.\nRegards\nJaroslaw\nW dniu 2022-07-26 10:20:38 użytkownik Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e napisał:\neven with zero block reward and minimal fees, large holders who perform zero transactions will still mine in order to preserve the value of the network\n \nthis is not \"mining your own tx\", it is unrelated\n \nthis is \"mining at a small loss to preserve your stake\"\n \nnot only don't we need issuance or fees, but also the censorship resistance is not meaningfully improved with issuance \n \nOn Mon, Jul 18, 2022 at 3:14 PM Erik Aronesty \u003cerik at q32.com\u003e wrote:\nsubsidy to directly tie miner revenue to the total value of Bitcoin\nmakes it not exactly how we want to incentivise a service that keeps\n \nagain, this is meaningless.   if the fees aren't enough to keep  bitcoin secure for large transactions, then large holders are incentivised to mine\n \nthat's it.\n \nit's not complicated\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20220726/b91c65b7/attachment.html\u003e"}