{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1l3sj8amnurgf3cu3p2hhcaham90khafc4vgsmymqdnn0k3kanulsghwq5p","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1l3sj8amnurgf3cu3p2hhcaham90khafc4vgsmymqdnn0k3kanulsghwq5p","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-05-26\n📝 Original message:This is true, but the device doesn't know if the LAN it's on is a safe\nnetwork or a hotel wifi, for example. So there would be a tricky UX there.\nYou'd have to ask the user during set up if this is a trusted LAN or not;\nor something like that. That may not be an issue though depending on the\nnature of the product. For example, Chromecast doesn't need any security\nprotections against trolls on the same LAN. I guess it just depends on what\nyou're planning to build.\n\nOn Mon, May 25, 2015 at 9:56 PM, Matt Whitlock \u003cbip at mattwhitlock.name\u003e\nwrote:\n\n\u003e Who would be performing a Sybil attack against themselves? We're talking\n\u003e about a LAN here. All the nodes would be under the control of the same\n\u003e entity. In that case, you actually want them all connecting solely to a\n\u003e central hub node on the LAN, and the hub node should connect to \"diverse\n\u003e and unpredictable\" other nodes on the Bitcoin network.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e On Monday, 25 May 2015, at 9:46 pm, Kevin Greene wrote:\n\u003e \u003e This is something you actually don't want. In order to make it as\n\u003e difficult\n\u003e \u003e as possible for an attacker to perform a sybil attack, you want to\n\u003e choose a\n\u003e \u003e set of peers that is as diverse, and unpredictable as possible.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e On Mon, May 25, 2015 at 9:37 PM, Matt Whitlock \u003cbip at mattwhitlock.name\u003e\n\u003e \u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e This is very simple to do. Just ping the \"all nodes\" address (ff02::1)\n\u003e and\n\u003e \u003e \u003e try connecting to TCP port 8333 of each node that responds. Shouldn't\n\u003e take\n\u003e \u003e \u003e but more than a few milliseconds on any but the most densely populated\n\u003e LANs.\n\u003e \u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e On Monday, 25 May 2015, at 11:06 pm, Jim Phillips wrote:\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e Is there any work being done on using some kind of zero-conf service\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e discovery protocol so that lightweight clients can find a full node\n\u003e on\n\u003e \u003e \u003e the\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e same LAN to peer with rather than having to tie up WAN bandwidth?\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e I envision a future where lightweight devices within a home use SPV\n\u003e over\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e WiFi to connect with a home server which in turn relays the\n\u003e transactions\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e they create out to the larger and faster relays on the Internet.\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e In a situation where there are hundreds or thousands of small SPV\n\u003e devices\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e in a single home (if 21, Inc. is successful) monitoring the\n\u003e blockchain,\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e this could result in lower traffic across the slow WAN connection.\n\u003e And\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e yes, I realize it could potentially take a LOT of these devices\n\u003e before\n\u003e \u003e \u003e the\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e total bandwidth is greater than downloading a full copy of the\n\u003e \u003e \u003e blockchain,\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e but there's other reasons to host your own full node -- trust being\n\u003e one.\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e --\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e *James G. Phillips IV*\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e \u003chttps://plus.google.com/u/0/113107039501292625391/posts\u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e \u003chttp://www.linkedin.com/in/ergophobe\u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e *\"Don't bunt. Aim out of the ball park. Aim for the company of\n\u003e \u003e \u003e immortals.\"\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e -- David Ogilvy*\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e  *This message was created with 100% recycled electrons. Please think\n\u003e \u003e \u003e twice\n\u003e \u003e \u003e \u003e before printing.*\n\u003e \u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e \u003e\n\u003e ------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\u003e \u003e \u003e One dashboard for servers and applications across\n\u003e Physical-Virtual-Cloud\n\u003e \u003e \u003e Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications\n\u003e \u003e \u003e Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable\n\u003e Insights\n\u003e \u003e \u003e Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight.\n\u003e \u003e \u003e http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y\n\u003e \u003e \u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e \u003e \u003e Bitcoin-development mailing list\n\u003e \u003e \u003e Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net\n\u003e \u003e \u003e https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development\n\u003e \u003e \u003e\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150525/05bd344b/attachment.html\u003e"}