{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1nc78dlt7hp3v5dl32qu3m678h2j0ss374glcjnz8df75xcx7ngpq4gw452","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1nc78dlt7hp3v5dl32qu3m678h2j0ss374glcjnz8df75xcx7ngpq4gw452","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2014-02-19\n📝 Original message:Twisting your words a bit I read:\n\n* you want to support relay of transactions that can be changed on the fly, but you consider it wrong to modify them.\n* #3 is already not forwarded, but you still find it relevant to support it.\n\nRational use cases of #3 will be pretty hard to find given the fact that they can be changed on the fly. We are down to inclusion in blocks by miners for special purposes - or did I miss out something?\n\nI think that we could guarantee fewer incidents by making version 1 transactions unmalleable and then optionally introduce a version 3 that supported the malleability feature. That way most existing problematic implementations would be fixed and no doors were closed for people experimenting with other stuff - tx v 3 would probably then be called experimental transactions.\n\n/M\n\n\nOn Feb 19, 2014, at 3:38 PM, Pieter Wuille \u003cpieter.wuille at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 3:11 PM, Michael Gronager \u003cgronager at mac.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e Why introduce a new transaction version for this purpose ? Wouldn't it be more elegant to simply let:\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e 1. the next bitcoin version \"prettify\" all relayed transactions as deterministic transactions fulfilling the scheme 1-6 effectively blocking any malleability attack? If miners would upgrade then all transactions in blocks would have a deterministic hash.\n\u003e \n\u003e I consider actively mutating other's transactions worse than not\n\u003e relaying them. If we want people to make their software deal with\n\u003e malleability, either will work.\n\u003e \n\u003e Regarding deterministic hash: that's impossible. Some signature hash\n\u003e types are inherently (and intentionally) malleable. I don't think we\n\u003e should pretend to want to change that. The purpose is making\n\u003e non-malleability a choice the sender of a transaction can make.\n\u003e \n\u003e Most of the rules actually are enforced by IsStandard already now.\n\u003e Only #1 and #7 aren't. #1 affects the majority of all transactions, so\n\u003e changing it right now would be painful. #7 only affects multisig.\n\u003e \n\u003e\u003e 2. In a version later one could block relay of non deterministic transactions, as well as the acceptance of blocks with non-confirming transactions.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e To non-standard conforming clients this \"prettify\" change of hash would be seen as a constant malleability attack, but given the \"prettify\" code it is to fix any client into producing only conforming transactions, just by running the transaction through it before broadcast.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e There is a possible fork risk in step 2. above - if a majority of miners still havn't upgraded to 1 when 2 is introduced. We could monitor % non conforming transaction in a block and only introduce 2. once that number is sufficiently small for a certain duration - criteria:\n\u003e\u003e * Switch on forcing of unmalleable transactions in blocks when there has been only conforming transactions for 1000 blocks.\n\u003e \n\u003e The problem in making these rules into consensus rule (affecting\n\u003e tx/block validity) is that some rules (in particular #3) may not be\n\u003e wanted by everyone, as they effectively limit the possibilities of the\n\u003e script language further. As it is ultimately only about protecting\n\u003e senders who care about non-malleability, introducing a new transaction\n\u003e version is a very neat way of accomplishing that. The new block\n\u003e version number is only there to coordinate the rollout, and choosing\n\u003e an automatic forking point.\n\u003e \n\u003e -- \n\u003e Pieter\n\n-------------- next part --------------\nA non-text attachment was scrubbed...\nName: signature.asc\nType: application/pgp-signature\nSize: 496 bytes\nDesc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20140219/f91a05d2/attachment.sig\u003e"}