{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub130jddflllc905dlmj0pks9j6fdtld9eu0pql9gm86dxts7whrvxq5hyp4t","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub130jddflllc905dlmj0pks9j6fdtld9eu0pql9gm86dxts7whrvxq5hyp4t","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-05-10\n📝 Original message:On 05/08/2015 11:36 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:\n\u003e Another related point which has been tendered before but seems to have\n\u003e been ignored is that changing how the size limit is computed can help\n\u003e better align incentives and thus reduce risk.  E.g. a major cost to the\n\u003e network is the UTXO impact of transactions, but since the limit is blind\n\u003e to UTXO impact a miner would gain less income if substantially factoring\n\u003e UTXO impact into its fee calculations; and without fee impact users have\n\u003e little reason to optimize their UTXO behavior.\n\nAlong the lines of aligning incentives with a diversity of costs to a \nvariety of network participants, I am curious about reactions to Justus' \ngeneral approach:\n\nhttp://bitcoinism.liberty.me/2015/02/09/economic-fallacies-and-the-block-size-limit-part-2-price-discovery/\n\nI realize it relies on pie-in-the-sky ideas like micropayment channels, \nbut I wonder if it's a worthy long-term ideal direction for this stuff."}