{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1654pkuj4rway0043gcu6rdh4umxescp7ew42d2czqvts3kwvg3esc48xrx","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1654pkuj4rway0043gcu6rdh4umxescp7ew42d2czqvts3kwvg3esc48xrx","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-05-08\n📝 Original message:such a contract is a possibility, but why would big owners give an\nexclusive right to such pools? It seems to me it'd make sense to offer\nthose for any miner as long as the get paid a little for it. Especially\nwhen it's as simple as offering an incomplete transaction with the\nappropriate SIGHASH flags.\n\na part of the reason I like this idea is because it will allow stakeholders\na degree of influence on how large the fees are. At least from the surface,\nit looks like incentives are pretty well matched. They have an incentive to\nnot let the fees drop too low so the network continues to be usable and\nthey also have an incentive to not raise them too high because it'll push\nusers into using other systems. Also, there'll be competition between\nstakeholders, which should keep the fees reasonable.\n\nI think this would at least be preferable to the \"let the miner decide\"\nmodel.\n\n- Joel\n\nOn Fri, May 8, 2015 at 7:51 PM, Peter Todd \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 03:32:00PM +0300, Joel Joonatan Kaartinen wrote:\n\u003e \u003e Matt,\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e It seems you missed my suggestion about basing the maximum block size on\n\u003e \u003e the bitcoin days destroyed in transactions that are included in the\n\u003e block.\n\u003e \u003e I think it has potential for both scaling as well as keeping up a\n\u003e constant\n\u003e \u003e fee pressure. If tuned properly, it should both stop spamming and\n\u003e increase\n\u003e \u003e block size maximum when there are a lot of real transactions waiting for\n\u003e \u003e inclusion.\n\u003e\n\u003e The problem with gating block creation on Bitcoin days destroyed is\n\u003e there's a strong potential of giving big mining pools an huge advantage,\n\u003e because they can contract with large Bitcoin owners and buy dummy\n\u003e transactions with large numbers of Bitcoin days destroyed on demand\n\u003e whenever they need more days-destroyed to create larger blocks.\n\u003e Similarly, with appropriate SIGHASH flags such contracting can be done\n\u003e by modifying *existing* transactions on demand.\n\u003e\n\u003e Ultimately bitcoin days destroyed just becomes a very complex version of\n\u003e transaction fees, and it's already well known that gating blocksize on\n\u003e total transaction fees doesn't work.\n\u003e\n\u003e --\n\u003e 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org\n\u003e 00000000000000000f53e2d214685abf15b6d62d32453a03b0d472e374e10e94\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150509/50484235/attachment.html\u003e"}