{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1g5zswf6y48f7fy90jf3tlcuwdmjn8znhzaa4vkmtxaeskca8hpss23ms3l","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1g5zswf6y48f7fy90jf3tlcuwdmjn8znhzaa4vkmtxaeskca8hpss23ms3l","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2020-06-20\n📝 Original message:\nGood morning again,\n\n\u003e Good morning Dave,\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e ZmnSCPxj noted that pay-to-preimage doesn't work with PTLCs.[2] I was\n\u003e \u003e hoping one of Bitcoin's several inventive cryptographers would come\n\u003e \u003e along and describe how someone with an adaptor signature could use that\n\u003e \u003e information to create a pubkey that could be put into a transaction with\n\u003e \u003e a second output that OP_RETURN included the serialized adaptor\n\u003e \u003e signature. The pubkey would be designed to be spendable by anyone with\n\u003e \u003e the final signature in a way that revealed the hidden value to the\n\u003e \u003e pubkey's creator, allowing them to resolve the PTLC. But if that's\n\u003e \u003e fundamentally not possible, I think we could advocate for making\n\u003e \u003e pay-to-revealed-adaptor-signature possible using something like\n\u003e \u003e OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK.[3]\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003csnip\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e The signed message could be a signature to `SIGHASH_NONE`, finally an actual use for that flag.\n\nIf you are going to embed it in an `OP_RETURN` in the same transaction, you also need `SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT`, otherwise you cannot embed the adaptor signature for spending from that transaction in the transaction being spent, it also implies `A[p4s] = a[p4s] * G` is a one-time-use keypair.\n\nRegards,\nZmnSCPxj"}