{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1pmw4p7tz6s8k62zrpdpxc93ajlmpxe0s03j275dcmcejv8wazz9qhe5c0r","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1pmw4p7tz6s8k62zrpdpxc93ajlmpxe0s03j275dcmcejv8wazz9qhe5c0r","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2018-01-28\n📝 Original message:I don't think this is a realistic concern. The incentive compatibility _already_ exists (just in reverse: miners are refusing transactions that would increase their total fees in the next block), and as the mempool is already generally competitive enough it's actually worse the way it is.\n\nBut I don't think it makes sense to take a zealous approach on \"incentive compatibility\". Bitcoin is already built on a whole bunch of incentive incompatible behaviors, even things as simple as \"change outputs\" (you'd be better off privately giving your transaction to trusted miners without change, who deduct the min fee they would've needed and refund the rest OOB). Not to mention, we expect miners to avoid reorgs and stuff even if it's in their short-term interest.\n\nAt least personally, I think DoS risks are the real concern.\n\n-Ryan\n\n-------- Original Message --------\nOn January 28, 2018 12:29 PM, David A. Harding \u003cdave at dtrt.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 05:43:34PM +0100, Sjors Provoost via bitcoin-dev wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Peter Todd wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\u003e In fact I considered only requiring an increase in fee rate, based on the\n\u003e\u003e\u003e theory that if absolute fee went down, the transaction must be smaller and thus\n\u003e\u003e\u003e miners could overall earn more from the additional transactions they could fit\n\u003e\u003e\u003e into their block. But to do that properly requires considering whether or not\n\u003e\u003e\u003e that's actually true in the particular state the mempool as a whole happens to\n\u003e\u003e\u003e be in, so I ditched that idea early on for the much simpler criteria of both a\n\u003e\u003e\u003e feerate and absolute fee increase.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Why would you need to consider the whole mempool?\n\u003e\n\u003e Imagine a miner is only concerned with creating the next block and his\n\u003e mempool currently only has 750,000 vbytes in it. If two 250-vbyte\n\u003e transactions each paying a feerate of 100 nanobitcoins per vbyte (50k\n\u003e total) are replaced with one 325-vbyte transaction paying a feerate of\n\u003e 120 nBTC (39k total), the miner's potential income from mining the next\n\u003e block is reduced by 11k nBTC.\n\u003e\n\u003e Moving away from this easily worked example, the problem can still exist\n\u003e even if a miner has enough transactions to fill the next block. For\n\u003e replacement consideration only by increased feerate to be guaranteed\n\u003e more profitable, one has to assume the mempool contains an effectively\n\u003e continuous distribution of feerates. That may one day be true of the\n\u003e mempool (it would be good, because it helps keep block production\n\u003e regular sans subsidy) but it's often not the case these days.\n\u003e\n\u003e -Dave\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20180128/bc4e57d3/attachment-0001.html\u003e"}