{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1aslmpzentw224n3s6yccru4dq2qdlx7rfudfnqevfck637cjt6esswfqmx","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1aslmpzentw224n3s6yccru4dq2qdlx7rfudfnqevfck637cjt6esswfqmx","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2020-10-13\n📝 Original message:\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e A crucial thing is that these hold fees don't need to be symmetric. A new\n\u003e \u003e node for example that opens a channel to a well-known, established\n\u003e routing\n\u003e \u003e node will be forced to pay a hold fee, but won't see any traffic coming\n\u003e in\n\u003e \u003e anymore if it announces a hold fee itself. Nodes will need to build a\n\u003e \u003e reputation before they're able to command hold fees. Similarly, routing\n\u003e \u003e nodes that have a strong relation may decide to not charge hold fees to\n\u003e \u003e each other at all.\n\u003e\n\u003e I can still establish channels to various low-reputation nodes, and then\n\u003e use them to grief a high-reputation node.  Not only do I get to jam up\n\u003e the high-reputation channels, as a bonus I get the low-reputation nodes\n\u003e to pay for it!\n\u003e\n\nSo you're saying:\n\nATTACKER --(no hold fee)--\u003e LOW-REP --(hold fee)--\u003e HIGH-REP\n\nIf I were LOW-REP, I'd still charge an unknown node a hold fee. I would\nonly waive the hold fee for high-reputation nodes. In that case, the\nattacker is still paying for the attack. I may be forced to take a small\nloss on the difference, but at least the larger part of the pain is felt by\nthe attacker. The assumption is that this is sufficient enough to deter the\nattacker from even trying.\n\n\n\u003e Operators of high reputation nodes can even make this profitable; doubly\n\u003e so, since they eliminate the chance of any of those low-reputation nodes\n\u003e every getting to be high reputation (and thus competing).\n\u003e\n\n\u003e AFAICT any scheme which penalizes the direct peer creates a bias against\n\u003e forwarding unknown payments, thus is deanonymizing.\n\u003e\n\nIf you're an honest but unknown sender (initiating the payment) and you\njust pay the hold fee, I don't think there is a problem? The unknown\nforward will still be carried out by a high-rep node. Also need to keep in\nmind that the hold fee for quick happy flow payments is going to be tiny\n(for example when calculating back from a desired annual return on the\nstaked channel capacity). And we can finally make these parasitic hodl\ninvoice users pay for it!\n\nI guess your concern is with trying to become a routing node? If nobody\nknows you, you'll be forced to pay hold fees but can't attract traffic if\nyou charge hold fees yourself. That indeed means that you'll need to be\nselective with whom you accept htlcs from. Put limits in place to control\nthe expenditure. Successful forwards will earn a routing fee which could\ncompensate for the loss in hold fees too.\n\nI think this mechanism can create interesting dynamics on the network and\neventually reach an equilibrium that is still healthy in terms of\ndecentralization and privacy.\n\nJoost\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20201013/aede1d83/attachment.html\u003e"}