{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1uyhgpz5nsfnvdlcqm3erjsdjasd9pdeaejeetwtkvumm6mp3ujlqxt9vwk","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1uyhgpz5nsfnvdlcqm3erjsdjasd9pdeaejeetwtkvumm6mp3ujlqxt9vwk","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2023-05-08\n🗒️ Summary of this message: The proposed HTLC endorsement scheme has a vulnerability where local reputation can be abused during high routing fees, and should aim for reputational transitivity.\n📝 Original message:\nHi,\n\nI think the HTLC endorsement scheme as proposed is still suffering from a\n\u003e vulnerability as local reputation can be built up during periods of low\n\u003e routing fees, endorsement gained and then abused during periods of high\n\u003e routing fees. Therefore, it sounds to me this scheme should aim for some\n\u003e reputational transitivity between incoming traffic and outgoing traffic.\n\u003e Namely, the acquisition cost of the local reputation should be equal to the\n\u003e max timevalue damage that one can inflict on a routing node channel\n\u003e accessible from its local counterparty granting this high-level of\n\u003e reputation.\n\u003e\n\nThis is the reason we have a moving window for the calculation.\nNote that if there is a channel between Alice and Bob, then the reputation\nof Alice from Bob's point of view is a function of Bob's total revenue in\nthe latest time period. If Bob experiences a spike in routing fees, nodes\nmight lose their reputation, but it would not work the other way around.\nThat is, one cannot gain reputation during low fee times and use it when\nfees are high.\n\nSee further details in this email [0]\n\nBest,\nClara\n\n[0]\nhttps://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2023-February/003857.html\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20230508/abc0a16c/attachment-0001.html\u003e"}