{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1ac86vemj7ce5z8jyxt39rna3tvwql6xd30ha3vxcd6esysp23d9qrlswfj","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1ac86vemj7ce5z8jyxt39rna3tvwql6xd30ha3vxcd6esysp23d9qrlswfj","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2014-04-28\n📝 Original message:On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 10:53:08PM +1000, Gareth Williams wrote:\n\u003eBitcoin is this perfect /trustless/ mathematical machine [...]\n\u003e\n\u003e2. the economic majority will not cooperate to reinterpret history\n\u003e\n\u003e [this proposal was...] replacing it with:\n\u003e \n\u003e2. the economic majority will not cooperate to reinterpret history\n\u003eagainst any good guys, only against bad guys; \"please trust their good\n\u003ejudgement.\"\n\nNicely put.\n\nI agree the idea of a populist vote to redistribute or remove mining reward\nis an inelegant thing which would probably devolve into politics.\n\nI think the reason that it would likely work out badly is that its not\nprovable, and so no consensus rule can be constructed requiring proof, so\nthen it risks devolving to a political decision.  \n\nStep 1: Finney attackers for hire anonymize their blocks (publish via Tor,\nuse a different reward address for each block, and each pool miner). \nDemanding identification of blocks is generally undesirable for the\nobjective of avoiding centralization and policy abuse.  Dont even think\nabout demanding identity, there is no identity in a distributed system.\n\nStep 2: people send tracer payments through Finney attackers, and use that\nevidence to decide to vote away their reward.  (However the proof is\nnon-transitive so people can vote anyway they like for any reason).\n\nStep 3: Finney attackers vote down other pools to make the point.\n\nAdam"}