{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1f2nxequ09nz44775vv6lkffq2plzqvrqramnk29eddmwcc9z7jys8ms289","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1f2nxequ09nz44775vv6lkffq2plzqvrqramnk29eddmwcc9z7jys8ms289","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2020-05-06\n📝 Original message:Hi Antoine,\n\nConsensus capture by miners isn't the only concern here. Consensus capture\nby any subset of users whose interests diverge from the overall consensus\nis equally damaging. The scenario I can imagine here is that the more light\nclients outpace full nodes, the more the costs of security are being\nexternalized from the light clients onto the full nodes. In this situation,\nit can make full nodes harder to run. If they are harder to run it will\nprice out some marginal set of full node operators, which causes a net new\nincrease in light clients (as the disaffected full nodes convert), AND a\nredistribution of load onto a smaller surface area. This is a naturally\nunstable process. It is safe to say that as node counts drop, the set of\nnode operators will increasingly represent economic actors with extreme\nweight. The more this process unfolds, the more likely their interests will\ndiverge from the population at large, and also the more likely they can be\ncoerced into behavior they otherwise wouldn't. After all it is easier to\nfind agents who carry lots of economic weight. This is true independent of\ntheir mining status, we should be just as wary of consensus capture by\nexchanges or HNWI's as we are about miners.\n\nKeagan\n\nOn Wed, May 6, 2020 at 3:06 AM Antoine Riard \u003cantoine.riard at gmail.com\u003e\nwrote:\n\n\u003e I do see the consensus capture argument by miners but in reality isn't\n\u003e this attack scenario have a lot of assumptions on topology an deployment ?\n\u003e\n\u003e For such attack to succeed you need miners nodes to be connected to\n\u003e clients to feed directly the invalid headers and if these ones are\n\u003e connected to headers/filters gateways, themselves doing full-nodes\n\u003e validation invalid chain is going to be sanitized out ?\n\u003e\n\u003e Sure now you trust these gateways, but if you have multiple connections to\n\u003e them and can guarantee they aren't run by the same entity, that maybe an\n\u003e acceptable security model, depending of staked amount and your\n\u003e expectations. I more concerned of having a lot of them and being\n\u003e diversified enough to avoid collusion between gateways/chain access\n\u003e providers/miners.\n\u003e\n\u003e But even if you light clients is directly connected to the backbone\n\u003e network and may be reached by miners you can implement fork anomalies\n\u003e detection and from then you may have multiples options:\n\u003e * halt the wallet, wait for human intervention\n\u003e * fallback connection to a trusted server, authoritative on your chain view\n\u003e * invalidity proofs?\n\u003e\n\u003e Now I agree you need a wide-enough, sane backbone network to build on top,\n\u003e and we should foster node adoption as much as we can.\n\u003e\n\u003e Le mar. 5 mai 2020 à 09:01, Luke Dashjr \u003cluke at dashjr.org\u003e a écrit :\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e On Tuesday 05 May 2020 10:17:37 Antoine Riard via bitcoin-dev wrote:\n\u003e\u003e \u003e Trust-minimization of Bitcoin security model has always relied first and\n\u003e\u003e \u003e above on running a full-node. This current paradigm may be shifted by LN\n\u003e\u003e \u003e where fast, affordable, confidential, censorship-resistant payment\n\u003e\u003e services\n\u003e\u003e \u003e may attract a lot of adoption without users running a full-node.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e No, it cannot be shifted. This would compromise Bitcoin itself, which for\n\u003e\u003e security depends on the assumption that a supermajority of the economy is\n\u003e\u003e verifying their incoming transactions using their own full node.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e The past few years has seen severe regressions in this area, to the point\n\u003e\u003e where Bitcoin's future seems quite bleak. Without serious improvements to\n\u003e\u003e the\n\u003e\u003e full node ratio, Bitcoin is likely to fail.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Therefore, all efforts to improve the \"full node-less\" experience are\n\u003e\u003e harmful,\n\u003e\u003e and should be actively avoided. BIP 157 improves privacy of fn-less\n\u003e\u003e usage,\n\u003e\u003e while providing no real benefits to full node users (compared to more\n\u003e\u003e efficient protocols like Stratum/Electrum).\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e For this reason, myself and a few others oppose merging support for BIP\n\u003e\u003e 157 in\n\u003e\u003e Core.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e Assuming a user adoption path where a full-node is required to benefit\n\u003e\u003e for\n\u003e\u003e \u003e LN may deprive a lot of users, especially those who are already denied a\n\u003e\u003e \u003e real financial infrastructure access.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e If Bitcoin can't do it, then Bitcoin can't do it.\n\u003e\u003e Bitcoin can't solve *any* problem if it becomes insecure itself.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Luke\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e P.S. See also\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e https://medium.com/@nicolasdorier/why-i-dont-celebrate-neutrino-206bafa5fda0\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e https://medium.com/@nicolasdorier/neutrino-is-dangerous-for-my-self-sovereignty-18fac5bcdc25\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e Lightning-dev mailing list\n\u003e Lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20200506/ce5bff4d/attachment.html\u003e"}