{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1wz2sm8h4ylh9dn28688vjzwrmhaxnh3jl04p8jk3qeq7umwf8cus72jvxz","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1wz2sm8h4ylh9dn28688vjzwrmhaxnh3jl04p8jk3qeq7umwf8cus72jvxz","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2014-11-27\n📝 Original message:Hello there,\n\nquote:\n\u003e Please see also the following:\n\u003e\n\u003e https://cpunks.org//pipermail/cypherpunks/2014-November/005971.html\n\u003e\n\nI agree about the severity of the Tor/Bitcoin issue, but I see no\npoint in bashing Bitcoin's financial privacy characteristics as\nthe linked pages seem to do.\n\nBitcoin can be useful as a part of a strategy to improve on privacy,\nbut it does not intend to be a run-and-forget solution for doing so.\n\nA lot of issues found in this context can actually be traced back to\nTor's characteristics already known before. It's just that\nBitcoin makes Tor's deficiencies more measurable - before Bitcoin,\nthose interested in researching how Tor performs in an automated\ncontext where a much smaller community. In the end, I guess both\nprojects can benefit from the research we can do now.\n\n\u003e Respect,\n\u003e\n\u003e - -Odinn\n\u003e\n\u003e Jeff Garzik:\n\u003e \u003e I don't recall being contacted directly, but the attack has been\n\u003e \u003e discussed.  It relies on a number of conditions.  For example, if\n\u003e \u003e you are over Tor, they try to kick the machine off Tor, _assuming_\n\u003e \u003e that it will fall back to non-Tor.  That's only true for dual stack\n\u003e \u003e nodes, which are not really 100% anonymous anyway -- you're\n\u003e \u003e operating from your public IP anyway.\n\u003e \u003e\n\nGenerally, it cannot be said that the attack vector described here is\nirrelevant for non-dual-stack nodes. An attacker might not be able to\ncollect IP addresses of Tor-only nodes, but he can try to kick the\nusers from all Tor exit nodes he does not control, and proceed with\nother attacks when a large number of Tor-only users connect through\nhis Tor exit node(s).\n\nSince this attack vector has been discussed, I started making some\nmeasurements on how effective it is to connect to Bitcoin using Tor,\nand I found that the number of connections dropping to near-zero is\na situation which occurs rather frequently, which suggests that there\nis still room to improve on the DoS handling.\n\nBest regards,\n\nIsidor"}