{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub17ty4mumkv43w8wtt0xsz2jypck0gvw0j8xrcg6tpea25z2nh7meqf4qgyd","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub17ty4mumkv43w8wtt0xsz2jypck0gvw0j8xrcg6tpea25z2nh7meqf4qgyd","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2014-04-23\n📝 Original message:I think the cost to mines is the same as what's possible today, actually.\n\nConsider a group of miners who wish to do this with no changes to the rule\nset. They can coordinate out of band and figure out if they have a majority\nof hashpower behind the decision to orphan a block, e.g. by signing a nonce\nwith their coinbase keys. If they reach quorum, then they begin work on a\nparallel chain. Because they have majority they are guaranteed to\neventually win, though depending on luck it may take a while. Because of\nthis, assuming the external quorum system is public, the moment consensus\nis reached the other miners should all abandon the existing branch and\nstart work on the parallel chain too, lest they waste work mining on a\nbranch that is surely doomed.\n\nThe end result would be that the chain stops making progress, disrupting\nend users and generally creating uncertainty as the new chain is forged.\nAlso, miners who built on top of the orphaned block end up being punished\neven if they did nothing wrong. Both these side effects are undesirable and\nunnecessary.\n\nSo the more I think about this scheme, the more it seems like a simple\nimprovement on the current status quo. Miners can do what they could\nalready do, but with a more reliable in-band signalling mechanism that\ndoesn't require things like coinbase keys to be online, and them doing so\ndoes not disrupt existing users or waste energy.\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20140423/97196da4/attachment.html\u003e"}