{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1ac86vemj7ce5z8jyxt39rna3tvwql6xd30ha3vxcd6esysp23d9qrlswfj","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1ac86vemj7ce5z8jyxt39rna3tvwql6xd30ha3vxcd6esysp23d9qrlswfj","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2013-05-15\n📝 Original message:On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 07:19:06AM -0400, Peter Todd wrote:\n\u003eProtocols aren't set in stone - any attacker that controls enough\n\u003ehashing power to pose a 51% attack can simply demand that you use a\n\u003eBitcoin client modified [to facilitate evaluation of his policy]\n\nProtocol voting is a vote per user policy preference, not a CPU vote, which\nis the point.  Current bitcoin protocol is vulnerable to hard to prove\narbitrary policies being imposable by a quorum of \u003e 50% miners.  The blind\ncommitment proposal fixes that, so even an 99% quorum cant easily impose\npolicies, which leaves the weaker protocol vote attack as the remaining\navenue of attack.  That is a significant qualitative improvement.\n\nThe feasibility of protocol voting attacks is an open question, but you\nmight want to consider the seeming unstoppability of p2p protocols for a\nhint.\n\nAdam"}