{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1wu8nl4rek0s38jw0p5tx4h8a0vu75f33v5ucc0ndj2fza5yav05q36fwsk","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1wu8nl4rek0s38jw0p5tx4h8a0vu75f33v5ucc0ndj2fza5yav05q36fwsk","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-12-28\n📝 Original message:On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 11:30 AM, Emin Gün Sirer \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 2:12 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Do you specifically mean selfish mining as defined in Emin Gün\n\u003e\u003e Sirer/Ittay Eyal's paper? Keep in mind that attack is only a significant\n\u003e\u003e issue in a scenario - one malicious miner with \u003e30% hashing power -\n\u003e\u003e where you're already very close to the margins anyway; the difference\n\u003e\u003e between a 50% attack threshold and a 30% attack threshold isn't very\n\u003e\u003e significant.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e This is not quite right: we know that selfish mining is a guaranteed win\n\u003e at 34%. We do not know when exactly it begins to pay off. The more\n\u003e consolidated and centralized the other mining pools, the less of a threat\n\u003e it is below 34%; the more decentralized, the more likely it is to pay off\n\u003e at lower thresholds.\n\u003e\n\nExactly.\n\n\n\u003e Far more concerning is network propagation effects between large and\n\u003e\u003e small miners.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e On a related note, the Bitcoin-NG paper took a big step towards moving\n\u003e these kinds of concerns out of the realm of gut-feelings and wavy hands\n\u003e into science. In particular, it introduced metrics for fairness (i.e.\n\u003e differential\n\u003e rate in orphans experienced by small and large miners), hash power\n\u003e efficiency, as well as consensus delay.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e For that class of issues, if you are in an environemnt\n\u003e\u003e where selfish mining is possible - a fairly flat, easily DoS/sybil\n\u003e\u003e attacked network topology - the profitability difference between small\n\u003e\u003e and large miners even *without* attacks going on is a hugely worrying\n\u003e\u003e problem.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Indeed, there is a slight, quantifiable benefit to larger pools. Which is\n\u003e why\n\u003e we need to be diligent about not letting pools get too big.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Note though that Eligius is *not* the only pool to have had problems\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e with block withholding, though AFAIK Eligius is the only one who has\n\u003e\u003e gone on record so far. (as I said in my original post, I'm relaying\n\u003e\u003e information given to me under condition of confidentiality)\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e I can see why they don't want to go public with this: it means that they\n\u003e are less profitable than other pools.\n\u003e\n\nThis I disagree with -- if they know that they have been attacked, then\nthere is every reason to come forward with this information.\n\nFirst of all, it offers an explanation for poor profits (this is better\nthan unexplained poor profits).\n\nSecond of all, if one pool can be attacked then any pool can be attacked --\nthis is not a reason not to mine on a particular pool.  If anything, it's a\nreason to diversify hashrate among many pools.\n\n--Adam\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20151228/8c25dd48/attachment-0001.html\u003e"}