{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1f2nxequ09nz44775vv6lkffq2plzqvrqramnk29eddmwcc9z7jys8ms289","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1f2nxequ09nz44775vv6lkffq2plzqvrqramnk29eddmwcc9z7jys8ms289","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2021-02-23\n📝 Original message:I wanted to follow up on what Jeremy and others are saying regards finding\nconsensus on LOT. I've seen a few other opinions saying that finding\nconsensus on the LOT value is far more important than what the LOT value\nactually is. This makes sense because if 100% of economic activity is\nrunning the same rule set, there is no divergence, regardless of which\nvalue is picked.\n\nIt is my understanding that those who oppose LOT=true are mostly opposed on\nthe grounds of it *appearing* \"unnecessarily coercive\" and that this lack\nof consensus can precipitate a chain split at the \"brinksmanship period\" as\nJeremy refers to it. I don't think that we can say that LOT=true is\ncoercive at all unless there is some opposition to Taproot itself.\nOpposition on the grounds that it *may* be opposed by others and Core does\nnot want to assert control over the protocol is a conservative view but\nultimately contingent upon opposition to Taproot for more fundamental\nreasons. If no one opposes it, then by definition you have consensus, and\nin that case I also don't think that the LOT=true (or false) in that regard\nsets meaningful precedent, as I would expect precedents to only be\nmeaningful if they were established during a contentious scenario. As it\nstands we have precedents for both MASF's and UASF's to execute soft forks\nin Bitcoin.\n\nOf course it seems intractable to ascertain the views of ~100% of the\nBitcoin constituency, and therefore it gives credibility to the argument\nthat by coming to consensus on LOT=false among those who *are* speaking up\nis safer with the embedded assumptions that modifying consensus beyond what\ncore ships is an active choice, presumably by those who know what they are\ndoing. However, the simple act of Core choosing to ship an unconfigurable\nLOT=false value does not *prevent* the forking and creation of a UASF\nclient. As Jeremy points out, the LOT=true possibility always exists here,\nand we have multiple high profile people saying they will be running that\nregardless of how things turn out. It seems to me that in this scenario,\nLOT=false does less to prevent a chain split.\n\nIn regards to precedent, there may be good reasons to force that minority\nto fork themselves off the network, as would be the case if a hypothetical\nsoft fork was a consensus action to blacklist some UTXO's or something else\nthat weaponizes consensus against some subset of Bitcoin's user base, but I\nhaven't heard a single person who advocates for LOT=false on the grounds\nthat they *themselves* oppose the consensus change that is being proposed\nhere. So if the goal is to prevent a chain split, and the soft fork is\nbenign and essentially \"annexing unoccupied territory\" with respect to\nscript versions, and no one actually has opposed Taproot itself, then I\nfail to see how LOT=false is safer in the presence of a grenade defense by\nthe LOT=true crowd.\n\nI personally *prefer* LOT=true for these reasons, but I am NOT going to be\njoining the ranks of the intolerant minority if Core ultimately ships\nLOT=false. I think it is more important to stay in consensus, and as a\nresult I am able to be convinced that false is the right answer. My\nquestion to everyone else (true AND false advocates) is this: what would\nyou have to observe, in order to change your mind or is it immutably made\nup? If we have a significant portion of the community that is immutably\nmade up to go false, and another portion that is going to go true, the\nasymmetry of the fork almost *requires* that those of us whose opinions are\nmalleable to break for true.\n\nIf social consensus is what drives technical consensus and not the other\nway around it seems as if there cannot exist a valid (rational?) reason to\noppose Taproot itself, and then by extension with the arguments laid out\nabove, LOT=true seems to be the logical conclusion of all of this, even if\nCore ships LOT=false at the outset.\n\nWhere am I wrong here?\n\nKeagan\n\nOn Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 7:11 PM Jeremy via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Not responding to anyone in particular, but it strikes me that one can\n\u003e think about the case where a small minority (let's say H = 20%?) of nodes\n\u003e select the opposite of what Core releases (LOT=false, LOT=true). I'm\n\u003e ignoring the case where a critical bug is discovered in Taproot for reasons\n\u003e I could expand on if anyone is interested (I don't think LOT=true/false has\n\u003e much of a diff in that regard).\n\u003e\n\u003e You'll note an asymmetry with LOT=true / false analysis. LOT=true nodes\n\u003e are clearly updated (or lying), LOT=false nodes may be un-upgraded (or\n\u003e however you want to interpret it).\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e *# 80% on LOT=false, 20% LOT=True*\n\u003e\n\u003e - Case 1: Activates ahead of time anyways\n\u003e\n\u003e No issues.\n\u003e\n\u003e - Case 2: Fails to Activate before timeout...\n\u003e\n\u003e 20% *may* fork off with LOT=true. Bitcoin hashrate reduced, chance of\n\u003e multi block reorgs at time of fork relatively high, especially if network\n\u003e does not partition.\n\u003e\n\u003e Implication is that activation % being 90%, then X% fewer than 70% of\n\u003e miners are signaling for Taproot at this time.  If X% is small the\n\u003e increased orphan rate caused by the LOT=true miners will cause it to\n\u003e activate anyways. If X% is larger, then there will be a consensus split.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e *# 80% on LOT=true, 20% LOT=False*\n\u003e - Case 1: Activates ahead of time Anyways\n\u003e\n\u003e No issues.\n\u003e\n\u003e - Case 2: Fails to Activate before timeout...\n\u003e\n\u003e A% + B% + C% = 20%\n\u003e\n\u003e A% (upgraded, signal activate) remain on majority chain with LOT=false,\n\u003e blocks mined universally valid.\n\u003e\n\u003e B% (upgraded, not signaling) succeeds in activating and maintaining\n\u003e consensus, blocks are temporarily lost during the final period, but\n\u003e consensus re-emerges.\n\u003e\n\u003e C% (not upgraded/not signalling) both fail to activate (not upgraded) and\n\u003e blocks are rejected (not signaling) during mandatory signalling.\n\u003e Essentially becomes an SPV miner, should still not select transactions\n\u003e improperly given mempool policy, but may mine a bad tip.\n\u003e\n\u003e (I argue that group B is irrational entirely, as in this case the majority\n\u003e has upgraded, inevitably winning, and is orphaning their blocks so B should\n\u003e effectively be 0% or can be combined with group C as being somehow not\n\u003e upgraded if they are unable to switch once it becomes clear after say the\n\u003e first 100 blocks in the period that LOT \u003e 50%. The only difference in\n\u003e lumping B with C is that group C SPV mines after the fork and B should, in\n\u003e theory, have full validation.).\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Apologies if my base analysis is off -- happy to take corrections.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e My overall summary is thus:\n\u003e\n\u003e 1) People care what Core releases because we assume the majority will\n\u003e likely run it. If core were a minority project, we wouldn't really care\n\u003e what core released.\n\u003e 2) People are upset with LOT=true being suggested as release parameters\n\u003e because of the *narrative* that it puts devs in control.\n\u003e 3) LOT=true having a sizeable minority running it presents major issues to\n\u003e majority LOT=false in terms of lost blocks during the final period and in\n\u003e terms of a longer term fork.\n\u003e 4) Majority LOT=true has no long term instability on consensus (majority\n\u003e LOT=true means the final period always activates, any instability is short\n\u003e lived + irrational).\n\u003e 5) On the balance, the safer parameter to release *seems* to be LOT=true.\n\u003e But because devs are sensitive to control narrative, LOT=false is preferred\n\u003e by devs.\n\u003e 6) Almost paradoxically, choosing a *less safe* option for a narrative\n\u003e reason is more of a show of dev control than choosing a more safe option\n\u003e despite appearances.\n\u003e 7) This all comes down to if we think that a reasonable number of\n\u003e important nodes will run LOT=true.\n\u003e 8) This all doesn't matter *that much* because taproot will have many\n\u003e opportunities to activate before the brinksmanship period.\n\u003e\n\u003e As a plan of action, I think that means that either:\n\u003e\n\u003e A) Core should release LOT=true, as a less disruptive option given stated\n\u003e community intentions to do LOT=true\n\u003e B) Core  community should vehemently anti-advocate running LOT=true to\n\u003e ensure the % is as small as possible\n\u003e C) Do nothing\n\u003e D) Core community should release LOT=false and vehemently advocate\n\u003e manually changing to LOT=true to ensure the % is supermajority, but leaving\n\u003e it as a user choice.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Overall, I worry that plan B has a mild Streissand effect and would result\n\u003e in boosting LOT=true (which could be OK, so long as LOT=true +\n\u003e LOT=false+signal yes becomes the large majority, but would be not fun for\n\u003e anyone if LOT=true + LOT=false+signal yes are a small majority). Plan C\n\u003e most likely ends up with some % doing LOT=true anyways. D feels a little\n\u003e silly, but maybe a good tradeoff.\n\u003e\n\u003e If I had to summarize the emotional dynamic among developers around\n\u003e LOT=true, I think devs wish it didn't exist because it is clear LOT=true\n\u003e *creates* the issues here. LOT=false would be fine if the LOT=true strategy\n\u003e didn't exist at all. But unfortunately the cat is out of the bag and cannot\n\u003e be put back in. To validate the emotions, I think it is fine to be angry\n\u003e about LOT=true and not like it, but we should either accept that it is most\n\u003e likely to create consensus OR we should find a new game theoretic\n\u003e activation strategy with better pro-social equilibriums.\n\u003e\n\u003e Personally, I think with either plan the ultimate risk of forking is low\n\u003e given probability to activate before timeout, so we should just pick\n\u003e something and move on, accepting that we aren't setting a precedent by\n\u003e which all future forks should abide. Given my understanding of the\n\u003e tradeoffs, I believe that the safest choice is LOT=true, but I wouldn't\n\u003e move to hold back a plan of LOT=false (but would probably take mitigative\n\u003e steps on community advocacy if it looks like there is non majority but non\n\u003e negligible LOT=true uptake).\n\u003e\n\u003e Cheers,\n\u003e\n\u003e Jeremy\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20210223/5d65c6e3/attachment-0001.html\u003e"}