{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1r3san9v5njl6798hvauyu9ntm6r9c7u8s0t65wls58gpfdcvqp5sa48d0u","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1r3san9v5njl6798hvauyu9ntm6r9c7u8s0t65wls58gpfdcvqp5sa48d0u","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-06-12\n📝 Original message:Peter it's not clear to me that your described protocol is free of miner\ninfluence over the vote, by artificially generating transactions which they\nclaim in their own blocks, or conforming incentives among voters by opting\nto be with the (slight) majority in order to minimize fees.\n\nWouldn't it in fact be simpler to use the dynamic block size adjustment\nalgorithm presented to the list a few weeks back, where the miner opts for\na larger block by sacrificing fees? In that way the users \"vote\" for larger\nblocks by including sufficient fees to offset subsidy, but as it is an\neconomic incentives miners gain nothing by inflating the fees in their own\nblocks.\n\nOn Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 11:11 AM, Peter Todd \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Jeff Garzik recently proposed that the upper blocksize limit be removed\n\u003e entirely, with a \"soft\" limit being enforced via miner vote, recorded by\n\u003e hashing power.\n\u003e\n\u003e This mechanism within the protocol for users to have any influence over\n\u003e the miner vote. We can add that back by providing a way for transactions\n\u003e themselves to set a flag determining whether or not they can be included\n\u003e in a block casting a specific vote.\n\u003e\n\u003e We can simplify Garzik's vote to say that one of the nVersion bits\n\u003e either votes for the blocksize to be increased, or decreased, by some\n\u003e fixed ratio (e.g 2x or 1/2x) the next interval. Then we can use a\n\u003e nVersion bit in transactions themselves, also voting for an increase or\n\u003e decrease. Transactions may only be included in blocks with an\n\u003e indentical vote, thus providing miners with a monetary incentive via\n\u003e fees to vote according to user wishes.\n\u003e\n\u003e Of course, to cast a \"don't care\" vote we can either define an\n\u003e additional bit, or sign the transaction with both versions. Equally we\n\u003e can even have different versions with different fees, broadcast via a\n\u003e mechanism such as replace-by-fee.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e See also John Dillon's proposal for proof-of-stake blocksize voting:\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02323.html\n\u003e\n\u003e --\n\u003e 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org\n\u003e 0000000000000000127ab1d576dc851f374424f1269c4700ccaba2c42d97e778\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e ------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e Bitcoin-development mailing list\n\u003e Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net\n\u003e https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development\n\u003e\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150612/89a6898b/attachment.html\u003e"}