{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1xqcwcttsyk0a64d63crrwsxp88pa42np37rw87hrfn4uku78g2aqltcnns","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1xqcwcttsyk0a64d63crrwsxp88pa42np37rw87hrfn4uku78g2aqltcnns","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2021-05-24\n📝 Original message:\u003e  proof of burn clearly solves this, since nothing is held online\n\nWell.. the coins to be burned need to be online when they're burned. But\nyes, only a small fraction of the total coins need to be online.\n\n\u003e your burn investment is always \"at stake\", any redaction can result in a\nloss-of-burn, because burns can be tied, precisely, to block-heights\n\nSo you're saying that if say someone tries to mine a block on a shorter\nchain, that requires them to send a transaction burning their coins, and\nthat transaction could also be spent on the longest chain, which means\ntheir coins are burned even if the chain they tried to mine on doesn't win?\nI'm fuzzy on how proof of burn works.\n\n\u003e proof of burn can be more secure than proof-of-stake\n\nFYI, proof of stake can be done without the \"nothing at stake\" problem. You\ncan simply punish people who mint on shorter chains (by rewarding people\nwho publish proofs of this happening on the main chain). In quorum-based\nPoS, you can punish people in the quorum that propose or sign multiple\nblocks for the same height. The \"nothing at stake\" problem is a solved\nproblem at this point for PoS.\n\n\n\nOn Mon, May 24, 2021 at 3:47 AM Erik Aronesty \u003cerik at q32.com\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e \u003e I don't see a way to get around the conflicting requirement that the\n\u003e keys for large amounts of coins should be kept offline but those are\n\u003e exactly the coins we need online to make the scheme secure.\n\u003e\n\u003e proof of burn clearly solves this, since nothing is held online\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e  how does proof of burn solve the \"nothing at stake\" problem in your\n\u003e view?\n\u003e\n\u003e definition of nothing at stake: in the event of a fork, whether the\n\u003e fork is accidental or a malicious, the optimal strategy for any miner\n\u003e is to mine on every chain, so that the miner gets their reward no\n\u003e matter which fork wins.   indeed in proof-of-stake, the proofs are\n\u003e published on the very chains mines, so the incentive is magnified.\n\u003e\n\u003e in proof-of-burn, your burn investment is always \"at stake\", any\n\u003e redaction can result in a loss-of-burn, because burns can be tied,\n\u003e precisely, to block-heights\n\u003e\n\u003e as a result, miners no longer have an incentive to mine all chains\n\u003e\n\u003e in this way proof of burn can be more secure than proof-of-stake, and\n\u003e even more secure than proof of work\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e On Sun, May 23, 2021 at 3:52 AM Lloyd Fournier via bitcoin-dev\n\u003e \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Hi Billy,\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e I was going to write a post which started by dismissing many of the weak\n\u003e arguments that are made against PoS made in this thread and elsewhere.\n\u003e \u003e Although I don't agree with all your points you have done a decent job\n\u003e here so I'll focus on the second part: why I think Proof-of-Stake is\n\u003e inappropriate for a Bitcoin-like system.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Proof of stake is not fit for purpose for a global settlement layer in a\n\u003e pure digital asset (i.e. \"digital gold\") which is what Bitcoin is trying to\n\u003e be.\n\u003e \u003e PoS necessarily gives responsibilities to the holders of coins that they\n\u003e do not want and cannot handle.\n\u003e \u003e In Bitcoin, large unsophisticated coin holders can put their coins in\n\u003e cold storage without a second thought given to the health of the underlying\n\u003e ledger.\n\u003e \u003e As much as hardcore Bitcoiners try to convince them to run their own\n\u003e node, most don't, and that's perfectly acceptable.\n\u003e \u003e At no point do their personal decisions affect the underlying consensus\n\u003e -- it only affects their personal security assurance (not that of the\n\u003e system itself).\n\u003e \u003e In PoS systems this clean separation of responsibilities does not exist.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e I think that the more rigorously studied PoS protocols will work fine\n\u003e within the security claims made in their papers.\n\u003e \u003e People who believe that these protocols are destined for catastrophic\n\u003e consensus failure are certainly in for a surprise.\n\u003e \u003e But the devil is in the detail.\n\u003e \u003e Let's look at what the implications of using the leading proof of stake\n\u003e protocols would have on Bitcoin:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e ### Proof of SquareSpace (Cardano, Polkdadot)\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Cardano is a UTXO based PoS coin based on Ouroboros Praos[3] with an\n\u003e inbuilt on-chain delegation system[5].\n\u003e \u003e In these protocols, coin holders who do not want to run their node with\n\u003e their hot keys in it delegate it to a \"Stake Pool\".\n\u003e \u003e I call the resulting system Proof-of-SquareSpace since most will choose\n\u003e a pool by looking around for one with a nice website and offering the\n\u003e largest share of the block reward.\n\u003e \u003e On the surface this might sound no different than someone with an mining\n\u003e rig shopping around for a good mining pool but there are crucial\n\u003e differences:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e 1. The person making the decision is forced into it just because they\n\u003e own the currency -- someone with a mining rig has purchased it with the\n\u003e intent to make profit by participating in consensus.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e 2. When you join a mining pool your systems are very much still online.\n\u003e You are just partaking in a pool to reduce your profit variance. You still\n\u003e see every block that you help create and *you never help create a block\n\u003e without seeing it first*.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e 3. If by SquareSpace sybil attack you gain a dishonest majority and\n\u003e start censoring transactions how are the users meant to redelegate their\n\u003e stake to honest pools?\n\u003e \u003e I guess they can just send a transaction delegating to another pool...oh\n\u003e wait I guess that might be censored too! This seems really really bad.\n\u003e \u003e In Bitcoin, miners can just join a different pool at a whim. There is\n\u003e nothing the attacker can do to stop them. A temporary dishonest majority\n\u003e heals relatively well.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e There is another severe disadvantage to this on-chain delegation system:\n\u003e every UTXO must indicate which staking account this UTXO belongs to so the\n\u003e appropriate share of block rewards can be transferred there.\n\u003e \u003e Being able to associate every UTXO to an account ruins one of the main\n\u003e privacy advantages of the UTXO model.\n\u003e \u003e It also grows the size of the blockchain significantly.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e ### \"Pure\" proof of stake (Algorand)\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Algorand's[4] approach is to only allow online stake to participate in\n\u003e the protocol.\n\u003e \u003e Theoretically, This means that keys holding funds have to be online in\n\u003e order for them to author blocks when they are chosen.\n\u003e \u003e Of course in reality no one wants to keep their coin holding keys online\n\u003e so in Alogorand you can authorize a set of \"participation keys\"[1] that\n\u003e will be used to create blocks on your coin holding key's behalf.\n\u003e \u003e Hopefully you've spotted the problem.\n\u003e \u003e You can send your participation keys to any malicious party with a nice\n\u003e website (see random example [2]) offering you a good return.\n\u003e \u003e Damn it's still Proof-of-SquareSpace!\n\u003e \u003e The minor advantage is that at least the participation keys expire after\n\u003e a certain amount of time so eventually the SquareSpace attacker will lose\n\u003e their hold on consensus.\n\u003e \u003e Importantly there is also less junk on the blockchain because the\n\u003e participation keys are delegated off-chain and so are not making as much of\n\u003e a mess.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e ### Conclusion\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e I don't see a way to get around the conflicting requirement that the\n\u003e keys for large amounts of coins should be kept offline but those are\n\u003e exactly the coins we need online to make the scheme secure.\n\u003e \u003e If we allow delegation then we open up a new social attack surface and\n\u003e it degenerates to Proof-of-SquareSpace.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e For a \"digital gold\" like system like Bitcoin we optimize for simplicity\n\u003e and desperately want to avoid extraneous responsibilities for the holder of\n\u003e the coin.\n\u003e \u003e After all, gold is an inert element on the periodic table that doesn't\n\u003e confer responsibilities on the holder to maintain the quality of all the\n\u003e other bars of gold out there.\n\u003e \u003e Bitcoin feels like this too and in many ways is more inert and\n\u003e beautifully boring than gold.\n\u003e \u003e For Bitcoin to succeed I think we need to keep it that way and\n\u003e Proof-of-Stake makes everything a bit too exciting.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e I suppose in the end the market will decide what is real digital gold\n\u003e and whether these bad technical trade offs are worth being able to say it\n\u003e uses less electricity. It goes without saying that making bad technical\n\u003e decisions to appease the current political climate is an anathema to\n\u003e Bitcoin.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Would be interested to know if you or others think differently on these\n\u003e points.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e [1]:\n\u003e https://developer.algorand.org/docs/run-a-node/participate/generate_keys/\n\u003e \u003e [2]: https://staking.staked.us/algorand-staking\n\u003e \u003e [3]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573.pdf\n\u003e \u003e [4]:\n\u003e https://algorandcom.cdn.prismic.io/algorandcom%2Fece77f38-75b3-44de-bc7f-805f0e53a8d9_theoretical.pdf\n\u003e \u003e [5]:\n\u003e https://hydra.iohk.io/build/790053/download/1/delegation_design_spec.pdf\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Cheers,\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e LL\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e On Fri, 21 May 2021 at 19:21, Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e I think there is a lot of misinformation and bias against Proof of\n\u003e Stake. Yes there have been lots of shady coins that use insecure PoS\n\u003e mechanisms. Yes there have been massive issues with distribution of PoS\n\u003e coins (of course there have also been massive issues with PoW coins as\n\u003e well). However, I want to remind everyone that there is a difference\n\u003e between \"proved to be impossible\" and \"have not achieved recognized success\n\u003e yet\". Most of the arguments levied against PoS are out of date or rely on\n\u003e unproven assumptions or extrapolation from the analysis of a particular PoS\n\u003e system. I certainly don't think we should experiment with bitcoin by\n\u003e switching to PoS, but from my research, it seems very likely that there is\n\u003e a proof of stake consensus protocol we could build that has substantially\n\u003e higher security (cost / capital required to execute an attack) while at the\n\u003e same time costing far less resources (which do translate to fees on the\n\u003e network) *without* compromising any of the critical security properties\n\u003e bitcoin relies on. I think the critical piece of this is the disagreements\n\u003e around hardcoded checkpoints, which is a critical piece solving attacks\n\u003e that could be levied on a PoS chain, and how that does (or doesn't) affect\n\u003e the security model.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e @Eric Your proof of stake fallacy seems to be saying that PoS is worse\n\u003e when a 51% attack happens. While I agree, I think that line of thinking\n\u003e omits important facts:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e * The capital required to 51% attack a PoS chain can be made\n\u003e substantially greater than on a PoS chain.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e * The capital the attacker stands to lose can be substantially greater\n\u003e as well if the attack is successful.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e * The effectiveness of paying miners to raise the honest fraction of\n\u003e miners above 50% may be quite bad.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e * Allowing a 51% attack is already unacceptable. It should be\n\u003e considered whether what happens in the case of a 51% may not be\n\u003e significantly different. The currency would likely be critically damaged in\n\u003e a 51% attack regardless of consensus mechanism.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e Proof-of-stake tends towards oligopolistic control\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e People repeat this often, but the facts support this. There is no\n\u003e centralization pressure in any proof of stake mechanism that I'm aware of.\n\u003e IE if you have 10 times as much coin that you use to mint blocks, you\n\u003e should expect to earn 10x as much minting revenue - not more than 10x. By\n\u003e contrast, proof of work does in fact have clear centralization pressure -\n\u003e this is not disputed. Our goal in relation to that is to ensure that the\n\u003e centralization pressure remains insignifiant. Proof of work also clearly\n\u003e has a lot more barriers to entry than any proof of stake system does. Both\n\u003e of these mean the tendency towards oligopolistic control is worse for PoW.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e Energy usage, in-and-of-itself, is nothing to be ashamed of!!\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e I certainly agree. Bitcoin's energy usage at the moment is I think\n\u003e quite warranted. However, the question is: can we do substantially better.\n\u003e I think if we can, we probably should... eventually.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e Proof of Stake is only resilient to ⅓ of the network demonstrating a\n\u003e Byzantine Fault, whilst Proof of Work is resilient up to the ½ threshold\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e I see no mention of this in the pos.pdf you linked to. I'm not aware of\n\u003e any proof that all PoS systems have a failure threshold of 1/3. I know that\n\u003e staking systems like Casper do in fact have that 1/3 requirement. However\n\u003e there are PoS designs that should exceed that up to nearly 50% as far as\n\u003e I'm aware. Proof of work is not in fact resilient up to the 1/2 threshold\n\u003e in the way you would think. IE, if 100% of miners are currently honest and\n\u003e have a collective 100 exahashes/s hashpower, an attacker does not need to\n\u003e obtain 100 exahashes/s, but actually only needs to accumulate 50\n\u003e exahashes/s. This is because as the attacker accumulates hashpower, it\n\u003e drives honest miners out of the market as the difficulty increases to\n\u003e beyond what is economically sustainable. Also, its been shown that the best\n\u003e proof of work can do is require an attacker to obtain 33% of the hashpower\n\u003e because of the selfish mining attack discussed in depth in this paper:\n\u003e https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243. Together, both of these things reduce\n\u003e PoW's security by a factor of about 83% (1 - 50%*33%).\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e  \u003e Proof of Stake requires other trade-offs which are incompatible with\n\u003e Bitcoin's objective (to be a trustless digital cash) — specifically the\n\u003e famous \"security vs. liveness\" guarantee\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e Do you have a good source that talks about why you think proof of stake\n\u003e cannot be used for a trustless digital cash?\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e You cannot gain tokens without someone choosing to give up those\n\u003e coins - a form of permission.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e This is not a practical constraint. Just like in mining, some nodes may\n\u003e reject you, but there will likely be more that will accept you, some\n\u003e sellers may reject you, but most would accept your money as payment for\n\u003e bitcoins. I don't think requiring the \"permission\" of one of millions of\n\u003e people in the market can be reasonably considered a \"permissioned currency\".\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e 2. Proof of stake must have a trusted means of timestamping to\n\u003e regulate overproduction of blocks\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e Both PoW and PoS could mine/mint blocks twice as fast if everyone\n\u003e agreed to double their clock speeds. Both systems rely on an honest\n\u003e majority sticking to standard time.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 5:32 AM Michael Dubrovsky via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e Ah sorry, I didn't realize this was, in fact, a different thread! :)\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 10:07 AM Michael Dubrovsky \u003cmike at powx.org\u003e\n\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Folks, I suggest we keep the discussion to PoW, oPoW, and the BIP\n\u003e itself. PoS, VDFs, and so on are interesting but I guess there are other\n\u003e threads going on these topics already where they would be relevant.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Also, it's important to distinguish between oPoW and these other\n\u003e \"alternatives\" to Hashcash. oPoW is a true Proof of Work that doesn't alter\n\u003e the core game theory or security assumptions of Hashcash and actually\n\u003e contains SHA (can be SHA3, SHA256, etc hash is interchangeable).\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Cheers,\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Mike\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 4:55 PM Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e 1. i never suggested vdf's to replace pow.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e 2. my suggestion was specifically *in the context of* a working\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e proof-of-burn protocol\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - vdfs used only for timing (not block height)\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - blind-burned coins of a specific age used to replace proof of work\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - the required \"work\" per block would simply be a competition to\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e acquire rewards, and so miners would have to burn coins, well in\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e advance, and hope that their burned coins got rewarded in some far\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e future\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - the point of burned coins is to mimic, in every meaningful way, the\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e value gained from proof of work... without some of the security\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e drawbacks\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - the miner risks losing all of his burned coins (like all miners\n\u003e risk\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e losing their work in each block)\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - new burns can't be used\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - old burns age out (like ASICs do)\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e - other requirements on burns might be needed to properly mirror the\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e properties of PoW and the incentives Bitcoin uses to mine honestly.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e 3. i do believe it is *possible* that a \"burned coin + vdf system\"\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e might be more secure in the long run, and that if the entire space\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e agreed that such an endeavor was worthwhile, a test net could be spun\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e up, and a hard-fork could be initiated.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e 4. i would never suggest such a thing unless i believed it was\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e possible that consensus was possible.  so no, this is not an \"alt\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e coin\"\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 10:02 AM Zac Greenwood \u003czachgrw at gmail.com\u003e\n\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e Hi ZmnSCPxj,\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e Please note that I am not suggesting VDFs as a means to save\n\u003e energy, but solely as a means to make the time between blocks more constant.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e Zac\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e On Tue, 18 May 2021 at 12:42, ZmnSCPxj \u003cZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com\u003e\n\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e Good morning Zac,\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e VDFs might enable more constant block times, for instance by\n\u003e having a two-step PoW:\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e 1. Use a VDF that takes say 9 minutes to resolve (VDF being\n\u003e subject to difficulty adjustments similar to the as-is). As per the\n\u003e property of VDFs, miners are able show proof of work.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e 2. Use current PoW mechanism with lower difficulty so finding a\n\u003e block takes 1 minute on average, again subject to as-is difficulty\n\u003e adjustments.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e \u003e As a result, variation in block times will be greatly reduced.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e As I understand it, another weakness of VDFs is that they are not\n\u003e inherently progress-free (their sequential nature prevents that; they are\n\u003e inherently progress-requiring).\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e Thus, a miner which focuses on improving the amount of energy\n\u003e that it can pump into the VDF circuitry (by overclocking and freezing the\n\u003e circuitry), could potentially get into a winner-takes-all situation,\n\u003e possibly leading to even *worse* competition and even *more* energy\n\u003e consumption.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e After all, if you can start mining 0.1s faster than the\n\u003e competition, that is a 0.1s advantage where *only you* can mine *in the\n\u003e entire world*.\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e Regards,\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e ZmnSCPxj\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e --\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Michael Dubrovsky\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e Founder; PoWx\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e www.PoWx.org\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e --\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e Michael Dubrovsky\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e Founder; PoWx\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e www.PoWx.org\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e \u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e \u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e \u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e \u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e \u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e \u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e \u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20210524/4796a55c/attachment-0001.html\u003e"}