{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub10zyxjrelgpp85qc93pnt8e4yx0jsxm27sn9lsypkhlrttjpmjktqkqsg9a","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub10zyxjrelgpp85qc93pnt8e4yx0jsxm27sn9lsypkhlrttjpmjktqkqsg9a","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-06-19\n📝 Original message:I have some experience here. If you are seriously suggesting these\nmeasures, you might as well kill retail transactions altogether.\n\nIn practice, if a retail place starts to accept bitcoin they have a\nsimilar situation as with cash, only that the fraud potential is much\nlower. (e.g. 100-dollar bill for a sandwich might turn out fake later)\nand the fraud frequency is also much lower.\n\n0-conf concerns were never a problem in practice. except for 2-way atms\ni have never heard of a problem that was caused by double spends.\nwhile adding these measures is generally positive, requiring them means\nexcluding 99.9% of the potential users. so you might as well not do it.\n\nRBF as implemented by F2Pool just flat out lowers Bitcoins utility\nvalue. So it's a bad thing.\n\nfor any online or automated system, waiting for a handful of\nconfirmations was always recommended practice.\n\nAm 19.06.2015 um 22:39 schrieb Matt Whitlock:\n\u003e Retail POS merchants probably should not be accepting vanilla Bitcoin\n\u003e payments, as Bitcoin alone does not (and cannot) guarantee the\n\u003e irreversibility of a transaction until it has been buried several\n\u003e blocks deep in the chain. Retail merchants should be requiring a\n\u003e co-signature from a mutually trusted co-signer that vows never to sign\n\u003e a double-spend.  \n\n-------------- next part --------------\nA non-text attachment was scrubbed...\nName: 0xAA4EDEEF.asc\nType: application/pgp-keys\nSize: 998 bytes\nDesc: not available\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150620/84f25498/attachment.bin\u003e"}