{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"Juraj (npub1m2…lr8p9)","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1m2mvvpjugwdehtaskrcl7ksvdqnnhnjur9v6g9v266nss504q7mqvlr8p9","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"Three questions to ask about any hardware wallet\n\nMost comparisons argue about chips. Three duller questions tell you more:\n\nDoes an outside firm test it, and can you read the report? Anyone can claim their device is secure. Paying researchers to attack it and then publishing what they found, including the unflattering parts, costs money and stings.\n\nDo they pay for bugs? A bounty gives someone who finds a flaw a reason to report it rather than sell it, and gives skilled researchers a reason to go looking at all.\n\nCan those researchers see the code? Closed firmware still gets attacked. Fuzzing over USB or QR is routine, and reverse engineering has got cheaper as models have got better at reading disassembly. Source code does not make an audit possible, it makes it cheaper, so more people attempt more of it. Open source beats source available too, because code under a real licence gets reused, and the developers reusing it (sometimes) read it.\n\nAll three\n\nPassport publishes firmware under GPL and hardware under CERN-OHL-S v2, complete enough to build one from the files. Outside audits are online with the fixes. The bounty covers the device, though the amount is decided case by case.\n\nKeystone also has all three, with the best evidence that its bounty works: outside researchers found a real firmware flaw and got paid. Audits from two firms, reproducible builds, schematics and secure element firmware published. One catch is theirs alone: researchers are asked not to disclose without written approval, with no time limit.\n\nTwo of three\n\nTrezor publishes firmware and hardware and runs the best funded bounty, up to $100,000. No commissioned audit report, but the secure element in its newest device was tested externally and the flaw disclosed publicly.\n\nLedger pays well and its in house team does serious offensive work, including on rivals. Firmware and OS are closed, so every finding costs more effort. The chips are lab certified, but you only see the certificate.\n\nOpen and nothing else\n\nJade and Bitkey publish firmware, Bitkey with reproducible builds. No audits or bounties, so the code waits for volunteers. Sometimes they turn up: Jade's serious 2025 flaw was found and reported for free.\n\nSeedSigner is as open as anything here and built from off the shelf parts, but there is no company; an audit or bounty was never on offer.\n\nThis measures how a company  behaves, not how the device is built. Still, between two similar devices, take the one that publishes its code and pays people to break it."}