{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-12-28\n📝 Original message:On Sat, Dec 26, 2015 at 12:12:13AM -0800, Multipool Admin wrote:\n\u003e Any attempt to 'fix' this problem, would most likely require changes to all\n\u003e mining software, why not just make mining more decentralized in general?\n\u003e \n\u003e For example, allow anyone to submit proofs of work to Bitcoind that are\n\u003e some fraction of the network difficulty and receive payment for them if\n\u003e they're valid.  This would also encourage the proliferation of full nodes\n\u003e since anyone could solo mine again.  Then, the next coinbase transaction\n\u003e could be split among, say, the top 100 proofs of work.\n\nThat's certainly be a good place to be, but the design of Bitcoin\ncurrently makes achieving that goal fundementally difficult. \n\n\u003e Eligius already does their miner payouts like this.\n\u003e \n\u003e If you want to fix an issue with mining, fix the selfish mining issue first\n\u003e as it's a much larger and more dangerous potential issue.\n\nDo you specifically mean selfish mining as defined in Emin Gün\nSirer/Ittay Eyal's paper? Keep in mind that attack is only a significant\nissue in a scenario - one malicious miner with \u003e30% hashing power -\nwhere you're already very close to the margins anyway; the difference\nbetween a 50% attack threshold and a 30% attack threshold isn't very\nsignificant.\n\nFar more concerning is network propagation effects between large and\nsmall miners. For that class of issues, if you are in an environemnt\nwhere selfish mining is possible - a fairly flat, easily DoS/sybil\nattacked network topology - the profitability difference between small\nand large miners even *without* attacks going on is a hugely worrying\nproblem. OTOH, if you're blocksize is small enough that propagation time\nis negligable to profitability, then selfish mining attacks with \u003c30%\nhashing power aren't much of a concern - they'll be naturally defeated\nby anti-DoS/anti-sybil measures.\n\n\u003e I don't believe it was ever clearly established whether Eligius suffered a\n\u003e block withholding attack or was just the victim of a miner with (what was,\n\u003e at the time) a large amount of faulty hardware, however, from the\n\u003e Bitcointalk threads at the time I believe it was assumed to be the latter.\n\nI think the latter was assumed as well, although ruling out of the\nformer is impossible.\n\nNote though that Eligius is *not* the only pool to have had problems\nwith block withholding, though AFAIK Eligius is the only one who has\ngone on record so far. (as I said in my original post, I'm relaying\ninformation given to me under condition of confidentiality)\n\n-- \n'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org\n000000000000000004a36565fb282c4bd06dda61329fda2465b0bfeaf7241dab\n-------------- next part --------------\nA non-text attachment was scrubbed...\nName: signature.asc\nType: application/pgp-signature\nSize: 650 bytes\nDesc: Digital signature\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20151228/1e23dd8a/attachment.sig\u003e"}