{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub138d0km3t8jujy9duwng26dh79fwuxqhw0xmxjdw2h2t2dgwzwpxsk9dl95","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub138d0km3t8jujy9duwng26dh79fwuxqhw0xmxjdw2h2t2dgwzwpxsk9dl95","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2013-05-15\n📝 Original message:I can't see this working, if 51% of the mining power doesn't like your\ncoins, when you create the commitment they will reject it.\nIf the commitment is opaque at the time of inclusion in the block then\nI will create multiple commitments and then after revealing the\ncommitment and spend to you I will reveal the earlier commitment which\ncommits the coins to an address I control.\n\nOn the topic of reversibility, I suspect in the long term the lack of\nchargebacks will create issues as criminals learn that for the first\ntime in history, kidnap \u0026 ransom is effective. Suffice to say after the\nfirst \u003e= $10mn kidnapping-for-bitcoin heist, governments will be forced\nto decide how they view the system. It will likely fall somewhere between\n\"arrest/question anyone identified holding tainted coins\" to something\nnonsensical and reactionary like \"blocking\" bitcoin as Iran does TOR.\n\nThanks,\nCaleb\n\n\n\nOn 05/15/2013 07:49 AM, Adam Back wrote:\n\u003e On Wed, May 15, 2013 at 07:19:06AM -0400, Peter Todd wrote:\n\u003e\u003e Protocols aren't set in stone - any attacker that controls enough\n\u003e\u003e hashing power to pose a 51% attack can simply demand that you use a\n\u003e\u003e Bitcoin client modified [to facilitate evaluation of his policy]\n\u003e \n\u003e Protocol voting is a vote per user policy preference, not a CPU vote, which\n\u003e is the point.  Current bitcoin protocol is vulnerable to hard to prove\n\u003e arbitrary policies being imposable by a quorum of \u003e 50% miners.  The blind\n\u003e commitment proposal fixes that, so even an 99% quorum cant easily impose\n\u003e policies, which leaves the weaker protocol vote attack as the remaining\n\u003e avenue of attack.  That is a significant qualitative improvement.\n\u003e \n\u003e The feasibility of protocol voting attacks is an open question, but you\n\u003e might want to consider the seeming unstoppability of p2p protocols for a\n\u003e hint.\n\u003e \n\u003e Adam\n\u003e \n\u003e ------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\u003e AlienVault Unified Security Management (USM) platform delivers complete\n\u003e security visibility with the essential security capabilities. Easily and\n\u003e efficiently configure, manage, and operate all of your security controls\n\u003e from a single console and one unified framework. Download a free trial.\n\u003e http://p.sf.net/sfu/alienvault_d2d\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e Bitcoin-development mailing list\n\u003e Bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net\n\u003e https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development\n\u003e"}