{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1la96qlytstsrg6nzha6d3q329vkcccsun4wjjzqlxxdp3xm9mrhqkv90n4","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1la96qlytstsrg6nzha6d3q329vkcccsun4wjjzqlxxdp3xm9mrhqkv90n4","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2016-06-23\n📝 Original message:In England under RIPA 2000 legislation, it's irrelevant whether you have\nthe data or not. If the authorities compel you to hand over that\ninformation, and it is within your means to obtain it then you are\nobliged to do so under threat of criminal offense.\n\nSo any mechanism whereby data could be collected from Bitcoin users,\nwhether it's stored ephemerally or not, if the police have reasonable\nsuspicion to think it exists then they can compel all parties to work to\nget them the data they require.\n\nIf the mechanism flat out does not exist, that is miles better than\ncould exist. Deniability is not a defense when served with a police\nnotice for disclosing data.\n\nYou have to think not only about the end result, but also about how\nthese mechanisms can be used for intimidating users or leveraging\ntechnologies.\n\nJustin Newton via bitcoin-dev:\n\u003e On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 1:46 PM, s7r via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Any kind of built-in AML/KYC tools in Bitcoin is bad, and might draw\n\u003e\u003e expectations from _all_ users from authorities. Companies or individuals\n\u003e\u003e who want and/or need AML/KYC can find ways and do it at their side\n\u003e\u003e isolated from the entire network, and the solutions shouldn't come from\n\u003e\u003e upstream. AML/KYC/\u003cinsert other regulation here\u003e differ from country to\n\u003e\u003e country and will be hard to implement in a global consensus network even\n\u003e\u003e if it would be worth it.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e This was precisely our thinking as well.\n\u003e \n\u003e This is actually exactly why BIP 75 was designed the way that it was.  Any\n\u003e (voluntary) identity exchange is done at the application level, on an\n\u003e encrypted https (or other) connection between the sender and receiver.\n\u003e Identity data is not passed through or stored on the blockchain, and there\n\u003e is actually no mark left on the blockchain that identity was even exchanged\n\u003e on that transaction.\n\u003e \n\u003e The only people who know identity info was exchanged, or what the identity\n\u003e was is the counterparties in the transaction, and depending on\n\u003e implementation, their service provider.  (At a high level, many software\n\u003e based wallet providers wouldn’t have any visibility into identity info,\n\u003e where many hosted services would, for example)\n\u003e \n\u003e We did this to protect user privacy as well as fungibility.\n\u003e \n\u003e We are allowing the people who want or need to exchange identtity info\n\u003e (either self signed or 3rd party validated) the option to exchange it, in a\n\u003e standards based way, directly between peers, without touching the\n\u003e blockchain or network itself.\n\u003e \n\u003e Is this more clear?\n\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e"}