{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1fx98zxt3lzspjs5f4msr0fxysx5euucm29ghysryju7vpc9j0jzqtcl2d8","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1fx98zxt3lzspjs5f4msr0fxysx5euucm29ghysryju7vpc9j0jzqtcl2d8","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2021-02-22\n📝 Original message:Sorry, I haven't read everything. I just want to say what I think is\nthe best option and why.\nLet's say something like 2 years in which miners can signal activation\nafter which, the MUST signal it for their blocks to be valid (I think\nthis is LOT=true, but I don't remember what LOT stands for).\nSome may argue than it's easier to move from LOT=false to LOT=true\nthan viceversa (I think I'm getting this right), but either way\ndifferent clients could interpret things more differently more easily\nand, you know, that's really bad.\nIf anyone is against the consensus change itself, what they should do\nis run a client in which the must is turned into a MUST NOT. Whenever\nminers signal activation, blocks aren't valid so that it doesn't\nhappen.\nThat way both sides can be cleanly separated and both communities\n(assuming there's a community of users opposing the change) can stick\ntogether with their own in the same chain. That is, having only 2\nchains in total if there are users opposing the change or only one if\nnot, but never 2 chains for people who want the change or 2 chains for\npople who don't want it.\n\nJust my two sats, please nobody ask me \"why would anyone oppose\ntaproot?\" or anything similar. Because I'm trying to generalize here,\nif we're talking about activation, I think the specifics of the change\nare kind of irrelevant.\n\nSeparately: thanks to everyone who worked on taproot.\n\n\nOn Mon, Feb 22, 2021 at 3:00 PM Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev\n\u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e On Feb 22, 2021, at 05:16, Anthony Towns \u003caj at erisian.com.au\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e If a lockinontimeout=true node is requesting compact blocks from a\n\u003e lockinontimeout=false node during a chainsplit in the MUST_SIGNAL phase,\n\u003e I think that could result in a ban.\n\u003e\n\u003e More importantly, nodes on both sides of the fork need to find each other.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e (If there was going to be an ongoing fork there'd be bigger things to\n\u003e worry about...)\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e I think it should be clear that a UASF-style command line option to allow consensus rule changes in the node in the short term, immediately before a fork carries some risk of a fork, even if I agree it may not persist over months. We can’t simply ignore that.\n\u003e\n\u003e I think the important specific case of this is something like \"if a chain\n\u003e where taproot is impossible to activate is temporarily the most work,\n\u003e miners with lockinontimeout=true need to be well connected so they don't\n\u003e end up competing with each other while they're catching back up\".\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Between this and your above point, I think we probably agree - there is material  technical complexity hiding behind a “change the consensus rules“ option. Given it’s not a critical feature by any means, putting resources into fixing these issues probably isn’t worth it.\n\u003e\n\u003e Matt\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev"}