{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub12rkw0jajmsck4uwdtksdvtswrlkypusfryjzera7m4fhqta6jhdsz3aqxc","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub12rkw0jajmsck4uwdtksdvtswrlkypusfryjzera7m4fhqta6jhdsz3aqxc","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2013-12-08\n📝 Original message:On 8 December 2013 12:37, Luke-Jr \u003cluke at dashjr.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Encryption is useless here. We want everyone to be able to download Bitcoin\n\u003e clients. Binaries on sourceforge are signed by multiple parties using\n\u003e gitian.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e Decentralization:\n\u003e \u003e So long as we actually use DNS, the website is centralized :( However,\n\u003e \u003e its content isn't (can be forked on GitHub), but regarding the domain\n\u003e \u003e name, there is not much we can do against this AFAIK.\n\u003e\n\u003e So long as someone has root (or a user that can modify it), the website is\n\u003e centralised. To really solve this, we would need a dedicated server that\n\u003e accepts commands only when signed by N-of-M parties, inside a cage locked\n\u003e by\n\u003e padlocks with keys held by independent parties, with a SSL certificate\n\u003e issued\n\u003e by an authority that has multiple parties watch it every step of the way\n\u003e into\n\u003e that server.\n\n\nMalicious actors with root access to the server is another issue entirely.\nSure it's a problem, but it is not an argument not to have a properly\nsigned SSL certificate.\n\nWith out one, the exploit can be performed on routers to redirect traffic\nthrough a third party alter the content of the site (like the links on\nbitcoin.org to various wallet projects) and then onto the correct\ndestination. SSL at least mitigates that. For example it would be trivial\nto impersonate Electrum's site or whatever, \"change\" the link on the fly\nthat appears on the trusted source bitcoin.org via BGP redirection. Now\nusers will be directed to the scammers site which could be identical except\nfor domain name and of course malicious binaries.\n\nBGP redirection is a reality and can be exploited without much\nexpense/effort. MITM is a real world threat, not some theoretical\npossibility - reports show it's happening on an unprecedented scale. SSL is\nessential - that's a no-brainer. Sure other measures are important, but\nwithout SSL there is almost no point to any of the other options.\n\nSSL is so considered so important that the *HTTP 2.0 spec might be SSL\nonly*according to recent discussions at the W3C (\nhttp://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/2013OctDec/0625.html).\n\nDrak\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20131208/c6778642/attachment.html\u003e"}