{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub15wz8j5cse6sexlw6f5q7arc5efe5hxn6kcxxyy222et8qms4u3lsemaru8","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub15wz8j5cse6sexlw6f5q7arc5efe5hxn6kcxxyy222et8qms4u3lsemaru8","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-12-29\n📝 Original message:There have been no decent objections to altering the block-selection\nmechanism (when two block solutions appear at nearly the same time) as\ndescribed at\n\nhttp://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/39226\n\nKey components are:\n\n   - Compute BitcoinDaysDestroyed using only transactions that have been in\n   your mempool for some time as oBTCDD (\"old BTCDD\").\n   - Use \"nearly the same time\" to mean separated in time by your guess of\n   the average duration of block propagation times.\n   - When two block solutions come in at nearly the same time, build on the\n   one that has the most oBTCDD, rather than the one that came in first.\n\nThe goal of this change is to reduce the profitability of withholding block\nsolutions by severely reducing the chances that a block solved a while ago\ncan orphan one solved recently.  \"Came in first\" seems more easily gamed\nthan \"most oBTCDD\".  As I wrote there, \"*old coins* is always a dwindling\nresource and *global nodes willing to help cheat* is probably a growing\none.\"\n\nI will write a BIP if anyone agrees it's a good idea.\n\nOn Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 12:26 PM, Ivan Brightly via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 2:12 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e Far more concerning is network propagation effects between large and\n\u003e\u003e small miners. For that class of issues, if you are in an environemnt\n\u003e\u003e where selfish mining is possible - a fairly flat, easily DoS/sybil\n\u003e\u003e attacked network topology - the profitability difference between small\n\u003e\u003e and large miners even *without* attacks going on is a hugely worrying\n\u003e\u003e problem. OTOH, if you're blocksize is small enough that propagation time\n\u003e\u003e is negligable to profitability, then selfish mining attacks with \u003c30%\n\u003e\u003e hashing power aren't much of a concern - they'll be naturally defeated\n\u003e\u003e by anti-DoS/anti-sybil measures.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Let's agree that one factor in mining profitability is bandwidth/network\n\u003e reliability/stability. Why focus on that vs electricity contracts or\n\u003e vertically integrated chip manufacturers? Surely, sufficient network\n\u003e bandwidth is a more broadly available commodity than \u003c$0.02/kwh\n\u003e electricity, for example. I'm not sure that your stranded hydroelectric\n\u003e miner is any more desirable than thousands of dorm room miners with access\n\u003e to 10gbit university connections and free electricity.\n\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\n\n-- \nI like to provide some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you need a\ntechie?\nI own Litmocracy \u003chttp://www.litmocracy.com\u003e and Meme Racing\n\u003chttp://www.memeracing.net\u003e (in alpha).\nI'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist \u003chttp://www.voluntaryist.com\u003e which\nnow accepts Bitcoin.\nI also code for The Dollar Vigilante \u003chttp://dollarvigilante.com/\u003e.\n\"He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules\" - Satoshi\nNakamoto\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20151229/654898a2/attachment.html\u003e"}