{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub17ty4mumkv43w8wtt0xsz2jypck0gvw0j8xrcg6tpea25z2nh7meqf4qgyd","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub17ty4mumkv43w8wtt0xsz2jypck0gvw0j8xrcg6tpea25z2nh7meqf4qgyd","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-02-12\n📝 Original message:\u003e\n\u003e You can prove a doublespend instantly by showing two conflicting\n\u003e transactions both signed by thar party. This pair can be distributed as a\n\u003e proof of malice globally in seconds via a push messaging mechanism.\n\u003e\nThere have been lots of e-cash schemes proposed in the academic literature\nthat work like this, or variants of it. Schemes where participants are\nanonymous until they double spend are popular.\n\nLet's re-write your proposal but substituting the word notary for miner:\n\nTo profit, the *miner* would have to be sure the payout from agreeing on\ncollusion (or to perform the doublespend themselves) would pay out better\nthan acting honestly for a given amount of time info the future. This means\ntransactions for small sums are secure.\n\n\nThat's the exact argument we're having. The assertion is that a \"rational\"\nnotary would kill his own business to increase his profits in the next few\nhours. So you're just arguing that a notary is different to a miner,\nwithout spelling out exactly why.\n\nDoes the notary have to make a big up front investment? If so, why is that\ndifferent to mining investment?\n\nIs the notary non-anonymous and afraid of being charged with payment fraud?\nIf so, note that big miners do lots of non-anonymous things too, like\nrenting warehouses and importing specialised equipment.\n\nIs it because of the big up front collateral they're meant to have lying\naround? If so, how do you ensure a fluid market for notaries?\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150212/9ac6414a/attachment.html\u003e"}