{"type":"rich","version":"1.0","author_name":"npub1s4lj77xuzcu7wy04afcr487f0r3za0f8n2775xrpkld2sv639mjqsd44kw","author_url":"https://nostr.ae/npub1s4lj77xuzcu7wy04afcr487f0r3za0f8n2775xrpkld2sv639mjqsd44kw","provider_name":"njump","provider_url":"https://nostr.ae","html":"📅 Original date posted:2015-06-23\n📝 Original message:On Tue, Jun 23, 2015 at 4:46 PM, Peter Todd \u003cpete at petertodd.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Pieter Wuille showed with simulations that miners with bad connectivity\n\u003e are negatively affected by other miners creating larger blocks.\n\u003e\n\n... but the effect is only significant if they have an absurdly\nlow-bandwidth connection and do NOTHING to work around it (like rent a\nserver on the other side of the bandwidth bottleneck and write some code to\nmake sure you're creating blocks that will propagate quickly on both sides\nof the bottleneck).\n\n\nWhy do you think connectivity is a centralizing effect? It is just one\nfactor in the profitability-of-mining equation. A location with bad\nconnectivity (the US, maybe) but 10% cheaper electricity might be just as\ngood as one with great connectivity but more expensive electricity.\n\nHaving lots of variables in the profitability equation is a decentralizing\nforce, it means there is very likely to be several different places in the\nworld / on the net where mining is equally profitable.\n\n\n\u003e ... until transaction fees become significant.  But by the time that\n\u003e \u003e happens, protocol optimizations of block propagation will make the block\n\u003e \u003e size an insignificant term in the \"how profitable is it to mine in THIS\n\u003e \u003e particular place on the Internet / part of the world\" equation.\n\u003e\n\u003e These block propagation improvements are both already implemented (Matt\n\u003e Corallo's relay network, p2pool) and require co-operation.\n\u003e\n\nLong term the p2p protocol will evolve to incorporate those optimizations,\nso will require no co-operation.\n\n\n\n\u003e For instance, notice the recent full-RBF debate where Coinbase said\n\u003e they'd consider getting contracts directly with miners to get\n\u003e transactions they desired mined even when they otherwise would not be\n\u003e due to double-spends. This is one of many scenarios where block\n\u003e propagation improvements fail. Thus for a safety engineering\n\u003e analysis we need to talk about worst-case scenarioss\n\n\n\n\u003e Equally, I don't see any analysis from anyone of that % of non-optimized\n\u003e transactions need to fail for what kind of centralizing pressure.\n\u003e\n\u003e In any case, this ponts to the need for your proposal to explictly talk\n\u003e about what kind of resources are needed by miners for what kind of\n\u003e profitability, including the case where other miners are sabotaging\n\u003e their profitability.\n\u003e\n\nAre you familiar with the terms \"Gish Gallop\" and \"Moving the Goalposts\" ?\n\nI have written quite a lot about the kind of resources needed to run a full\nnode, and have asked you, specifically, several times \"how much do you\nthink is too much\" and received no answer.\n\n-- \n--\nGavin Andresen\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150623/a0f02566/attachment.html\u003e"}